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ABSTRACT. 
Since its publication in 1 990, many governments throughout the world have used 
Michael Porter's Industrial Cluster Theory (ICT) as a tool in national and regional 
economic development. Australian federal and state governments are no exception, 
and in the last decade, there have been numerous attempts to improve Australia's 
economic development with implementations ofiCT. Most of these efforts have been 
of limited success, with Australia 's record at developing industrial clusters well below 
the OECD average. One of the major reasons for this has been difficulty in using 
Porter' s theory, and in particular his ideas concerning the role of government, in 
industrial cluster development. 
This observed difficulty provides the research opportunity for this thesis. This study 
focuses on the role that the Tasmanian state govemment played in the development of 
one of Australia's most successful industrial clusters, the Tasmanian Light 
Shipbuilding Industry (TLSI) cluster. The study was conducted as a longitudinal 
embedded single case study, and included interviews with 25 key informants. S ix of 
these were cunent heads of Tasmanian government departments (including the TLSI 
cluster's training faci lities); five were ex-state premi ers spanning the TLS I  cluster's 
history ( 1 977-1 998); one was the current state premier ( 1 998 -present);  three were 
senior bureaucrats that had served the state parliament from 1 977- 1 998; one was an 
incumbent federal Member of the House of Representatives for Tasmania that has 
served since 1 977;  and finally, the nine founding managers of the TLSI cluster's 
private sector firms (all of whom were still in charge of their organisation in 2002). 
lV 
In order to address the research opportunity, t1 1s thesis answers two research 
questtons. The first research question was: What role did the Tasmanim1 Government 
play in the development of the TLSI cluster since its inception in 1 977? The answers 
to tl11s question found a distinct set of government roles that proved benefi cial to the 
TLSI cluster's over its life cycle. The roles that the Tasmanian government had to 
play were changeable over this life cycle, and ranged from an initially non-committal 
stance towards the industry, to one that was heavily involved in its infrastructure 
requirements. The study also found that the role of chance events in Porter's ICT 
deserved considerably more prominence than the theory suggested. 
The second research question was: How did the change in the importance ofthe TLSI 
cluster to the Tasmanian economy over time impact upon the Tasmanian 
govemment's  policy development process? The answers to this research question 
indicated that the relative importance of the TLSI cluster to the Tasmanian economy 
influenced the degree of govemment interaction with and development of the industry 
cluster. In particular, the research indicates how the Tasmanian government' s policy 
choices were related to the perceived needs and political power of the T LSI cluster 
finns (particularly that of the hub-finn International Catamarans). The degree of 
social responsibility felt, separately, by International Catamarans and the Tasmanian 
government was found to be significant in the mix of factors affecting policy and 
progress. 
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CHAPTER ONE. 
RATIONALE AND INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS. 
1.1 OBJECTIVE OF THE CHAPTER. 
The objective of this chapter is to introduce this thesis. The chapter commences with 
a discussion of the rationale for this thesis. Next, the broad research opportunity is 
noted and briefly discussed. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the structure 
of the thesis. 
1.2 RATIONALE FOR THE THESIS. 
Since the 1970s, the onrush of globalisation in Australia's markets has presented 
significant economic policy challenges to the country's federal and state governments 
(Everett, 2002; Goldfinch, 1999). A major concern for Australian legislators was 
(and remains) the question as to how to make a nation previously protected by a 
'fortress' of tariffs and subsidies more productive and competitive in world markets 
(Brown, 2000; Edwards, 2002; Martin, 2000). One theoretical framework that 
achieved prominence in Australian economic policy development in the 1990s, 
largely due to its intuitive appeal and apparent value in increasing the wealth and 
competitive advantage of nations, was Porter's (1990) Industrial Cluster Theory (ICT) 
(Boddy, 2000). As part of his book The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Porter 
argued that for a modem economy to advance within a globalised marketplace, it 
needed to foster innovative industries able to compete successfully on an international 
scale. In order to best achieve this, Porter argued governments needed to recognise 
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and facilitate the growth of innovative industry clusters, particularly those enjoying 
some level of local advantage that could not be readily imitated elsewhere. In 
Australia, this belief was expressed in the federal government's manufacturing 
reports, which introduced Porter's notion of industrial cluster development into 
government policy by proposing the development of regional industry partnerships 
that strengthened networks, encouraged innovation, and the inter-firm transfer of 
technology (Australian Manufacturing Council, 1994; Bureau of Industry Economics, 
1991). 
Further to this, in 1993, a federal government investigation into the requirements of a 
sustainable economic development strategy for the nation highlighted the need for 
Australia's regional economies to similarly optimise their economic productivity by 
developing their localised advantages (Keating, 1994; Kelty, 1993). This was 
followed by the McKinsey Report 'Lead Local, Compete Global' (McKinsey & 
Company, 1994) which was the first report to suggest that the industrial clustering 
concept was an appropriate basis upon which to develop Australia's regional 
economies to internationally competitive standards. Given the level of investigation 
and documentation undertaken, it is apparent that successive Australian governments 
believed the conditions leading to the formation of internationally competitive 
'wealth-generating' industry clusters (such as the internationally renown 'Silicon 
Valley' in the United States) could be replicated to help foster the inception and 
growth of new Australian industries, and to re-engineer older ones to world standards 
(lvarsson, 1999). 
2 
1.2.1 Industrial cluster development: The Australian experience. 
Despite the widespread adoption of industrial cluster policy by federal and state 
governments over the past decade, Australia remains significantly below the OECD 
average in terms of its industrial clusters' economic contributions to real wealth 
creation (Brown, 2000; OECD, 1998a; Porter, 2002, cited in James, 2002). One of the 
major reasons cited for this relatively poor performance has been the observed 
difficulty in mobilising the tenets of Porter's ICT as an effective framework for 
industrial cluster policy development in Australia (Brown 2000; Enright & Roberts, 
2001). Indeed, Brown (2000) suggests Australia's poor performance is almost 
entirely predicated on the inability of its legislators to conceptualise their role within 
Porter's ICT framework. Brown's (2000:13) comment that Australian governments 
have displayed a "very confused role" in their industrial cluster policy development 
was echoed by Porter in 2002, when he stated: "Australia does not have a strategy for 
competing in the global economy, and is not doing what is necessary to get one" (in 
James, 2002: 13). 
The issues associated with the Australian expenence at industrial cluster 
development, however, are not unique in the literature. Since the inception of Porter's 
ICT paradigm, there has been considerable literary debate concerning the theory's 
ability to provide a practical framework for government in its efforts to develop 
internationally competitive industrial clusters (see for example, Baptista, 1996; 
Boddy, 2000; Gordon & McCann, 2000; Lyons, 1995; Schweke, 1995; Wejland, 
1999; Yla-Anttila, 1994). Much of the literary debate has resulted in either the 
dismissal of Porter's ICT as a useful framework for policy development (for example, 
see Y etton, Craig, Davis & Hilmer, 1992), or have merely introduced a collection of 
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generalised 'macro-economic' roles for government to play, without offering a 
definitive set of guidelines for practitioners to use in their development of regionally-
based industrial clusters (Lyons, 1995; Markusen, 1996; Peters & Hood, 2000). 
What is lacking in the literature, and therefore the research opportunity for this thesis 
is the provision of a clearly defined 'role of government' within Porter's ICT. In 
terms of advancing Porter's ICT to incorporate a definitive 'role of government' in a 
regional Australian economy, Porter himself notes: 
.. .in Australia, what is less understood is that the government has some positive roles, 
like innovation and training, infrastructure, and things like that. I think that the real 
frontier is [understanding] the positive roles to be played by government whilst 
avoiding the distortion or intervention in competition (in Trinca, 2002:39). 
1.2.2 Industrial cluster development: Investigating the role of an Australian state 
government. 
In order to understand the positive role that an Australian government can play in the 
industrial clustering process, this thesis will undertake an examination of the 25-year 
history of one of Australia's most successful industry clusters, that of the Tasmanian 
Light Ship Industry (TLSI) cluster (Industry Audit, 1998). In 2002, the TLSI cluster 
comprised eleven entities - International Catamarans (a producer of fast-ferry 
catamarans); Colbeck & Gunton (a producer of maritime fire protection equipment); 
APCO Engineering (a maritime 'cast and machined component' manufacturer); 
Lifera:ft Systems (a producer of maritime safety equipment); Riley Industrial & 
Marine Sales (a marine hydraulics manufacturer); Richardson Devine Marine (a 
producer of aluminium pleasure-craft); Muir Engineering (a producer of winches and 
associated maritime machinery); FC Management (a mono-hull passenger ferry 
manufacturer); North West Bay Ships (a producer of a diverse range of aluminium 
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passenger ferries); the Australian Maritime College; and the TAPE Aluminium 
Welding School (Industry Audit, 1998). 
The value of the TLSI cluster to the regional Tasmanian economy is beyond question. 
Since its inception in 1977, the TLSI cluster has grown substantially in terms of both 
its sales volume and innovative output (Industry Audit, 1998). At its peak in 1996, 
the TLSI cluster alone generated an annual turnover of AUD$400 million in export 
earnings for the Tasmanian economy (23 percent of the state's merchandise exports), 
and directly and indirectly employed approximately 2 500 people (Industry Audit, 
1998). The TLSI cluster also boasts the world's leading manufacturer of high-speed 
aluminium ferries, International Catamarans, which at the peak of the industrial 
cluster's output, managed to capture 40 percent of the world's passenger ferry market, 
simultaneously earning the status of being the regional economy's largest private 
sector employer (Wickham & Hanson, 2002). 
Given its demonstrable importance to the Tasmanian economy, an examination of the 
TLSI cluster's history provides an opportunity to determine the set of Tasmanian 
government's policy initiatives that were most effective in developing a highly 
successful industrial cluster in a regional Australian economy. The TLSI cluster case 
is also useful because it highlights the factors Porter emphasises in his original theory 
of national competitive advantage, namely the role that 'chance events' play m 
industrial cluster development, and the notion that governments are required to 
support a region's economic development. 
5 
1.3 BROAD RESEARCH OPPORTUNITY. 
In line with the preceding discussion, the central research question for investigation in 
this study is: 
What is the government's role in the facilitation and development of an 
internationally competitive industrial cluster in a regional Australian economy? 
This broad research question is designed to identify the roles (i.e. policy initiatives) 
that were undertaken by the Tasmanian government in the facilitation of the state's 
light shipbuilding industry cluster between 1977 and 2002. More specifically, this 
broad research question intends to explore how the Tasmanian government supported 
and advanced the key economic factors identified by Porter that led to the growth of 
the TLSI cluster, and the manner in which chance events amplified the relative 
importance of these economic factors. In keeping with the necessarily longitudinal 
nature of this research, changes in the Tasmanian government's policy over time will 
also be explored in order to ascertain the beneficial policy initiatives over the 25 year 
period, and perhaps more importantly, in terms of the TLSI cluster's stage of 
development. The identification of the Tasmanian government's role could prove 
useful for any Australian state government in its determination of what agencies to 
establish, resources to expend, and what competencies to employ in future efforts to 
facilitate internationally competitive industrial cluster development (Edwards, 2002). 
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1.4 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS. 
This thesis proceeds in nine chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 
Two provides an overview of the history of the industrial clustering concept, focusing 
on the nature and theoretical development of the government's role in industrial 
cluster development. The literature review, which incorporates research current to 
March 2002, will culminate in the generation of the specific research questions to be 
analysed in this case. Leading on from this, Chapter Three outlines the case method 
used to gather the necessary data required to answer the specific research questions 
posed in Chapter Two. In total, the eleven entities that collectively represent the TLSI 
cluster were studied, along with interviews with five ex-state premiers, the incumbent 
state premier, three ex-state government department heads directly involved with state 
development, three current government department heads; one federal member of 
Parliament; and two ex-government economic advisors. The research is therefore 
based on the analysis of 25 semi-structured interviews dealing with those individuals 
most closely associated with the development of the TLSI cluster over the past 25 
years. 
Chapter Four provides two historical accounts of shipbuilding in Australia. The first 
is an overview of Australia's history as a shipbuilding nation, and provides the 
context within which the TLSI cluster was to develop. The second account details the 
specific development of the TLSI cluster since the foundation of the industry's 
flagship, International Catamarans, in 1977. The historical accounts are based on 
both primary and secondary data sources, and serve as the basis for the interview 
questions posed to the key informants, and the basis upon which the research 
questions will be analysed. 
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Chapters Five through Eight provide an analysis of the case data in terms of the 
Tasmanian government's role in the development of the TLSI cluster over its 
industrial life cycle. Chapter Five introduces Porter's Diamond Factor model (a 
framework within which government has a key supporting role), as it existed in 
relation to the Tasmanian shipbuilding industry in 1977. Chapter Six then discusses 
the Tasmanian government's role during the introduction stage of the TLSI cluster's 
life cycle (1977-1984); Chapter Seven the 'growth stage' (1984-1998); and, Chapter 
Eight the 'maturity stage' (1998-2002). Drawing on the case, and using the computer 
software package NUD*IST (version six), the common themes emerging from the 
interviews are identified and triangulated between respondents. Chapter Nine 
provides a discussion of the key findings of the thesis. Based on the analysis of the 
case data, an adaptation of Porter's Diamond Factor model is proposed to reflect the 
Australian context. The adapted Diamond Factor model is accompanied by a 
discussion of the theoretical implications of using Porter's ICT as an effective policy 
development framework for governments in regional Australian economies. 
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CHAPTER TWO. 
INDUSTRIAL CLUSTER THEORY: 
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN INDUSTRIAL CLUSTER 
DEVELOPMENT. 
2.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE CHAPTER. 
The objectives of this chapter are four-fold. Firstly, it provides an account of the 
theoretical development of the industrial cluster concept, and the chapter briefly 
outlines the history of ICT since its inception in 1890. Secondly, the chapter 
discusses how the globalisation phenomenon, and the subsequent introduction of 
Porter's (1990) ICT, fundamentally altered the nature of the industrial clustering 
concept to embrace government as a key influencer of industrial cluster success. 
Thirdly, it provides an overview of Porter's ICT, and discusses the theoretical 
development of the government's role in developing internationally competitive 
industrial clusters. Finally, as an integration of these theoretical developments, the 
chapter presents the specific research questions addressed in this thesis. 
2.2. INDUSTRIAL CLUSTER THEORY- A BRIEF HISTORY. 
Although Porter's ICT was well received by academics and practitioners alike at the 
time of its publication, largely due to its apparent value in wealth generation through 
the development of a nation's competitive advantages, it was not an entirely new 
theoretical concept. As far back as Marshall's Industrial District Theory (1890; 1916; 
1920), Weber's Industrial Location Theory (1909; 1929), and Schumpeter's 
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Economic Development Theory (1934), theorists have recognised the tendency for 
complementary firms to position themselves in close geographical proximity 
(Marshall, 1920; Schumpeter, 1934; Weber, 1929). Three principles were common 
within classical industrial cluster theories. The first was the assumption of perfect 
competition and information transfer within the marketplace. The second was that 
clustered firms tended to locate their operations in particular geographic regions of 
their home county in order to gain efficient access to labour (amongst other 
specialised inputs), and to facilitate the sharing of knowledge vital to the industry's 
innovation process (Birkinshaw, 2000; Peters & Hood, 2000; Walcott, 1999). The 
third principle was the notable exception of any substantial reference to the 
government and its influence as a provider of the economic systems and infrastructure 
capable of supporting the growth of industrial clusters (McLean, 1996). 
In particular, Marshall's (1890; 1920) Industrial District Theory explained that the 
industrial clustering process is based on a firm's self-interested strategy to minimise 
the distance between its manufacturing operations, the resources it required for 
production, and the markets it sought to serve. Similarly, Weber's (1929) Industrial 
Location Theory argued that manufacturing firms would locate their operations in 
regions that possessed the necessary raw materials for production as well as access to 
profitable markets. The external economies of scale generated by the clustering firms 
was considered incidental to the firms' legitimate, self-interested operations, and not 
from government provision of economic infrastructure (Morgan, Brooksbank & 
Connolly, 2000). Schumpeter's (1934) Economic Development Theory focused on 
the advantages associated with sharing of tacit knowledge between the clustered but 
otherwise self-interested firms. In particular, Schumpeter (1934) identified how the 
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innovative skills derived from the cooperative process become fundamental in the 
creation of wealth in the capitalist economic system. Schumpeter (1934) posited that 
wealth creation was based on the firm's ability to produce innovative consumer 
goods, develop new methods of production, and to create new consumer markets; 
tasks that were to be performed by the firm, and without reference to the 
government's provision of the necessary economic or infrastructural support. 
Despite the absence of a role for government in the classical industrial clustering 
literature, Marshall (1890; 1920), Weber (1929), and Shumpeter's (1934) perspectives 
remained well accepted academically, receiving only marginal adaptation during the 
period leading up to the 'globalisation phenomenon' of the 1970s (for example, see 
Martin, 1966; Myrdal, 1957; Wise 1949; Wood, 1969). The majority of these 
adaptations were merely definitional in nature and directed at better defining the 
industrial cluster typologies that were found to exist in different industrial contexts 
(Aydalot, 1986; Birkinshaw & Hood, 2000; Piore & Sabel, 1984). 
2.2.1 Industrial cluster theory and the advent of the globalisation phenomenon. 
The onrush of globalisation since the 1970s (see Rischard, 2002; Waters, 1995), 
however, flagged the potential end of the economic advantages that firms could derive 
from the classical industrial clustering process (Fujita & Hill, 1998; Krugman, 1991; 
Nelson, 1993; Peters & Hood, 2000; Raco, 1999). Given advances in communication 
and transport technologies, the lowering of trading barriers between nations, and the 
availability of cheaper labour (and other production inputs) in foreign markets, the 
efficiencies and economic advantages of industrial clustering in a firm's home 
country appeared at best diminished, and at worst, obsolete (Gourevitch, Bohn, & 
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McKendrick 2000; Hill, 2001 ). Given the commercial implications of the 
globalisation phenomenon, there was expectation that firms located within relatively 
high-cost regions, such as Australia and the US, would forgo the industrial cluster 
advantages established in their home country and locate their operations in regions 
that presented significant cost advantages, such as Asia and Eastern Europe 
(Audretsch, 1998). Indeed, during the 1980s, the focus of industrial location literature 
shifted towards an application to international business, and in particular how the firm 
could maximise return by investing its manufacturing resources in foreign markets 
(Aharoni, 1996; Cavusgil, 1991; Dunning, 1995). 
2.2.2 The Global Paradox and Porter's competitive advantage of nations. 
One of the most striking inconsistencies to emerge in the literature, however, was the 
observed 'global paradox' that developed between the disciplines of strategic 
management and economic development (Audretsch, 1998; Merriden, 1998; Naisbitt 
1994). Where strategic management theory emphasised the benefits of relocating 
firm operations to access the cost-saving advantages available internationally (e.g. 
comparatively lower wages and less stringent legal requirements), the economic 
development literature increasingly reported instances of firms establishing their 
competitive advantage by locating their operations in particular regions of their home 
country (Enright, 2000; Merriden, 1998). Just as the classical ICTs were unable to 
predict the onrush of globalisation that was to occur in the 1970s, they were similarly 
unable to account for the observed global paradox of firm behaviour in a globalised 
economy (McLean, 1996). 
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The inability of the classical ICTs to explain the observed firm behaviours of the 
1980s culminated in the publication of Porter's (1990) work The Competitive 
Advantage of Nations, a text largely predicated upon the conceptualisation and 
resolution of the global paradox. In his book, Porter develops the notion of industrial 
clusters as part of a framework known as the Diamond Factor model of national 
competitive advantage; a conceptualisation of the interrelated economic factors that 
explain the competitive success of particular national industries in globalised markets. 
Porter's ICT argues that a nation's industry will be internationally competitive if a 
synergistic interrelationship exists between four important Diamond Factor variables: 
'factor conditions'; 'local demand conditions'; 'related and supporting industries'; 
'firm strategy, structure and rivalry'; and the two influencing roles of chance events 
and government. The tenets of Porter's ICT, and the role of government within it, are 
discussed in the following section. 
2.2.2.1 Porter's JCT: Factor conditions. 
Factor conditions refer to any primary inputs required by the firm, that is, the basic 
factors of production such as land, labour and capital, human resources, and 
infrastructure, which are necessary conditions to compete in an industry (Porter, 
1990). Porter distinguishes between a hierarchy of factor inputs, ranging from 'basic 
and generalised' factor inputs to 'advanced and specialised' factor inputs. Basic 
factors include items such as natural resources, climate, location and unskilled or 
semi-skilled labour. Advanced factors include infrastructure, education systems and 
university research institutes. The question as to whether a factor input is considered 
'generalised' as opposed to 'specialised' depends upon its use within the economy. A 
factor is considered generalised if it can be deployed throughout a wide range of 
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industries, for example a nation's highway system is regarded as an advanced­
generalised factor. A factor input is considered 'specialised' if it can only be used in 
a limited number of industries, for example narrowly skilled personnel, and 
infrastructure with specific properties such as a biotechnology research institute. 
The distinct mix of factor conditions possessed by an individual nation help to define 
the industries in which it will be most internationally competitive (Porter, 1990). 
Theoretically then, a nation will be more likely to generate internationally competitive 
industries when it possesses an abundance of raw materials that is not similarly 
possessed elsewhere. For example, the world diamond market is dominated by South 
African firms due to the natural deposits of diamonds that exist in that country. 
However, in modern western economies, the forces of globalisation has meant that a 
firm's competitive advantage is largely derived through advanced-specialised factors 
of production, such as information and knowledge management, technology, and 
human capital development (Porter, 1990; 1998a). In western economies therefore, 
the role of factor inputs in generating a nation's competitive advantage are rather 
more reliant upon national investment and the establishment of relationship networks 
between firms and government (Porter, 1990). Given that these factors are of key 
importance to modern economic development, and are prone to obsolescence, they 
require continuous upgrading and investment, otherwise firms risk losing the potential 
of these factors to create a competitive advantage (Clark & Guy, 1998; Yla-Anttila, 
1994). 
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2.2.2.2 Porter's ICT: Demand conditions. 
The second diamond factor, the nation's 'demand conditions', can influence the 
development of an internationally competitive national industry by ensuring that 
clustered firms focus on differentiated (and increasingly sophisticated) consumer 
preferences (Porter, 1990). Sophisticated and discerning consumers are considered 
particularly important, as they drive the need for quality and high standards of 
innovation that, in turn, may lead to enhanced market competitiveness. The nation's 
public sector has an equally important role to play, both as a demanding customer 
itself, and an establisher of rigid standards concerning a firm's safety, its product 
quality, and its environmental impact (Porter, 1990). It is an assumption of the 
Diamond Factor model that only those products performing well in domestic markets 
characterised by relatively advanced and sophisticated demand, are able to provide a 
national industry with a competitive advantage internationally. 
2.2.2.3 Porter's ICT· Related and supporting industries. 
The third diamond factor, the nation's 'related and supporting industries', refers to 
those industries within an economy that share common technologies, factor inputs, 
distribution channels, customers, activities and/or provide products that are 
complementary in nature to that of the clustering firms (Porter, 1990). Linkages 
between industries constitute the nexus around which Porter's notion of industrial 
clusters are formed. Subsequent research indicates that most successful companies in 
western economies have extensive linkages with other industries, allowing them to 
improve their international competitiveness (Yla-Anttila, 1994). The more effective 
the related and supporting industries are in an economy, the greater the value of the 
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technologies, ideas and human capital development that may ensue within that 
economy, with industries better able to benefit from these external economies of scale 
(Porter, 1990). 
2.2.2.4 Porter's ICT· Firm strategy, structure and rivalry. 
The fourth diamond factor, 'firm strategy, structure and rivalry' not only fosters the 
growth of national industries, but also serves as an impetus for increased 
competitiveness as they create pressure for firms to improve their local 
competitiveness and innovativeness (Porter, 1990). According to Porter's ICT, 
rigorous domestic competition helps ensure a precondition for success in international 
markets, because it forces firms to innovate and prevents them from relying merely on 
an abundance of natural resources or protection via government intervention policies. 
The pattern of strategy, structure, and rivalry among firms varies greatly between 
nations due to cultural differences in business relationships, raw material availability, 
and type of government intervention (Porter, 1990). In Japan, for example, 
cooperative and competitive systems have facilitated the cross-functional 
management of complex assembly operations. In the United States, competition 
among computer manufacturers and software producers has resulted in the 
development and international dominance of these industries (Davies, 2001; Porter, 
1998b). 
Of the four diamond factors, Porter argues that the 'intensity of domestic rivalry' and 
the nature of its 'related and supporting industries' in particular, are considered of 
utmost importance in the development of internationally competitive national industry 
clusters, and therefore able to generate real economic growth. Porter argued that a 
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nation would be particularly competitive in industries where a set of related and 
supporting industries are clustered geographically, allowing their interactions to be 
more complementary and far more dynamic than they might be otherwise. 
Simultaneously, the intensity of the domestic rivalry between firms promotes the 
upgrading of the entire industrial cluster system, while geographical concentration 
increases the intensity of interactions within that system (Baptista, 1996). An 
industrial cluster of firms drawing on common specialised inputs and infrastructure 
should upgrade local factor quality and increase its supply. In a similar fashion, 
geographical concentration should also have positive effects on the composition and 
size of local demand, and on the existence and development of related and supporting 
industries, particularly specialised suppliers and users. Geographical concentration is 
of foremost importance for organisational improvement and technological innovation. 
Universities and other research centres, customers and suppliers in close proximity are 
best placed to exchange ideas and co-operate in industry research. As such, Porter's 
notion of industrial clusters are often characterised as agglomerations of 
interdependent firms that together are able to achieve wealth-creating synergies 
throughout their operations. 
2.2.3 Porter's ICT: The introduction of 'chance events ' and 'government'. 
According to Porter, chance events refer to any occurrences that are outside the 
control of the firm or government, for example war, embargoes, and technological 
discontinuities that play a major role in the creation or destruction of industrial 
clusters within a national context. Chance events can lead to chains of occurrences 
that trigger the growth of an industry cluster, for example, the partial destruction of 
Tasmania's Tasman Bridge in 1975 resulted in the rapid growth of a marine 
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transportation industry. Alternatively, chance events in the form of technological 
discontinuities may cause the destruction of industries that remain dependent on 
'obsolete technologies'. 
Porter argues that the role of government is of equal importance as 'chance events' in 
the development and maintenance of an economy's industrial clusters. Porter 
contends that the government's actions and policy directions have a direct and/or 
indirect influence on the development of Porter's Diamond factors that are considered 
central to the industrial cluster development process. According to Porter, 
governments are able, and therefore required, to undertake steps to create the 
economic conditions required that accommodate the development of their economy's 
potential industrial clusters. 
Porter further notes, however, that government policy formation may indeed be 
entirely inappropriate, particularly if it provides only subsidies or other protectionist 
policies to industry cluster entities. Porter states that such government policy will 
(most likely) result in the establishment of inefficiencies within an industry, which 
will ultimately cause its competitive decline (Porter, 1990). Although the 
government's role in policy development may be pivotal to the success of establishing 
and nurturing industrial clusters, its actions may also negatively affect an industrial 
cluster's growth and long-term ability to generate wealth (Porter, 1990). Figure 2.1 
(over page) depicts Porter's Diamond Factor Model. 
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Figure 2.1: Porter's (1990) original Diamond Factor model. 
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Adapted from Porter's (1990) The Competitive Advantage of Nations. 
In order to explain how nations have managed to develop their existing set of 
industrial clusters, Porter includes the notions of 'historical dependence', and 'stage 
of national competitive development' into the theory. Historical dependencies refer to 
those events or patterns of activity that recur in a given region due to their relative 
importance to the local population. These help the local population to develop a 
particular expertise, i.e. in terms of Porter's ICT, a comparatively advanced level of 
specialised human capital within their community. Porter cites Italy's world leading 
ski boot industry as an exemplar, an industry that grew out of the nation's historical 
requirement for the high quality climbing and hiking shoes needed to traverse the 
mountainous northeastern region of the country. Porter (1990) indicates that, due to 
the importance of historical dependence in the social capital development of a region, 
an effective role for government would be to concentrate its policy initiatives on those 
industries in which the region has some significant historical dependence. 
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Porter's notion of a 'stage of national competitive development' consists of four 
discrete phases that influence the generic role that government has to play in the 
development of industrial clusters. The four phases are referred to as the factor­
driven development phase, the investment-driven development phase, the innovation­
driven development phase, and the wealth-driven development phase. At the factor­
driven phase of development, nations draw their competitive advantage almost 
entirely from basic factors of production such as agriculture or minerals. There are 
few technological innovations created locally. Domestic firms predominantly use 
imported technology (usually through licensing and/or joint ventures), and there is 
some presence of foreign direct investment. Most developing countries are operating 
within this stage, as are the centrally planned economies. Interestingly, Australia (and 
therefore Tasmania) has also been classified as being at the factor-driven stage of 
economic development (Chen, 1995). 
At the investment-driven phase of development, industries are already in a position to 
compete on world markets in standardised products. They are able to apply acquired 
foreign technology and improve on it. Domestic innovation however, is limited to 
process and product adaptation. Due to the development of social and physical 
infrastructure advanced factors begin to play an increasingly important role, while 
basic factor conditions are still a source of competitive advantage. Thus, labour costs 
remain low despite an increasingly skilled workforce and production remains 
concentrated in relatively labour-intensive industries that do not require a full 
'diamond' to be competitive. Demand conditions are unsophisticated but developing, 
and tend to be geared towards quantity rather than quality. There is intense domestic 
rivalry, although related and supporting industries are still in the development stage. 
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There is a strong government influence to encourage investments and exports 
acquisition of foreign technology, selective protection and upgrading of factor 
conditions. Foreign direct investment by countries at a higher stage of development is 
prevalent during this phase. 
At the innovation-driven phase of development, the economy not only appropriates 
and improves technology from foreign locations, but also manages to create its own 
(Porter, 1990). Firms in these economies compete not on factor cost advantages, but 
rather on productivity and innovation. Governments during this phase are responsible 
for providing regulatory framework as well as encouraging the creation of more 
advanced factors of production. A vertical development (or 'deepening') of industrial 
clusters occurs at this stage of development (Porter, 1990). For example, a nation 
with a competitive advantage in video equipment manufacture may develop a similar 
competitive advantage in related industries such as videotape and audio equipment. 
This vertical industrial cluster development is often indicative of a nation having 
achieved moderate level of innovative capacity. A horizontal (or 'widening') of 
industrial clusters also occurs, as new 'related and supporting' clusters are created. 
At the wealth-driven phase of development, clustered firms begin to lose the 
economies of scope advantages as inter-industry rivalry reduces and large firms begin 
to influence government policy (Porter, 1990). Once the advantages of the industrial 
clustering process are diminished (particularly in high productivity industries) a de­
clustering process results. During this stage, firms begin to compete on price, and 
combined with falling rates of productivity leads directly to falling wages, rising 
unemployment and a decline in demand conditions. Only those industries associated 
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with high-income consumption, as well as those that derive their competitive 
advantage from the natural advantages inherent to the region remain internationally 
competitive (Porter, 1990). According to Chen (1995), Australia's economy is 
characterised by activity closely associated with the factor-driven stage of 
development. Under the tenets of Porter's ICT, it is at this stage that the 
government's role is required to be at its most direct in influencing the Diamond 
factors such that they support the development of the nations internationally 
competitive industrial clusters. 
2.3 THE THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PORTER'S ICT. 
Driven by the propensity of national and regional governments to adopt Porter's ICT 
as part of their economic policy reforms, numerous researchers have undertaken 
empirical investigations into the theory to better define the nature and benefits of 
industrial clustering (see Audretsch, 1998; Lyons, 1995; Markusen, 1996; Yla-Anttila, 
1994). A review of the literature indicates that researchers have attempted to develop 
Porter's ICT in four main areas in order to make it more amenable for use as a policy 
making framework. The four areas, each discussed in the next section, refer to the 
practical implications of using Porter's ICT as a policy framework for regional 
economic development; the reasons why government implementation of Porter's ICT 
as a policy framework have tended to fail; the need for government to identify the 
discrete industrial cluster typologies that exist in their economy; and the need for 
policy makers to understand the policy implications associated with the life cycle 
requirements of an economy's set of industrial clusters. 
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2.3.1 The theoretical development of Porter's ICT: 
The role of regional government in economic policy development. 
As noted, conventional wisdom predicted that the globalisation phenomenon would 
lead to the demise of the economic region as a meaningful nnit of economic analysis 
(Merriden, 1998; Raco, 1999). Yet the observations of Porter, and the obsession of 
policy-makers aronnd the globe to create the next Silicon Valley, revealed the 
increased importance of geographic proximity and regional agglomerations to 
economic policy development (Audretsch, 1998; Digiovanna, 1996). There is now a 
considerable body of work arguing for the development of industrial clusters, given 
their link to the process of innovation and economic dynamism (Boddy, 2000; 
Dicken, 2001; Gordon & McCann, 2000; Hodgetts, 1993; Maillat, 1998; Yla-Anttila, 
1994). For example, at the national level, major economic-policy reviews employing 
the industrial cluster framework have been nndertaken by governments in leading 
advanced economies including Germany, and the U.S., in small advanced economies 
such as Switzerland and Denmark, in economies in transition such as Bulgaria, and 
South Africa; and in various developing economies such as Portugal, Morocco, and 
Venezuela. Furthermore, a number of regional bodies (for example, in Arizona, 
California, Quebec, Scotland, etc.) and public authorities in U.S. cities have embraced 
the approach as a new way to think about the economic activity within their 
jurisdiction and how to organise related economic-development efforts. 
In addition, Enright ( 1999, in Raff & Lamoreux, 1999) noted the growing interest of 
multi-lateral organisations, such as the World Bank, UNIDO, the OECD, and the 
European Union, which now use the approach as a framework for regional and local 
economic development. Increasingly, this framework has been drawn upon in a 
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policy-creation context, with the a1m of emulating high-growth and innovative 
localities (known in Australia as 'Technological Precincts'). Authors such as Davies 
(2001), Enright and Roberts (200 1), Peters and Hood (2001), and Porter (1998a) have 
each noted and detailed the growing interest of policymakers in the industrial cluster 
approach to regional economic development. 
Part ofthe intellectual appeal to this large and diverse group of policy interests lies in 
the global paradox which Porter's  ICT seems to resolve, namely, why localised 
advantages will continue to matter in a globalising world economy. Digiovanna 
(1996), for example, suggests that regional governments have had to undertake some 
tough policy choices, given the unstable nature of the modem global economy. On 
the one hand, increasing international competition is subjecting regional economies to 
more and more of the 'harsh realities' of global capitalism. On the other hand, the 
reality of growing national budgets and trade deficits, and increasingly unregulated 
multinational corporations, means that national governments, the traditional agents in 
encouraging and directing regional development, increasingly lack both the resources 
and ability to protect or nurture their regional economies. In addition, the 
abandonment of some regions by national governments' policy direction has required 
regional governments to act internationally and choose from among alterative 
development strategies with greater freedom and independence. In this way, many 
regional governments have started to view themselves as somewhat autonomous of 
the nation in which they are located (Enright 1999, in Raff & Lamoreux, 1999). 
24 
Davies (200 1)  attempts to link industrial clustering and economic policy development 
by advancing the notion of collective efficiency, defined as the competitive advantage 
derived from the external economies arising from joint firm action. Collective 
efficiency enables small-scale industry to grow through innovation, specialisation and 
differentiation. The literature on innovation suggests that informal, unplanned, face­
to-face, oral communication is critical to the innovation process (see Fidler & 
Johnson, 1984; Marceau & Basri, 200 1 ;  Saxberg, 2003). It is this type of 
communication in which geographic concentration provides a distinct advantage, even 
in the age of rapid communication and advanced information systems. The 
geographic concentrations of firms, suppliers, and buyers found in many industrial 
clusters provide short feedback loops for ideas and innovations (Enright & Roberts, 
2001). 
Recent work has highlighted the importance of regional industrial clustering to the 
economic development process (Bradshaw, King & Wahlstrom, 1999; Coe, 200 1;  
Enright & Roberts, 2001 ;  Porter, 200la, 2001b). Historical investigation suggests 
that economies tend to develop through the emergence of regional industrial clusters. 
In many economies, an industry emerges, perhaps around some particular natural 
resource, market need, or local skill (Coe, 2001 ;  Enright & Roberts, 2001). As the 
industry develops, new firms in the industry are founded and eventually suppliers 
emerge to provide inputs and services. New industries and skill bases are formed 
through information spill overs and the transfer of knowledge between industrial 
cluster participants. 'Downstream' industries also develop that take advantage of 
supplies, inputs, and infrastructure. This is not to say that the regional industrial 
clustering phenomenon is present in all industries or even most industries, but that it 
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is an important part of the modem western economic landscape (Enright & Roberts, 
200 1).  As the comparative advantage enjoyed by western economies has become 
increasingly based on the management of knowledge and innovation, public policy 
towards business has responded in two fundamental ways. 
The first has been a shift away from a 'traditional triad' of policy instruments that 
essentially constrained the freedom of firms to contract, namely the use of 
government regulation, the enforcement of competition policy, and the public 
ownership of business. This shift away from traditional policy was reflected by the 
onrush of deregulation and privatisation, along with the decreased emphasis of 
competition policy throughout the OECD nations during the 1990s. In its place, a 
new policy approach emerged that focused on enabling the creation and 
commercialisation of knowledge (Audretsch, 1998). The second fundamental shift 
involves the locus of these policies, which have increasingly been implemented at the 
state and regional level. During the 1990s, there has been the emergence of a broad 
spectrum of enabling policy initiatives that have fallen outside the traditional 
governmental regulatory agencies. Sternberg (1996) documents how the success of a 
number of different high-technology industrial clusters has been the direct result of 
enabling policies, such as the provision of venture capital and research support grants 
(for examples, see Feller, 1997; Sternberg, 1996). In Australia, the introduction of 
Porter's  ICT was met with almost immediate acceptance by state governments as a 
framework for their regional economic policy development (Australian 
Manufacturing Council, 1994; Bureau of Industry Economics, 1991 ). As discussed in 
the following section, Australia's experience at implementing Porter' s  ICT as a policy 
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framework for industrial cluster development has resulted in well below average 
performance relative to other OECD efforts. 
2.3.2 The theoretical development of Porter's ICT: 
Industrial cluster development and government policy failure in Australia. 
The history of regional economic development in Australia is characterised by the use 
of fads (Doeringer & Terkla, 1996, in Staber, Schaefer & Sharma, 1996). In the 
1960s, mature 'smokestack' industries were the focus of industrial recruitment and 
retention policies. In the 1970s, the attention of policymakers turned to high-
technology industries, and the 1980s saw the attraction of foreign direct investment 
become popular. Given that the economic advantages of industrial cluster 
development were well established in the literature, it is not surprising that Porter's 
model was widely accepted by policymakers around the globe in efforts to improve 
both mainstream and regional economic performance (Feser & Bergman, 2000). 
Although examples of successful industrial clusters do exist in Australia, the vast 
majority have managed to form without the need for prior and formal governmental 
planning (Digiovanna, 1996). However, many examples of economic policy failure 
exist, whereby government efforts to create an ideal economic climate for industrial 
clustering have either failed outright, or have performed far below expectations 
(Doeringer & Terkla, 1996, in Staber, Schaefer & Sharma, 1996). 
Within the literature, the observed barriers to effective governmental implementation 
of Porter's  ICT as an industrial cluster policy framework have been attributed to four 
mam causes. The first has been that much of the policy development to date has 
largely been focused on information gathering rather than on achieving either 
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business participation or greater understanding of the industrial clustering process 
(Davies, 2001). The second suggests that much ofthe policy development to date has 
largely been based on case study data pertaining to particular regions or sub-regions 
that are considered 'industrial cluster successes' (Boddy, 2000). The third cause 
suggests that although governments may have the ability to effectively identify 
working and potential industrial clusters, there is an assumption by policymakers that 
the mere provision of scarce resources will, in of itself, ensure an industrial cluster's  
economic success. The fourth cause relates to the simultaneous (and potentially 
incongruent) governmental adoption of macro-economic rationalist policies. 
The first major cause cited for government policy failure surrounds the observation 
that government policy development has largely been focused on descriptive 
information gathering rather than on achieving either business participation or greater 
understanding of the industrial clustering process (Davies, 2001). In many of the 
failed industrial cluster developments, researchers have noted that government policy 
appears to have been based upon a clear lack of understanding of local and 
interregional industrial linkages, and the channels of technology and knowledge 
transfer, which meant that relatively simple measures (such as location quotients and 
industry size) have often been used by government to detect industrial clusters in sub­
national regions (Gordon & McCann, 2000). Feser and Bergman (2000) similarly 
indicate that a growing number of cities, states and regions in Europe, North America 
and Asia have designed their development strategies around strategic clusters of 
industries, although the logic behind many of the failed initiatives is often poorly 
specified or simply not recognised as relevant. 
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In particular, there has been a tendency to use terms such as 'agglomeration' , 
'clusters', 'new industrial areas', 'embeddedness', 'milieu' and 'complex' 
interchangeably, with little concern for questions of operationalisation, which are 
actually far from straightforward and need to be considered differently for each 
(Staber, Schaefer & Sharma, 1996). If the causality of an industrial cluster's  growth 
producing factors is assumed by government rather than proven, such misconceptions 
are likely to lead to an ineffective policy development (Qakey, Kipling & Wildgust, 
2001). Part of the difficulty stems from the different theoretical contexts out of which 
these ideas have emerged; even two commonly linked concepts as 'industrial 
clustering' and 'increasing returns to scale' within the spatial economy are not 
necessarily synonymous, and distinguishing between situations where this is the case 
and where it is not, becomes a major analytical challenge (Gordon & McCann, 2000). 
The second major cause cited is that much of the governmental policy development to 
date has largely been based on case study data pertaining to particular regions or sub­
regions that are considered international successes (Boddy, 2000). Of particular 
concern has been the reliance of government policymakers on a limited set of 
particularly successful technological clusters such as Silicon Valley, Hong Kong's  
financial district, Boston's Route 128, and Cambridge in the UK. Boddy (2000) 
suggests that there are clear dangers in attempting to reproduce significant policy 
direction from a relatively small number of specific cases, especially those whose 
economic success is atypical. One of the major dangers is that of misunderstanding 
the specific origins and role of an industrial cluster (Boddy, 2000). Without the 
specific insight as to how the relationships and networks between clustered firms is 
created and maintained, government policy directed at merely 'locating firms 
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together' appears to omit and/or ignore the most important and dynamic aspects ofthe 
industrial clustering process. 
The third cause discussed concerns the government's allocation of its scarce resources 
as a potential ineffective policy approach to industry cluster formation. Feser and 
Bergman (2000) note that, at least at the local level, the approach frequently adopted 
by policymakers involves little more than the identification of current regional 
specialisations as targets for traditional development initiatives. In such cases, a 
cluster strategy serves more often as a means of allocating scarce resources than as a 
way to build the linkages and future inter-industry synergies documented so 
frequently in successful industrial districts (Feser & Bergman, 2000). For example, in 
Europe, the US and Asia, many 'planned' clusters have failed to materialise despite 
heavy investments by government into setting up the infrastructure required to 
support the clusters. The implication is that although setting up the infrastructure may 
be paramount to the diffusion of industrial clusters, it is not sufficient in of itself to 
ensure a cluster's  formation. 
The fourth cause has been the inadequacy of conventional approaches to 
governmental industrial cluster policy development in the face of the macroeconomic 
rationalism of the 1990s. Important though this effort is, the policy context has not 
always encouraged the analytical clarity which is required both for empirical testing 
of the theorised industrial cluster propositions, and for assessing the broad scale of 
benefits which the various kinds of policy initiative might be expected to yield in 
different contexts (Digiovanna, 1996). In addition, the nature ofpolitical will towards 
industrial cluster policy has also proven to be both highly changeable and problematic 
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in the 1990s. Given the relatively short terms of government, and the rather longer 
time-frame required for industrial clusters to become established in an economy, 
short-term political problems and policy shifts can have detrimental affects on 
planned industrial cluster initiatives. Political problems that affect policy direction 
can arise due to any number of factors, including economic downturns, imminent 
elections, humanitarian crises, and political scandal. In Australia, for example, the 
economic recession of 1989-1993 resulted in a federal government policy shift away 
from funding state-based industrial cluster projects, which resulted directly in the 
major alteration, and even abandonment of, many state-based industrial cluster policy 
initiatives in the late 1990s (see Boddy, 2000). 
Due to the absence of agreed-upon criteria, and the significant numbers of observed 
policy failures, it has been argued that Porter's  ICT is a 'backward looking model', 
and as such has lost some of its value as a category of policy analysis (Ellis & 
Pecotich, 2002; Rajneesh, 1993). Indeed, much ofthe literature on how governments 
have constructed (or should construct) their industry clusters fails to demonstrate their 
understanding of how to implement effective Diamond Factor development policies. 
Instead, industrial cluster policies appear to emerge from judgements based on broad 
industry growth forecasts, untested predictions regarding the business potential of 
particular technologies, and examples of particular industrial cluster configurations 
that have been successful elsewhere (Doeringer & Terkla, 1996, in Staber, Schaefer & 
Sharma, 1996; Rugman, 1991;  Yetton et al, 1992). 
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In order to form a clear understanding of the role of government in IC development, 
policymakers are required to undertake finer-grained assessments of the market 
failures that constrain industrial cluster operation and development. However, 
literature to date suggests this rarely happens for two distinct reasons. The first 
concerns the differing policy requirements of distinct industrial cluster typologies that 
may co-exist within a particular regional economy. Porter's  ICT does not indicate a 
need for government to differentiate between the needs of differing industrial cluster 
typologies. The second concerns the moderating variable of the industrial life cycle, 
and the changeable need requirements of the particular industrial cluster at their 
particular stage within it. This includes the manner in which an IC's changing 
importance to a regional economy impacts on the interaction between the 
government's  policy makers and the IC over time. These concerns are discussed in 
the following sections. 
2.3.3 The theoretical development of Porter's ICT: 
Industrial cluster typologies. 
Given that much of the empirical research into industrial cluster development has 
taken the form of case study analysis, research efforts have resulted in the 
identification of different industrial cluster typologies (Gordon & McCann, 2000). A 
large body of research exists that identifies a myriad of social and environmental 
factors that has led to the formation of industrial clusters, as well as providing reasons 
why discrete industrial cluster types derive their own distinct set of agglomeration 
advantages, and therefore, government policy requirements (Staber, 1996, in Staber, 
Schaefer & Sharma, 1996). 
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In their overview, Gordon and McCann (2000) identified two main industrial cluster 
typologies: the model of 'pure agglomeration', and the model of the 'industrial 
complex' .  The model of 'pure agglomeration' presumes that there is no form of co­
operation between actors, beyond what is in their individual interests in a competitive 
environment. Profitable local interaction is made possible through a combination of 
chance, the law of large numbers (increasing the probability of suitable partners being 
available) and the natural selection ofbusinesses benefiting from the opportunities on 
offer. Since not all firms will benefit from every type of externality, there will be a 
variety of distribution and displacement effects between groups of agents with 
different characteristics. The system is without any particular observable organisation 
or inter-agent loyalty, and simply functions as ecology of activities benefiting from 
proximity, and developing emergent forms of specialisation, possibly including 
distinct forms of economic culture (Gordon & McCann, 2000). 
The second model of geographical clustering proposed by Gordon and McCann 
(2000) suggests that industrial complexes are characterised by sets of identifiable and 
stable relations amongst firms, which are in part manifested in their behaviour. The 
relations are conceived primarily in terms of trading links, and it is these patterns of 
sales and purchases, which are seen as principally governing their locational 
behaviour. The earliest insights into the relationship between production and the 
spatial organisation of industry discussed the question of the relationship between the 
optimal location of the firm, the level of transport costs and the price of local 
production factors. The focus of the analysis here is on how the location of the firm is 
related to the spatial transaction costs faced by the firm, which are perceived to be 
clearly identifiable. In the early 20th-century literature, these spatial transactions costs 
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were assumed to be solely transport costs, although it is quite possible to adapt these 
approaches to include also telecommunications costs and a broader definition of 
shipment costs such as logistics-costs (Gordon & McCann, 2000). 
Coe (2001) summarises the notion of multiple 'cluster typologies' in his study into the 
Canadian film industry, where he identified three distinct industrial cluster 
configurations that existed in the economic geography literature. The three identified 
in his work include the 'satellite' cluster, the 'state anchored' cluster, and the 'hub and 
spoke' cluster. The 'satellite' typology is essentially an industrial cluster of branch 
plants of externally owned multi-plant corporations. In this case, key investment 
decisions are made externally to the industrial cluster, there is an absence oflong-term 
commitments to local suppliers, and the key labour markets are largely external to the 
districts. Satellite platforms are characterised by the dominance of externally owned 
firms and are usually staffed by a management-labour market external to the district, 
but internal to vertically integrated firms. As such, workers in this industrial cluster 
configuration are committed to the firm rather than the vitality of the other cluster 
firms. 
The second typology is the state-anchored district, whereby key public entities (e.g. 
universities, research laboratories or defence establishments) are the key anchor 
tenants that support the private industry members. This is a more eclectic category 
and the development path of the district depends to a large extent on the exact type of 
public investment and capabilities management of these key institutions. The third 
typology, the 'hub and spoke' cluster, denotes a situation whereby the regional 
industrial structure is heavily influenced by the actions of a single local firm within an 
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industry. Thus in contrast to the Marshall's  classical industrial district, the 'hub and 
spoke' industrial cluster is characterised by a singular dominant firm surrounded by a 
local web of smaller and less powerful suppliers that may, in time, develop strong 
extra-local connections and custom beyond that of the dominant firm. The 
implication for this research project is that the research method needs to identify the 
TLSI cluster's  specific typology, and therefore, qualify the government activities that 
facilitated the development of that typology over time. 
2.3.4 The theoretical development of Porter's ICT: 
Regional economic development and the industrial life cycle. 
The rapid uptake of Porter's  ICT for the purpose of regional economic development 
has been all the more impressive given the absence of empirical evidence that 
industrial cluster policy initiatives are actually effective. One of the most prevalent 
concerns in the literature regards the nature of the policy requirements of industrial 
clusters at different stages in an industry's life cycle. Peters and Hood (2000), for 
example, discuss the notion of industrial life cycle influences and stage of 
development as important moderators in industrial cluster policy effectiveness. A 
growing literature base suggests that 'who innovates' and 'how much' innovative 
activity is undertaken by an industry cluster is closely linked to the phase of the 
industry life cycle, and is of vital importance to effective policy implementation 
(Klepper, 1996). For example, policies that facilitate the innovative process will 
likely be different in the 'formation stage' of the life cycle than it would in the 
growth, maturity, or decline stages (Walcott, 1999). 
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Audretsch and Feldman ( 1996) similarly classified 210  industries into the four 
different stages of the industrial life cycle in order to categorise firm behaviour during 
the stages of the industry cluster's life cycle. Their results provide considerable 
evidence suggesting that the propensity for clustered firms to undertake innovative 
activity is strongly influenced by the stage of the cycle. On the one hand, new 
economic knowledge embodied in skilled workers tends to raise the propensity for 
innovative activity to cluster throughout all phases of the industry life cycle. On the 
other hand, certain other sources of new economic knowledge, such as university 
research, tend to elevate the propensity for innovative activity to cluster during the 
introduction stage of the life cycle, but not during the growth stage, and then again 
during the stage of decline (Audretsch, 1998). 
In addition, Audretsch and Feldman (1996) argue that a key aspect to an industrial 
cluster's  evolution over the industrial life cycle is where the innovative activity takes 
place. The theory of knowledge spill overs, derived from the knowledge production 
function, suggests that the propensity for innovative activity to cluster spatially will 
be the greatest in industries where tacit knowledge plays an important role. As 
suggested by Audretsch and Feldman (1996), it is tacit knowledge, as opposed to 
information, which can only be transmitted informally, and typically demands direct 
and repeated contact. The role of tacit knowledge in generating innovative activity is 
presumably the greatest during the early stages of the industry life cycle, before 
product standards have been established and a dominant design has emerged. 
Similarly, Enright (1999, in Hood, Young & Young, 1999) suggests that more 
focused cluster-promotion policies could be achieved if policymakers were to classifY 
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industrial clusters according to their 'state of development', and therefore, their 'state 
ofneed'. 
Evidence exists to suggest that innovative activity IS promoted by instances of 
knowledge spillovers that occur within a distinct geographic region, particularly in the 
formation stages ofthe industry's life cycle. However, as the industry cluster evolves 
towards the maturity and decline stages of the life cycle, innovative activity may be 
diluted by the introduction of additional centres of production that build up within the 
region. The evidence suggests that what may serve as an agglomerating influence in 
triggering innovative activity to cluster spatially during the introduction and growth 
stages of the industry life cycle, may later result in a congestion effect, leading to 
greater dispersion in innovative activity. While the literature on economic geography 
has traditionally focused on factors such as rents, commuting time and pollution as 
constituting congestion, and dissipating agglomeration economies; this type of 
congestion also refers to lock-in with respect to new ideas. 
While there may have been agglomeration economies in automobiles in Detroit in the 
1970s and computers in the Northeast Corridor in the 1980s, a type of intellectual 
lock-in made it difficult for Detroit to shift out of large-car production and for IBM to 
shift out of mainframe computers and into mini-computers. It has been argued that 
this 'intellectual congestion' led to the emergence of the personal computer in the 
distant West Coast region of Silicon Valley (Pullin, 2002). Thus, there is at least 
some evidence suggesting that spatial agglomerations, just like other organisational 
units of economic activity, are vulnerable to technological lock-in, with the result 
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being, in certain circumstances, that different life cycle stages reqmre different 
governmental policy directions (Audretsch, 1998). 
With regard to the government's role in ICT, it was noted that each of the industrial 
cluster typologies identified have differing needs and functions throughout their 
industrial life cycle. This may suggest that the industrial cluster notion utilised by 
government in their economic development planning may not be as generic as its 
policymakers may have assumed. Strong recent interest in the phenomenon of 
industrial clustering has led to a certain level of confusion in the literature, as 
researchers adopt the vanous concepts interchangeably and tend apply them 
generically in differing economic contexts. Such analyses are accumulating in many 
journals and for many regions, but their findings are typically so uniquely derived and 
depicted that little can be generalised about the structure of key industrial clusters 
(Feser & Bergman, 2000). It is therefore necessary for this research to highlight the 
longitudinal variation in government policy generation, and link them to the 
developmental needs of the TLSI cluster over the stages of the 'new industry's' life 
cycle. 
2.4 SPECIFIC RESEARCH QUESTIONS. 
The literature surrounding Porter's  ICT has tended to affirm the importance of the 
diamond factors, and the roles that chance events and government have to play in 
industrial cluster development. As noted in the review of the literature surrounding 
the use of Porter's  ICT in economic policy development, the roles of chance and 
government are treated as exogenous factors somewhat incidental to the operation of 
Porter's  diamond factors (Ellis & Pecotich, 2002). Given the documented difficulty 
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of Australian government policy makers to implement Porter's  ICT as an effective 
policy framework, a need exists to develop the concept of government within Porter's  
ICT, and the role that it has to play in the development of different industrial cluster 
typologies over their life cycle. Related issues that also require clarification are the 
manner in which the role of government is affected by the change in the industrial 
clusters relative economic importance over time, and how the concept of chance 
events may be best incorporated into a government's policy development process. 
Given the numerous variables that affect Porter's  ICT, the lack of descriptive theory 
concerning the role of government in facilitating the development of industrial 
clusters, and given the broad research opportunity identified in Chapter One, the 
specific research questions are as follows: 
Research Question 1: What role did the Tasmanian Government play in the 
development of the TLSI cluster since its inception in 1977? 
Research Question 2: How did the change in the importance of the TLSI cluster to 
the Tasmanian economy over time impact upon the Tasmanian government's policy 
development process? 
The first research question seeks to distil the government policy initiatives that 
positively affected the development of the TLSI cluster over its life cycle. In order to 
achieve this aim, answers to the first research question will link the Tasmanian state 
government's  policy initiatives with the perceived developmental requirements of the 
TLSI cluster as they presented themselves over time. Answers to the first research 
question will also include discussion of the other exogenous variable of 'chance 
events' ,  and the manner in which they may be incorporated in to a government's  role 
as a facilitator of industrial cluster development. The role of chance events requires 
inclusion in this analysis, as their impact may be more or less significant given the 
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context within which they occur. As such, the role that government has to play in the 
development of a regional economy's industrial clusters may be augmented by an 
enhanced understanding of the relationship between chance events and the regional 
economy's development over time. The second research question seeks to determine 
the manner in which the changing importance of the TLSI cluster to the regional 
economy affects the government's policy development process. In particular, this 
research question seeks to reconcile the state government's  TLSI policy development 
process in terms of its responsibility to the wider regional economy. 
2.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY. 
This chapter began with an introduction to Marshall, Weber, and Shumpeter's  
classical industrial cluster theories, and provided a brief discussion of their 
assumptions concerning firm behaviour in an industrial organisation context The 
chapter then introduced the observed global paradox, and the manner in which the 
classical theories were unable to explain the localised behaviour of firms given the 
advantages of globalised trade. Given the demonstrable weakness of the classical 
ICTs in explaining firm behaviour in the globalised context, this thesis introduced 
Porter's  (1990) ICT, a theory that sought to resolve the global paradox, and which 
formed part of his book The Competitive Advantage of Nations. 
Porter's  response to the global paradox, his Diamond Factor model of national 
competitive advantage, received wide academic acceptance and generated 
considerable policy and political debate since its publication (Birkinshaw, 2000; 
Enright, 2000; Feser & Bergman, 2000; Schweke, 1995). The academic acceptance 
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has generally surrounded the fact that the four diamond factors do indeed explain 
many observed instances of internationally competitive industrial clusters, and how 
cluster success in innovation is linked to the creation of a nation's competitive 
advantage (see Baptista, 1996; Davies, 2001 ;  Fitzgerald & Veliyath, 1999; Harrison, 
Kelley & Gant, 1996; Holt, 1998). 
The industrial cluster framework introduced by Porter in 1990 remams widely 
embraced by government policymakers around the globe. It has been viewed by 
many as a useful approach for developing integrated micro-economic policies, which 
enhance economic development and complement macro-economic policies designed 
to achieve greater stability in the general economic environment (Peters & Hood, 
2000). Research indicates that the inter-firm linkages formed through industrial 
clustering can lead to the emergence of collective efficiencies, which facilitates the 
industrialisation of small and medium-sized enterprises and has the potential to 
contribute significantly to regional economic development (Davies, 2001 ). 
Porter's  concept of industrial clustering, however, has attracted much attention and 
debate in the literature over the past decade, both as descriptive of an increasingly 
important phenomenon, and as a basis for effective government policy creation in 
regional economies. Much of the theoretical development of Porter's  ICT has 
suggested that whilst it remains valuable as a backward looking framework for 
explaining the existence of the world's most powerful industrial clusters, it remains 
weak in terms of providing a forward looking framework for government policy 
makers. There is general literary agreement, however, that the government must play 
an important role in the development of the economic conditions required to facilitate 
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the growth of an economy's internationally competitive industrial clusters (Davies, 
200 1 ;  Enright 1996, in Staber, Schaefer & Sharma, 1996; Porter, in Trinca, 2002). 
What is less clear in the literature, however, is the role government has to play in the 
development of industrial clusters over their life cycle, particularly in the context of a 
regional Australian economy (Enright, 1996, in Staber, Schaefer & Sharma, 1996; 
Porter, In Trinca, 2002). The research questions posed in this chapter seek to elicit 
this specific information, and the method used to gather the requisite data will be 
described and discussed in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE. 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY. 
3.1 OBJECTIVE OF THE CHAPTER. 
The objective of this chapter is to describe the research methodology adopted in this 
thesis. Consistent with the aim of the research, this thesis undertakes a longitudinal 
qualitative approach, which accommodates theory building based upon existing 
knowledge and postulated relationships, yet remaining sensitive to any patterns or 
phenomena that may emerge. This chapter explains the rationale and process of a 
single case study inquiry, and details the methodological principles and procedures 
that were engaged to investigate the research questions posed at the end of Chapter 
Two. 
3.2 RATIONALE FOR THE RESEARCH DESIGN. 
The broad aim of this thesis is to develop a more detailed understanding of the role of 
government in a regional Australian economy under Porter's I CT. As well as 
identifYing the various factors that influence an industrial cluster's  success over time, 
the extant literature emphasises the need to understand the important role state 
governments play in providing the economic climate required to foster industrial 
cluster development. Given the human and corporate complexities in the above 
issues, investigation requires a research process that is not only capable of discovering 
the behaviour of the various parties in the TLSI case, but is also able to penetrate the 
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rationale behind those behaviours. Accordingly, a qualitative research strategy was 
adopted, as this method provides a means of assessing otherwise unquantifiable facts 
about the research subjects, and allows the researcher to appreciate the perceptions 
and social constructions of others (Berg, 1989). 
3.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY. 
As noted in Chapter One, this research into the role of regional government in 
Porter's  ICT is exploratory in nature, and given the phenomena under investigation, a 
decision was taken to employ a single case study method for theory building. In 
particular, Yin suggests that single case study research is a method suitable: 
... to test a well-formulated theory ... The theory has specified a clear set of propositions 
as well as the circumstances within which the propositions are believed to be true. To 
confirm, challenge, or extend the theory, there may exist a single case, meeting all the 
conditions for testing the theory. The single case can then be used to determine whether 
a theory's propositions are correct or whether some alternative set of explanations might 
be more relevant (1994: 38). 
Yin (1994) suggests three rationales for conducting single-case designs. The first is 
when the case represents a 'critical case' in the sense that it develops a well-
formulated theory. In the TLSI cluster case, Porter's  ICT serves as the well-
formulated theory within which the critical role of government is largely undefined. 
Secondly, Yin (1994) suggests that single case studies are also ideal where the case is 
'unique or extreme'. The case of the TLSI cluster is 'unique and extreme' in the 
sense that it represents one of Australia's most internationally successful industrial 
clusters in a nation characterised by 'industrial cluster mediocrity' (see OECD, 
1998b), many resulting from prevalent government policy failure (see Brown, 2000; 
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Enright & Roberts, 2001 ;  Porter, 2002 in James, 2002). Thirdly, Yin (1994) suggests 
that single case studies are ideal where the case is a revelatory one. The TLSI cluster 
case is a potentially revelatory, in the sense that the role of government in a regional 
economy could be distilled from an analysis of this particular cluster's  evolution over 
the past 25 years. 
In addition, Yin (1994: 13) recommends using the "case study method because you 
deliberately want to cover contextual conditions - believing that they might be highly 
pertinent to your phenomenon of study". This is case with the role of government, 
where ''the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident" 
(Yin, 1994: 13). That the TLSI cluster was a highly successful industrial cluster is 
clear, but its evolution and the role government played in its facilitation is not. As 
this study seeks to investigate the role that the Tasmanian government played in the 
facilitation and development of the TLSI cluster, the single case study is an ideal 
research method. 
3.4 THE CASE STUDY AS A RESEARCH METHOD. 
According to Bromley (1990: 302), case study research is defined as a "systematic 
inquiry into an event or a set of related events which aims to describe and explain the 
phenomenon of interest". Hakim notes that case studies: 
.. . take as their subject one or more elected examples of a social entity - such as 
communities, social groups, organisations, events, life histories, work teams, roles or 
relationships - that are studies using a variety of data collection techniques .. .. Using a 
variety of data collection techniques and methods allows a more rounded, holistic study 
than with any other design (1987: 61). 
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Similarly, Yin (1994) suggests that case studies are not a specific research technique 
as such, but rather a way of organising social data to preserve the unitary character of 
the phenomenon being studied. Being amenable to accumulating data from various 
sources holistically, case studies have been widely applied to research into 
government policy creation (for example see Baptista, 1996; Boddy, 2000; Gordon & 
McCann, 2000; Peters & Hood, 2000; Schweke, 1995; Yla-Anttila, 1994). 
3.4.1 The purposes of case study research. 
Hakim (1987) suggests that the case study method is not, in and of itself, a prescribed 
research technique, but rather an amalgam of approaches that often overlaps with 
other research designs, offering their combined and complementary strengths. This 
eclecticism not only provides power and flexibility to the research effort, but as Stake 
explains, it also allows the study's  design to be directed by what it is that can be 
learned from the case itself: 
Case study [research] is not a methodological choice, but a choice of object to be 
studied. We choose to study the case .. . as a form of research, case study is de fined by 
interest in individual cases, not by the methods of inquiry used (1995: 236). 
Thus, a researcher's  purpose in studying a given case determines the methodology to 
be employed. Yin (1994) suggests three research purposes to which case study 
research may be applied: descriptive research, exploratory research, and explanatory 
research. As a method for descriptive research, the purpose of a case study is to 
produce a register of facts from which the researcher gathers evidence concerning 
some given phenomenon (Yin, 1994). From this evidence, the researcher may then 
interpret the evidence for the purposes of theory development (Peshkin, 1993). By 
studying the subject's perception of their own reality, and reporting on the issues at 
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play in that reality, a detailed portrait of social phenomena is available (Hakim, 
1987). Van Maanen (1988: 1) defines this portrait as "a written representation of 
culture", whilst Aamodt (1991) suggests that it represents a 'thick description' of 
social experiences that is vital to a naturalistic inquiry. By identifying and describing 
social phenomena as they evolve over time, case studies allow the researcher to 
"retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events" (Yin, 1994: 3). 
As noted, the exploratory purpose of the case study method is to examine the social 
reality ofthe actors' experiences. As Ball suggests: 
The analysis of case study is essentially concerned with interpretation. That is, the 
translation of raw data into a coherent portrayal of an institution and of institutional 
processes. The process of interpretation involves the data coming to stand for and 
represent a field of reality as the basis for a 'theoretical' (or some other kind of) 
account of the setting (in Hammersley, Scarth & Webb, 1985: 50). 
Given the interpretive nature of case study research, the researcher is able to advance 
propositions from the evidence accumulated, and as such, provides an excellent 
vehicle for the inductive development of new theory (Miles & Huberman, 1994; 
Peshkin, 1993; Yin, 1994). As a method for explanatory research, case studies enable 
the researcher to investigate data to determine the nature of the relationships between 
phenomena present in the case (Hartley, 1994). Given that case study research 
concentrates on the various issues that precede a known outcome, it also enables the 
examination ofthe processes involved in the case (Schendel & Hofer, 1979). 
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3.4.2 Criticisms of the case study method. 
Although case study research is considered of considerable benefit in advancing 
social inquiry, the approach has been criticised as an approach to research 
methodology. The major criticisms surround three points of contention: non-standard 
case study designs (Hamel, Dufour & Fortin, 1993), measures of reliability (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1981;  Stake, 1995), and verbose reports (Lynn, 1991). 
The first major criticism is that the efficacy of case study research is constrained by 
the absence of a definitive, routinised design through which to conduct social 
research. The argument that case studies are ad hoc research methods that lack 
rigour, and therefore, inter-research comparability (see Hamel, Dufour & Fortin, 
1993) assumes two important criteria. The first is that case studies should be required 
to follow a certain formula; and second, that researchers need ex ante formulations in 
which to elicit socially constructed information. In response to the first claim, Patton 
(1987) and Schultz and Kerr (1986) suggest that critics confuse the case studies 
method (as a design) with the type of data collected in the research itself. Therefore, 
they advise that the holistic nature of the case study method needs to be distinguished 
from the specific data gathering techniques used by the researcher. 
Concerning the second criticism, the lack of a precise format can be considered a 
strength of the case study method, as it is this characteristic that provides the 
researcher with the opportunity to vary the approach according to the purpose of the 
study itself. As Eisenhardt (1989) states, case study research aids in the development 
of theories, rather than the testing of rigid hypotheses, and as such provide "an 
empirical genre appropriately flexible, eclectic, and capable of creating surprises" 
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(Walker, 1983: 155). Hakim (1987: 63) agrees, stating that having the freedom to 
choose the method of inquiry is not an impediment, but rather a strength that makes 
case studies "one of the most powerful research designs". 
The second maJor criticism of case study research relates to the properties of 
'reliability' and 'validity',  which refer to the measures used to judge the quality of 
data (Guba & Lincoln, 1981 ;  Stake, 1995; Yin, 1994). The two concepts originate 
from experimental research, where systematic error is controllable by statistical 
techniques (Weiers, 1988). Reliability refers to how accurately a measure yields the 
same result on repeated trials (Yin, 1994). Validity refers to the degree to which a 
study accurately reflects the specific concept that the researcher is attempting to 
measure (Yin, 1994). Without the agreement of independent observers able to 
replicate research procedures, or the ability to use research tools and procedures that 
yield consistent measurements, researchers would be unable to satisfactorily draw 
conclusions, formulate theories, or make claims about the generalisability of their 
research (Guba & Lincoln, 198 1 ;  Stake, 1995). 
In quantitative research analysis, reliability is gauged by the consistency of the 
research instruments over repeated applications. Although replication of the research 
instruments is impossible in a single case study because "the operations involved 
depend upon the particular circumstances and events that occur within the case" 
(Bresnen, 1988: 47), Marshall and Rossman suggest that researchers should strive for 
reliability through notes of their work, enabling: 
.. . others to inspect their procedures, protocols and decisions .. . by keeping all data in well 
organized, retrievable form, researchers can make them available easily if the findings are 
challenged, or if another researcher wants to analyze the data (1989: 148). 
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Validity refers specifically to "the degree to which we observe what we purport to 
observe (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1984: 76). Yin (1984) proposes three approaches to 
assessing the validity of information obtained from case study research: construct 
validity, internal validity, and external validity. 
According to Babbie (2001), construct validity is achieved when the measure of a 
particular concept correlates with the measures of other relevant concepts in a 
theoretically expected manner. Yin ( 1994) offers three tactics to increase the 
construct validity in case study research. Firstly, Yin (1994) directs that a researcher, 
where possible, should use multiple sources of evidence so as to achieve a sufficient 
level of data triangulation. Secondly, the researcher should establish a chain of 
evidence that links the question asked, the data collected, and the conclusions drawn. 
Thirdly, the researcher should use the key informants to review the draft report, and 
provide comment where required to ensure the report's accuracy in portraying case 
events. 
Internal validity refers to the extent to which the observed effect in a case study is 
causal in nature (Babbie, 2001 ). Whereas cause and effect may be noted in 
quantitative analysis through the establishment of statistical significance, the 
qualitative realm is not so amenable to such precise linkages (Krathwohl, 1985). 
Internal validity in qualitative research, and particularly that undertaken in case 
studies, however, remains particularly susceptible to contamination by researchers 
who allow their own perceptions to influence their interpretation of the data (Goode 
& Hatt, 1952; Krawthwohl, 1985; Neck, Godwin & Spencer, 1996; Yin, 1994). 
Therefore, researchers undertaking a case study approach need to be vigilant in 
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seeking deficiencies in their case work by scrutinising the data where doubt may be 
justified, and using pattern-matching, triangulation and/or explanation-building to 
strengthen the accuracy of interpretation (Eisenhardt, 1989; Livingston, 1987; 
Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983; Yin, 1994). 
External validity refers to the generalisability of a study's  findings to other 
populations and to other environmental conditions (Yin, 1994). Although critics such 
as Tellis (1997) have claimed that case study research results lack external validity, 
Yin (1994) argues that such results may be generalised to a wider population 
provided that the case study is conducted rigorously. Yin (1994) continues to argue 
that the case study method is not simply undertaken to seek universally applicable 
results about populations, but rather to offer plausible and generalised findings to 
theory development. 
The final major criticism of case study research surrounds the notion that they result 
in desultory, wordy, and rather unfocused reports (Lynn, 1991). Miles and Huberman 
(1994), Morris, Fitz-Gibbon and Freeman (1987) and Yin (1994) each warn 
researchers to pay attention to the careful and rigorous process of description required 
by the case study method. They suggest that case studies should 'create reality' by 
describing it parsimoniously, thereby making ''the implicit explicit, the intuitive self­
evident, and the abstract concrete" (Walker, 1983: 163). Therefore, it is the 
responsibility of the researcher, through the skilled use of written communication, to 
reconstruct the composite issues inherent in a case study in a clear and concise form 
to the reader. In terms ofthis research inquiry, the above criticisms of the case study 
method (and their responses) required the researcher to incorporate a number of 
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specific measures to ensure the reliability and validly of the data gathering and 
analysis process. The following section details the measures undertaken to ensure the 
reliability and validity ofthe inquiry. 
3.5 THE SUITABILITY OF THE CASE STUDY METHOD IN THIS 
INQUIRY. 
The adoption of case study methodology in this inquiry was governed by two factors: 
the outcomes of the literature review, and the development of the Tasmanian Light 
Ship Industry cluster. 
3.5.1 The literature review. 
The literature review indicated that the government in regional economies have an 
important role in facilitating the growth and international success of industrial clusters 
in Australia. It also suggested that government policy aimed at developing and 
facilitating regional industrial clusters requires flexibility over time to be most 
effective. Perhaps most importantly, this means that government policy needs to be 
reflective of an industry's  growth requirements as they change through its life cycle, 
yet at the same time not merely amount to de facto subsidy or tariff protectionism. As 
this study requires a research methodology that accounts for both the human and 
policy interactions between the TLSI cluster firms themselves, and the TLSI and the 
Tasmanian government, a flexible approach that is receptive to emerging themes, 
unexpected relationships and new issues is necessary. The case study method 
enables these qualities to be studied effectively (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
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Yin's (1994) definition of the single case study method underscores its particular 
suitability in the investigation of the Tasmanian government's role in the development 
of the TLSI cluster. It allows the investigation of the phenomena (the Tasmanian 
government and its economic policy over time) within the real-life context (the 
development of the internationally competitive TLSI cluster) when the boundaries 
between the phenomenon and the context are not clear (as evident in the history 
presented in the case report). 
3.5.2 The Tasmanian light ship industry cluster as a unique case study. 
The TLSI cluster is a unique Australian case, in terms of its geographic and economic 
location, its history, and its international success relative to other industrial clustering 
efforts in this country. Equally unique is the role that the Tasmanian government had 
in its development during the period 1977-2002. These factors combined create what 
Yin (1994: 44) describes as a "rare of unique event" for which the case study 
methodology is a highly appropriate research design (Yin, 1994: 44). The 
government's  role in the development and facilitation of the TLSI cluster, however, 
cannot be considered as a single episode capable of being researched in a cross 
sectional manner. The history of the interaction between the clustered firms 
themselves, and between the clustered firms and the Tasmanian government, ensure 
that the interlocking series of events and perspectives can only be meaningfully 
assessed by a longitudinal inquiry (Fear, 2001). In her paper dealing with regional 
economic development research methods, McLean notes that due to the inherent 
complexities involved, longitudinal analysis is a particularly appropriate case study 
method because: 
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Through historical analysis, [researchers] gain a systematic method for understanding 
the changing context of regional institutions, the community, and the region's place in 
the global and national system. Historical analysis makes planners more aware of the 
interrelations of technical, social, cultural, and political factors (1996: 196). 
As such, the capture of longitudinal data in this case enables the researcher to both 
track the development of the TLSI cluster over time, and also the manner in which its 
growing significance to the region's economy impacted on the perceptions and 
actions of the actors within the case over time. It is important to note, that in this 
study a longitudinal inquiry does not refer to the collection of data over a period of 
time, but rather the historical examination of events. Rose (1991) suggests that case 
study design is ideal for longitudinal research, as it is amenable to both historical and 
processual aspects of investigation. Rose, highlighting the work of Pettigrew ( 1973) 
and Littler (1982) stated that: 
.. . methodological principle underlying [case study] design is the belief that theoretical 
concerns of a processual form require a longitudinal research design, thereby enabling a 
social system to be explored as a 'continuing system with a past, a present, and a future' 
(1991: 454). 
An issue with longitudinal research, however, is that the potentially large and diverse 
number of variables present in the case history necessitate the truncation of the time 
span covered by the inquiry, and/or the omission of certain important contextual 
factors (Field & Morse, 1985). However, as the geographical, political, 
organisational and temporal perimeters of the TLSI cluster and Tasmanian 
government interactions are self-defined, all of the relevant dimensions may be 
investigated completely in this case study. This property suits the single case study 
method, which allows the research entity to be understood in its entirety (Yin, 1994). 
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3.5.3 The purpose of the research. 
Given the nature of the phenomena under review, the descriptive, explanatory, and 
exploratory purposes of this research are significantly interrelated. The descriptive 
purpose is realised by creating 'thick descriptions' of the issues and the complexities 
of the case. This contextual data serves the exploratory requirements of the thesis, as 
it informs the process of theory building (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) and contributes to 
the explanatory purpose by identifying the causal links that may be present (Yin, 
1994). Although the exploratory purpose of the research is concerned with the 
discovery of theory from data, this study does not seek to generate grounded theory in 
which prior inquiry, or the investigator's  perspectives are excluded from the 
interpretive process. The literature review undertaken in Chapter Two indicated that 
government policy development has been significantly influenced by the research into 
the competitive advantage of nations, and as noted earlier, that researchers should not 
be detached from the subject matter. Through the collection of data from multiple 
sources, and by utilising an open coding technique (to be discussed later), the case 
study method may be used to both elucidate issues that have not been identified 
previously, and to refine existing theoretical concepts (see Yin, 1994). 
3.6 CONDUCT OF THE RESEARCH. 
The plan ofthis investigation is based on Yin's (1994) model for case study research. 
The processual order and content of this inquiry was modified to allow for the study's  
exploratory emphasis, and to accommodate the single case method. The research 
sequence is now described. 
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3.6.1 The selection of the case. 
Two major factors influenced the selection of the Tasmanian government (and its role 
in the development and facilitation of the TLSI cluster) as the focal case in this thesis. 
Firstly, the TLSI cluster represents an exceptional exemplar of an internationally 
competitive industry cluster located in a regional economy. As noted, the TLSI 
cluster captured 40 percent of the international market for fast ferries, and at one 
point accounted for the production of 50 percent of all fast ferries in operation around 
the globe (Industry Audit, 1998). The international success of the industrial cluster, 
and therefore the Tasmanian government's  role in its development over time 
represents a case worthy of further consideration through case study research. 
Researching the role that a regional Australian government played in such a profound 
case is supported by Pettigrew: 
.. . given the limited number of cases which can usually be studied, it makes sense to 
choose cases such as extreme situations and polar types in which the process of interest is 
"transparently observable". Thus, the goal of theoretical sampling is to choose cases 
which are likely to replicate or extend the emergent theory (1988, cited in Eisenhardt, 
1989: 537). 
Secondly, the role that the Tasmanian government played in the development and 
facilitation of the TLSI cluster provides a rare opportunity to examine the life of an 
industry cluster in its entirety. The case itself is ideal for the purposes of determining 
the Tasmanian government' s  role, as the entire industry cluster history is documented 
in numerous reliable secondary data sources - from its inception in 1977 (with the 
establishment of International Catamarans as the TLSI cluster's  'hub firm') to its 
current form (an industry cluster in the 'mature' stage of its industry life-cycle, and 
with numerous 'hub firms'). As this investigation centres on the interrelationship 
between the Tasmanian government and the TLSI cluster firms over a relatively short 
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(and discrete period of time), the study provides some redress to the paucity of 
management research, and Porter's  recent suggestion that: 
.. .in Australia, what is less understood is that the government has some positive roles, 
like innovation and training, infrastructure [provision] and things like that. I think that 
the real frontier is [understanding] the positive roles to be played by government whilst 
avoiding the distortion or intervention in competition (2002, cited in Trinca, 2002: 39). 
3.6.2 A review of the literature. 
The literature review posed in Chapter Two suggests that there are two maJor 
questions to be researched in this research. Firstly, what role did the government play 
in the development and facilitation of the TLSI cluster over time, specifically in terms 
of how it supported and advanced Porter's  Diamond Factor Model as they pertained 
to Tasmania's regional shipbuilding industry? Secondly, how did the changing 
importance of the TLSI cluster to the regional economy affect the government's  
policy development process? The examination of these topics defined the units of 
analysis, the research questions, and the appropriate methodology. 
3.6.3 The development of the case study protocol. 
The case study protocol documents the procedures to be employed when conducting 
case research. As well as describing each phase of the inquiry, the case study 
protocol assists in future considerations of the case by enabling other researchers to 
fully understand the methodology used. Yin (1994: 63) suggests that a case study 
protocol is an essential element of the case study method, because it is "a major tactic 
in increasing the reliability of case study research, and is intended to guide the 
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investigator in carrymg out the case study". As the case study protocol was an 
essential tool in identifYing the critical elements required in the planning and 
execution of the thesis, it was devised before the commencement of the research 
activity. This protocol (detailed in Appendix A) was used to determine the design of 
the research, and the nature of the data gathering process, and indeed, the basic form 
of the thesis itself. 
3. 6.4 Key informant interview preparation. 
The case study protocol specified the respondents, and the primary and secondary 
data to be gathered by the research. In order to obtain diverse perspectives, facilitate 
crosschecking of information, and recognise those issues requiring further 
consideration, 25 candidates were identified, and approached as informants. Six of 
these were current heads of Tasmanian government departments (including the TLSI 
cluster's  training facilities); five were ex-state premiers spanning the TLSI cluster's  
history (1977-1998); one was the current state premier (1998 - present); three were 
senior bureaucrats that had served the state parliament from 1977-1998; one was an 
incumbent federal Member of the House of Representatives for Tasmania that has 
served since 1977; and finally, the nine founding managers of the TLSI cluster's  
private sector firms (all of whom were still in charge of their organisation in 2002). 
In order to control the content and scope of the interviews, an interview guide (see 
Appendix B) was prepared. This guide was based on the 'elements for investigation', 
the 'data requirements', and the 'critical incidents' that emerged from the preliminary 
secondary data gathering process. Of the informants approached, all 25 agreed to 
participate in the research project and undertake a tape-recorded semi-structured 
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interview. The interviews themselves were of varying lengths, the shortest 20 
minutes duration, the longest 45 minutes duration. 
3.6.5 The case study research process. 
The case of the Tasmanian government' s  interaction with the TLSI cluster was 
researched over 1 5  months, and was conducted according to the research design 
outlined in the case study protocoL This process is detailed below. 
3. 6. 5.1 Combining the research purpose with the research questions. 
By considering the research question within the descriptive, exploratory and 
explanatory purposes of the study, a suitable method of data collection and 
examination was constructed. This provided the investigator with a 'research map', 
upon which the data were gathered and analysed. For each of the three purposes of 
this research, the data were managed in the following manner. 
Firstly, in preparing the case history, secondary data sources were utilised to map the 
critical incidents surrounding the development of the Tasmanian shipbuilding 
industry, and in particular, those that were directly linked with the TLSI cluster 
and/or the Tasmanian government. This is consistent with the recommendations of 
Fear, who stated that what is required: 
.. . is a careful, accurate reconstruction through archival research of the firm's objective 
situation, the key players, their perceptions of the situation, their reasoning in favor of 
one path or another, and contemporary statements explaining why they considered the 
chosen path to be the correct one (200 1: 1 7 4). 
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The sources of the secondary data included both local and national newspaper 
archives, the historical publications of the TLSI cluster firms, government agency 
publications, and the Tasmanian Parliamentary Library. The local and national 
newspaper archives were useful in identifYing the industry's critical incidents and 
issues in an historically accurate fashion. These critical incidents and issues were 
then summarised into an historical timeline, so that the appropriate issues (and 
therefore interview questions) could be directed at the individuals that were 
specifically involved with them. The critical incidents and issues aided in the 
construction of the interview questions asked of both the cluster firm managers, and 
the key informants from the government sector. As such, although the core interview 
questions remained consistent across all respondents, a number of interview questions 
were specific to particular government officials (be they an ex-state premier, or 
bureaucrat) depending upon their time in office. 
In preparing the case analysis, the reality of each critical incident and issue was 
elicited by composing thick descriptions of the informant's  views. This was achieved 
by asking 'what', 'when', 'why', and 'how' questions that preserve the 
meaningfulness of the phenomenon as a complex real-life process. Exploration of the 
phenomena was achieved by posing 'what' and 'when' questions (e.g. When, and 
what did the government do to develop the TLSI cluster over time? What was the 
TLSI's  response to this action?), as they are ideal for the development of hypotheses 
and tenable propositions (Yin, 1994). Explanation of the phenomena was achieved 
by posing 'how' and 'why', as they can access the links between certain phenomena 
within a case specific context (Yin, 1994). 
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This interrogative process described above was applied to each piece of information 
as it emerged during the data gathering and analysis stages of the case study research. 
Some information demanded only a single focus of inquiry, whereas others were 
multidimensional in nature; where the information was multidimensional (i.e. it 
displayed both descriptive and explanatory elements, it was analysed accordingly). 
3. 6.5.2 The unit of analysis. 
Case studies comprise a single unit of analysis based upon depth that is both holistic 
and exhaustive (Ball, 1996), and which retains the meaningful characteristics of 
realistic events. Thus, a case study as defined by Yin is an empirical inquiry that 
"investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, especially 
when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident 
(1994: 13). Miles and Huberman (1994) pick up Yin's (1994) second point, seeing 
boundaries as the critical issue in the struggle to define case studies. They employ a 
simple definition that "we can define a case as a phenomenon of some sort occurring 
in the bounded context (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 25). 
Miles and Huberman ( 1994) speak in terms of the focus of the study surrounded by 
an indeterminate edge of the case marking the boundary of what will not be studies. 
This problem of case boundary is reflective of the point made by Peshkin (1993) that 
descriptive analysis is inevitably selective. Within the flexibility of case studies, 
boundaries of relevance are sometimes elusive and elastic. Exploratory case studies 
are susceptible to ill-defined boundaries until issues emerge. Simultaneously, case 
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studies are opportunistic (Peshk:in, 1993) and permit the investigation to pursue new 
directions as the need arises, thus redrawing the boundaries. 
Given that the selection of the units of analysis is dependent on the "way the initial 
research questions have been defined" (Yin, 1994: 22), the primary unit of analysis 
that emerged from the research question in this thesis is 'the establishment and 
growth of the TLSI cluster between 1977 and 2002'. As the research concerns both 
the actions of the Tasmanian government, and the concomitant reactions and demands 
of the TLSI cluster over time, each dimension was subsumed as a secondary unit of 
analysis. Given that the interpretation of the interpretation of the regional 
government's  action relied upon an understanding of the attitudes, values, and 
behaviours of the other actors involved, a subordinate level of units of analysis was 
produced. Yin ( 1994: 41) terms the use of multiple units of analysis in a single case 
study as an "embedded case study design". Yin explains that multilevel units of 
analysis: 
. . . incorporate subunits of analyses, so that a more complex - or embedded - design is 
developed. The subunits can often add significant opportunities for extensive analysis, 
enhancing the insights into the single case (1994: 44). 
3. 6. 5. 3 Data collection. 
Documentary material may be classified as either a primary or secondary source. 
Primary data is that which originates from an investigator's specific inquiry into a 
research problem, whereas secondary data is that which is gathered by a researcher, 
but was originated by another's  inquiry to a different research problem (Malhotra, 
Hall, Shaw & Crisp, 1996). The distinction is significant, as it defines the proximity 
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of the document's  author to the subject matter. Whereas primary sources record the 
direct observations of involved parties, secondary sources are the remote observations 
of third parties. As the distance of secondary sources may decrease validity and 
reliability, primary sources are preferred (Babbie, 2001). This study incorporates 
both primary and secondary documentation as appropriate, and as available, with 
validation mechanisms to control their validity and reliability. 
Due to the strengths and weakness inherent to any single research method, Babbie 
(2001) recommends that multiple methods of inquiry be incorporated into case study 
research in order to overcome analytical and validity problems associated with 
singular research methodologies. As suggested by Babbie (2001), Hakim (1987), and 
Yin (1994), the use of several different sources of data, and indeed the incorporation 
of different research methods to capture this data (otherwise known as 'triangulation') 
is a valuable research strategy, and was incorporated into this investigation. Given 
the recommendation of Marshall & Rossman (1989), the choice of the data collection 
instruments in this study was dictated by the requirements of the research, and the 
investigator's  access to the necessary information. 
The first step in the data collection process involved the retrieval of secondary data 
descriptive of Tasmania's maritime history since European settlement, and the 
inception and evolution of the TLSI cluster since 1977. Given that documentary 
records are a fundamental resource for historical inquiry, the initial draft of the case 
history was composed from published accounts of the TLSI cluster, ranging from 
firm-published historical documents to official government reports. By 
reconstructing the past, the contextual factors of the shipbuilding operation were 
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assembled and clarified, and the critical incidents and issues identified for further 
examination. Marshall and Rossman (1989: 95) suggest that researchers commence 
the data gathering process with secondary historical material, as it is "useful for 
establishing a baseline or background prior to interviewing". 
As the researcher needed to gather data beyond the facts contained within the written 
histories (by gaining insight into the informant's  understanding of the incidents and 
issues), interviews were then organised with each of the key informants identified in 
the case study protocol. After the collection of the historical data was completed, 
therefore, a time line of events was constructed, and the interview questions to be 
posed to the cluster firm managers and key government figures formulated. 
Hutchison (1986: 1 15) suggests that the interview process is the most effective 
method to achieve this, as it "serves to clarify the meanings the participants 
themselves attribute to a given situation, [enabling] the researcher to understand the 
problem 'through the eyes' of the participant". These semi-structured interview 
questionnaires contained both standardised interview questions (i.e. common to all 
informants) and specific interview questions (i.e. aimed at the key informants' 
specific involvement in the TLSI's history), and were formulated to elicit the primary 
data required to answer the research questions posed in this inquiry. Both the 
standardised and specific interview questions were formulated to facilitate the 
aggregation, analysis, and validation of information, and enabled the researcher to 
interrogate the evidence gathered from other sources. These questions were designed 
to cover the necessary issues, but were framed in an open-ended manner, to allow the 
interviewees sufficient latitude for introspection and open reporting of their own 
perspectives. As a result, the informants were free to pursue those matters that they 
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considered important. With the permission of the participants, each interview was 
recorded onto audiotape. 
The collection of primary data using the semi-structured interview method allowed 
the informants to tell their own story in their own way, thereby allowing the 
researcher direct access to the experience of the case (Clandinin & Connelly, 1994). 
These individualised recollections aid to strengthen the inquiry by counteracting the 
bias that may exist in the secondary documents (Burgess, 1982), by adding matters of 
fact or detail that may only be recorded in individual memory (Samuel, 1982), and by 
giving voice to those not usually heard (Fontana & Frey, 1994). The semi-structured 
interviews assisted this inquiry in each of these areas, as they enabled the researcher 
to access facets of the case that would not have been available by any other data 
gathering technique. 
3.7 THE CASE ANALYSIS. 
The purpose of case study analysis is to summarise observations in such a manner 
that they yield answers to the research question (Yin, 1994). As suggested by Miles 
and Huberman (1994), data in this study were analysed in a continuous fashion 
throughout the data gathering process. By continually analysing the data as it evolved 
from the documents and interviews, contradictions were isolated, missing data were 
identified, and alternative explanations sought. The process and sequence ofthe case 
analysis appears below. 
65 
3. 7.1 Editing the data. 
Data should be edited to ensure that they are "accurate, consistent with other 
information, uniformly entered, complete, and arranged to facilitate coding and 
tabulation" (Emory & Cooper, 199 1 :  450). Editing was undertaken in the following 
manner on all information as it emerged from the documentary records and 
interviews. 
As primary and secondary documentation generally focused on the facts of the case, 
editing at this stage was primarily concerned with searching for inconsistencies and 
omissions within and amongst the manuscripts, as well as organising the data in 
preparation for coding and categorisation. A particular issue was the difficulty in 
determining the neutrality of the researchers, and as such, all reports and interviews 
were afforded close attention in the verification process, and instances of explicit bias 
discarded. 
As recommended by Denzin and Lincoln (1994), tapes of the interviews were 
transcribed immediately after the interviews. The immediacy of the transcription of 
an interview is important, as it is never an exact copy of the conversation that took 
place. No matter how thoroughly the transcript is done, the issues inherent to the 
'translation' process may result in inaccuracies, mistakes and misinterpretations 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). The immediate transcription of the interview recordings 
also enables the researcher to account for the content and context of the exchange, and 
add in additional notes to the data where it is deemed necessary. The interview 
transcripts serve four major functions. Firstly, they recapture the essence of the 
exchange, and allow the researcher to reflect on the meaning of what the respondent 
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had said. Secondly, they force the researcher to reflect on the relationship between 
what had been recorded, and the aims of the study. Thirdly, they help to determine 
what material was relevant and therefore worthy of coding. Fourthly, they enable 
preliminary coding decisions to be made. The completed transcripts were submitted 
to the informants for verification of accuracy. 
The editing process in this research revealed material omissions in a number of the 
documentary records, however the majority related to unrecorded periods in particular 
reports. From time to time, accounts displayed a paucity of detail in, and explanation 
of, the events under review. Inconsistencies within individual interviews were 
negligible, as was the incidence of one account being substantially inconsistent with 
another. The majority of these issues were rectified by reference to further 
documents, with the remainder being clarified during the interviews. 
3. 7.2 Data categorisation and coding. 
Data categorisation organises the various dimensions of the data by grouping together 
attributes that relate to the concepts being examined. By devising categories that are 
mutually exclusive, exhaustive, and based on a single classification (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 1994), aspects of the data were clustered together to facilitate the interpretive 
process. The previously noted units of analysis served as categories, and by 
considering their lateral and vertical relationships, the data were progressively 
distilled through interpretation and comparison. 
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Data coding refers to the appointment of titles to salient elements in the data, in order 
to assign them to an appropriate category (Schwandt, 1997). This exercise simplifies 
the handling and interpretation of information, by introducing 'rules of order' to the 
treatment of data (Schwandt, 1997). As recommended by Fleet and Cambourne 
(1989), data coding definition and labelling must fulfil three major criteria. Firstly, it 
must be consistent across the entire data banlc Secondly, it must precisely indicate 
what information is constituted by each code. Thirdly, it must align with the locus of 
the enquiry. As suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994), data codes were assigned 
throughout the entire data gathering process. This allowed for the discovery of issues 
requiring further investigation, the refocussing of the research questions, the 
generation of additional codes, and the refining of existing codes. The complete 
coding system is detailed in Appendix C. 
Given the qualitative nature of the inquiry, and the fact that statistical analysis fails to 
address the needs of undertaking analysis at the level of the whole case (see Yin, 
1994 ), only minor emphasis was placed on the enumeration of frequencies. Instead, 
the data were analysed for aspects of relevance to the research questions. This was 
achieved by using the principles suggested by Becker and Geer: 
� The coding should be inclusive. That is, any incident should be coded under a 
category, if there is initially any reason to believe tat it might be considered 
relevant. Many incidents will, therefore, be coded under several categories, for 
there may be relevant to all of them. An incident, which on later analysis proves 
to be irrelevant, can simply be discarded. 
� The coding should be by incidents: either complete verbal expressions or 
complete acts by an individual or group. 
� The coding should be 'full'. That is, the incident being coded should be 
summarised in all its relevant detail: the idea expressed, the actions taken, the 
people present, the date, and the setting (1982: 245). 
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As recommended by Babbie (200 1 ), when coding the data, all elements were 
inspected for their visible, surface components (i.e. the manifest constituents) and any 
meanings that might underlie the visible elements (i.e. latent constituents). 
Collectively, the coded incidents defined the essential situations and factors 
embedded in the units of observation. By srunmarising and describing the 
fundamental characteristics of these units, their bearing on the study was illuminated, 
and the relationships between them were assessed. 
3. 7.3 Data interpretation. 
Regardless of the methodological approach adopted in a research project, Bachor 
(2002) states that the researcher has an obligation to disclose the manner in which the 
data were interpreted to the reader. The nine tactics for data interpretation, as 
advanced by Miles and Huberman (1994) were employed in this research (see Table 
3 . 1  over page for a coherent and parsimonious summary of these tactics and their 
implementation). The information in this table is arranged from the descriptive to the 
explanatory, and from the 'concrete' to the abstract. As these procedures are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive, there was some overlap in their application to the data 
set. 
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Tactic 
Noting patterns 
and themes. 
Seeking plausibility. 
Clustering. 
Subsuming 
particulars 
into the general. 
Factoring 
(Factor analysis). 
Noting relationships 
between variables. 
Finding intervening 
variables. 
Building a logical 
chain 
of evidence. 
Making conceptual 
or theoretical 
coherence. 
Table 3.1 Processes for Data Interpretation 
Procedure 
When observing phenomena, gestalt psychology holds that people tend to perceive 
events in their entirety rather than their constituent parts. Therefore, as data were 
interrogated, recurring patterns and themes were noted in order to consolidate 
individual facets of the information. 
Miles and Huberman (1994:246) suggest that when drawing inferences "often 
happens during analysis that a conclusion is plausible, 'makes good sense', 'fits' .. . 
so plausibility, and intuition as the underlying basis for it, is [valuable]." 
Organising data in to clusters aids in its interpretation by grouping objects that 
have similar characteristics (Miles & Huberman, 1994). In this research, the 
clustering of data formed part of the coding process, followed by the grouping of 
more abstract elements during analysis. 
IBY making comparisons across the data set, instances of similar phenomena 
�ay be categorised together. This approach was integral to the category 
�evelopment in the analy tic and theory building processes of this thesis. 
Factor analysis effectively reduces the number of variables by identifying which 
belong together and which seem to measure the same phenomenon. 
Determining the nature of the relationship between variables involves examining 
data to ascertain whether certain variables change directly, change inversely, or 
indicate no relationship at all. 
An intervening variable is one that theoretically affects the observed phenomenon 
but cannot be observed. When variables in this inquiry seemed to be related but 
provided an unsatisfactory explanation, the data was searched for possible 
intervening variables. 
lfhis involves the development of a related sequence of factors so that prior 
�lements of events are related logically to subsequent elements. 
!Having gleaned evidence from the data that appeared to form converging patterns 
�d identify relationships, theory was inducted from that evidence. 
Th1s table 1s adapted from the recommendatiOns m Miles and Huberman (1994). 
3. 7.4 Verification of Conclusions. 
The process of verifYing the conclusions of this study emanated from the previously 
noted concerns regarding the notions of reliability and validity. While Altheide and 
Johnson (1994) argue that methods for establishing confidence in qualitative research 
are poorly defined, Miles and Huberman (1994) submit a number of tactics for 
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verifYing the outcomes of qualitative research. Again for the purposes of coherence 
and parsimony, those employed in this research are outlined below in Table 3.2. 
Tactic 
Checking for 
representativeness. 
Checking for 
researcher effects. 
Triangulation. 
Weighting the 
evidence. 
Ruling out spurious 
relationships. 
Checking out 
rival explanations. 
Looking for 
negative evidence. 
Getting feedback 
from informants. 
Comparing and 
contrasting 
variables. 
Table 3.2 Processes for Verifying Conclusions 
Procedure 
lOuring the interpretive process, data from non-representative sources was 
�crutinised, non-representative events were eliminated from the analysis, and no 
onclusions were drawn from this data. 
f'\ major concern in qualitative data analysis concerns the potential contamination 
pf data caused by the researcher during their inquiry. Potential sources of 
f-'ontamination in this study were: (a) holistic fallacy, whereby extreme evidence is 
gnored so data are interpreted as being more patterned or having greater 
f-'ongruence than they actually did; (b) 'going native ', whereby researcher­
·nformant relationships preclude the pursuit of further investigation lest it damages 
he rapport between the parties; and (c) over-reliance on particular well informed 
espondents. These influences were minimised by considering the material 
presented by a wide range of data sources. 
lfriangulation refers to the use of a combination of methodologies in the study of a 
�ingular phenomenon, and may be applied to both data and theories. Data 
riangulation was achieved by gathering material from a wide variety of sources. 
lfo account for the fact that some data were weaker or more suspect than others, the 
nqurry followed Miles and Huberman's (1994) suggestion that differential 
r,veightings be applied to the data according to (a) informant characteristics, and (b) 
ircumstances under which data were gathered. 
!Explanatory conclusions depend on inferences drawn that suggest that one factor is 
elated to the other. Kidder and Judd (1986) recommend that researchers inspect 
�ach apparent relationship in order to ascertain that other causal processes have not 
produced the inferred relationship. 
Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest that explanations should not be accepted until 
all possibilities had been explored. On finding alternative explanations, resolution 
between competing analyses was reached by retaining all probable explanations 
until one became more compelling as the result of stronger evidence or the weight 
of various sources of evidence. 
!Yin (1994) notes that conclusions should be interrogated for evidence that might 
�isprove an established result, thus this inquiry remained open to contrary findings. 
f'\s part of the triangulation process, the solicitation of feedback involved the 
·nformants reviewing drafts of the case reports. Yin (1994) emphasises the 
mportance of this test as a way of corroborating the essential facts and evidence 
presented in the case report and enhancing the study's construct validity. 
Sowden and Keeves (1988) inform that making comparisons and contrasts between 
persons, cases, groups, roles, activities and sites significantly assists the verification 
process. 
Th1s table 1s adapted from the recommendatwns m Mlles and Huberman (1994). 
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These tactics were applied progressively during the interpretation process, in 
accordance with the suggestion of Webb, Campbell, Schwartz and Sechrest that 
researchers should: 
.. . begin with tactics that are aimed at assuring the basic quality of the data, then move to 
those that check findings by various contrasts, then conclude with tactics that take a 
sceptical, demanding approach to emerging explanations (1966: 66). 
Where possible, then, a variety of tests were used for each outcome and, as a result, 
the rigour ofboth methodology and findings were significantly enhanced. 
3. 7.5 The mode of analysis. 
The interpretation ofthe data, and the verification ofthe conclusions, were facilitated 
by the use of the QSR NUD*IST (version 6.0) software package. In the method 
literature, it has been emphasised that computer software programs such as 
NUD*IST, are of significant value in qualitative analysis and any subsequent theory 
building (Kelle, 1995; Richards & Richards, 1995; Weitzman & Miles, 1995). The 
essential elements of the computerised interpretation and verification procedures were 
as follows. 
The interview transcripts were imported into the NUD*IST software database, 
following which the categories (i.e. the coding of the data) were established as a 
series of nodes. These nodes formed part of an index system that the software depicts 
as a 'stem and leaf system of association. As noted, this information is reproduced 
in Appendix C. The generation of category nodes, and the subsequent coding of the 
data into these nodes, occurred in two stages. 
72 
3. 7.5.1 Stage one coding. 
The initial categories were based upon the subordinate units of analysis, that is, the 
characteristics of the case entities that the researcher sought to understand, namely 
'what is government?',  'the role of government', 'the role of chance', and 'clustering 
in a regional economy' .  These appear as Nodes 1 ,  2, 3, and 4 in the 'stem and leaf 
depiction of concepts. Node 5 was allocated the 'facts and figures' associated with 
the case, and as such contained data relating to industry sales, TLSI market share etc. 
The secondary units of analysis (e.g. the 'leaf concepts such as 'government 
agencies' and 'parliamentarians')  were then attached as sub-categories. The 
interview transcripts were then scrutinised for significant terms, events, and issues 
located therein according to units of observation, and coded according to the index 
system. NUD*IST was then utilised to search the text, and then to allocate segments 
of the data to a designated node. A sample of this process is recorded in Appendix C, 
shows the role that the Tasmanian Bridge Disaster played as a chance event in the 
development of the TLSI cluster (i.e. the content of node 3 . 1). Where it was 
appropriate, data were allocated to more than one node for analysis. 
3. 7.5.2 Stage two coding. 
Nodes 6, 7, and 8 were then established to categorise the results of the analysis of 
nodes 1 through 5 .  Unlike nodes 1 through 5, these nodes were not determined by 
the units of analysis, but rather to group together the outcomes of further analysis. 
NUD*IST was utilised to search through the preliminary 'stage one' coding for those 
factors that were common between the various concepts under review in this study. 
The results were then assigned to node 6-8 sub-categories in a similar fashion to that 
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undertaken in stage one. In accordance with of Porter's ICT, the emergent 'result 
nodes' were: Node 6 :  Government Policy over Life Cycle; Node 7 :  Government 
Policy and Chance Events; and Node 8 :  Development ofPorter's  diamond factors. 
In order to facilitate the theory building process later in the research process, memos 
were maintained about the data, their categories, and the relationships between them 
as they emerged. Designed to store and organise ideas about the data, they were 
integrated into the analytic process. Wilson suggests that memos assist in the 
development of theory in five important ways: 
1. They require that you move your thinking about the idea to a conceptual level. 
2. They summarise the properties of each category so that you can begin to construct 
operational definitions. 
3. They summarise propositions about relationships between categories and their 
propositions. 
4. They begin to integrate categories with clusters of other categories. 
5. They relate your analysis to other theories (1985: 420). 
NUD*IST has a facility for the creation and retention of such memos for later 
consideration and analysis. Utilising the memo capability within the NUD*IST 
package, memo reports were generated by the software during 'stage two' coding. 
From these reports, the interaction between the parties' became clearer, the context of 
the various phenomena surfaced, causes and effects were revealed, and motivations 
were exposed. The manner in which this material was used to develop the outcomes 
of the study is presented in the next section. 
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3.8 DEVELOPING RESEARCH OUTCOMES. 
Consistent with the stated research purposes, the analysis led to descriptive, 
exploratory, and explanatory outcomes. These were achieved in the following 
manner. 
3.8.1 The descriptive outcome. 
The role of description in qualitative inquiry extends beyond a mere narration of the 
phenomena of the case. Instead, it presents the issues and themes that are central to 
the analysis, either through the illustration of a particular theme, or as a method of 
demonstrating a combination of issues (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). Given that this 
study involved the input from 25 actors whose experience of the phenomena stretches 
over 25 years, the issues and themes in this research were contextually bound, and 
therefore, their purpose and meanings could not be captured without first 
understanding their origins. The complexity of the Tasmanian government's 
interaction with the TLSI in light of the economic climate of the region could only be 
comprehended by producing 'thick descriptions' of the contextual elements. This 
approach is recommended by Guba and Lincoln (1989). The literal accounts oftime, 
place, economic circumstance, and so on embedded in the report facilitated the 
interpretation of the subjects' attitudes and values from their concrete behavioural 
displays. From these accounts, analytical judgements concerning the research 
question were made, working propositions generated, and relationships identified. 
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As no research can incorporate all aspects of a case, the report in this thesis represents 
an incomplete representation of the phenomena. However, the abridgement of 
peripheral data did not diminish the interpretive value of the investigation. 
Addressing this issue, Hughes suggests that: 
.. . although descriptions have a fringe of incompleteness about them .. . this does not 
impair their ability to do the job, since nothing like completeness is ever attempted by the 
speaker of a natural language. Often a single descriptor will provide an adequate 
description .. . the remaining particulars being, as it were, bracketed away for present 
purposes or their sense 'filled in' using the specifics of the context in which they are used 
(1980: 85). 
As an instrument through which the phenomena of an episode are exposed (Sekaran, 
1992), the descriptive component is clearly the foundation of case study research. 
Having identified the phenomena of the TLSI case, the researcher could investigate 
the dimensions, manifestations, and relationships of those phenomena. This is 
discussed below. 
3.8.2 The exploratory outcome. 
The distinguishing feature of inductive inquiry is that theoretical concepts emerge 
from the case data, rather than being imposed upon it (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). 
Inductive research is related to symbolic interaction (Chenitz & Swanson, 1986), a 
theoretical model in which investigation focuses on the ways people communicate 
and interpret meaning. By viewing the subjects' behaviour from this perspective, 
theories and propositions about social phenomena can be derived from the data of 
social research. 
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Emanating from the narrative data, from the findings of previous research, and 
researcher preconceptions, inductive research may not be able to offer the concrete 
reassurance that the hypothetical-deductive approach offers (Denzin & Lincoln, 
1994). However, inductive theory building does produce valuable research outcomes 
that are 'less sterile' then hypothesis testing. The generation of theory from case 
evidence in this study used four procedures: category development; linking 
categories; testing emerging relationships; and connecting with existing theory. Each 
is briefly described below. 
As noted, category (node) development was executed utilising NUD*IST software. 
Throughout the coding process, data were assigned to emerging categories to build a 
hierarchy of 'units of analysis'. In this procedure, Field and Morse suggest that: 
Identified categories are accumulated until it becomes clear to the researcher those 
properties and characteristics of the elements which fit into that particular category. The 
researcher can then identify the criteria for further instances that would fit the specific 
category. A category is saturated when no new information on the characteristics of the 
category are forthcoming (1985: 1 1 1). 
Once a category was 'saturated', a definition based on its inherent properties was 
formulated so as to demonstrate further data collection and stimulate theoretical 
reflection. Categories were refined, produced and discarded as required. 
The links between the vanous categories were identified through the use of the 
NUD*IST software, and integrated into the 'result nodes' 6 through 9. Scrutiny of 
the result node reports facilitated consideration of preliminary propositions, a 
recommended by Eisenhardt: 
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From the within-site analysis . . .  overall impressions, tentative themes, concepts, and 
possible relationships between variables begin to emerge. The next step of this highly 
iterative process is to compare systematically the emergent frame with evidence from 
[the] case in order to assess how well or poorly it fits with the case data (1989: 542). 
In order to test the emerging relationships, key variables within the 'result node' 
reports were identified and studied to ensure relationships held within and between 
categories. Although Eisenhardt's (1989) discussion of this process focussed on the 
multiple case study method, the principle holds for single case designs. Rather than 
testing relationships between individual perspectives were investigated: 
A step in shaping hypotheses is verifying that the emergent relationships between 
constructs fit with the evidence in each case. Sometimes a relationship is confirmed by 
the case evidence, while at other times it is revised, disconfirmed, or thrown out for 
insufficient evidence. This verification process is similar to that in traditional 
hypothesis research (Eisenhardt, 1989: 542). 
The emergent propositions were then compared to, and contrasted with, existing 
theory. This imperative is emphasised by Eisenhardt: 
Examining literature which conflicts with the emergent theory is important for two 
reasons. First, if researchers ignore conflicting findings, then confidence in the 
findings is reduced. Second . . .  conflicting literature presents an opportunity. The 
juxtaposition . . .  forces researchers into a more creative, frame-breaking mode of 
thinking . . .  The result can be deeper insight into both the emergent theory and the 
conflicting literature . . .  Literature discussing similar findings . . .  ties together underlying 
similarities in phenomena normally not associated with each other. The result is often 
a theory with a stronger internal validity, wider generalisability, and a higher 
conceptual level (1989: 544). 
Eisenhardt's ( 1989) approach is similar to Yin's (1994) tactic of pattern matching in 
which empirically based patterns coincide with, or contradict predicted patterns. 
Hartwig and Dearing (1979: 9) emphasise the procedures discussed above by 
suggesting that the "underlying assumption of the exploratory approach is that the 
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more one knows about the data, the more effectively data can be used to develop, test, 
and refine theory." Having identified the exploratory outcomes of the TLSI case, the 
researcher was able to identify the specific roles undertaken by the Tasmanian 
government over the TLSI cluster's  life cycle, and propose a plausible Diamond 
Factor Model for a regional Australian economy. The identification of these 
government roles also allowed the researcher to undertake analysis so to explain their 
rationale over the TLSI cluster's  life cycle. 
3.8.3 The explanatory outcome. 
Unlike quantitative research, where causal relationships are determined by the 
statistical analysis of dependent and independent variables, qualitative inquiry 
explanation rests on the researcher's  observation of the same, but from the case 
description (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). Due to the complexity of the 
interrelationships and the imprecise measures inherent in the interpretive approach, 
the explanatory process relies on deriving, organising, and integrating ideas about the 
manner in which phenomena are interrelated, and which offer understanding of the 
underlying causes of phenomena (Polit & Hungler, 1993). 
Warning that the process of explanation building from case studies is not well 
documented, Yin suggests that the final explanation results from a series of iterations, 
and recommends the following procedure: 
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� Making an initial theoretical statement or an initial proposition. 
� Comparing the findings of an initial case against such a statement or 
proposition. 
� Revising the statement or proposition. 
� Again revising the statement or proposition. 
� Comparing the revision to the facts of a second, third, or more cases. 
� Repeating this process as many times as is needed (1994: 1 1 1). 
Although Yin's (1994) process refers to multiple case studies, its basic features were 
applied in this research. As explanatory research invariably leads to alternative 
conclusions about the same set of results, Yin's (1994) iterative approach clarified the 
outcomes by consolidating some findings and discounting others. 
3.9 CHAPTER SUMMARY. 
This chapter described the methodological issues relating to the research. Based upon 
the need for a longitudinal qualitative approach to the research questions, the single 
case study method was used to address the descriptive, exploratory, and explanatory 
purposes of the inquiry. A protocol was developed to guide the investigation, and to 
assist in any further consideration of the case. Information was gathered using 
documentary records and semi-structured interviews. Verification was fundamental 
to the study, and was engaged at every stage of the inquiry. The processual elements 
were particularly influenced by Eisenhardt (1989), Miles and Huberman (1994), and 
Yin (1994). The categorisation, coding, and analysis of the case data was undertaken 
using the NUD*IST software package, details of which are included in Appendix C. 
The following chapters present the results of the adopted methodological approach, 
and are discussed in accordance with the 'organisation of the thesis' presented in 
Chapter One. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE TASMANIAN LIGHT SHIP 
CLUSTER: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW. 
4.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE CHAPTER. 
The objectives of this chapter are two-fold. Firstly, it provides a brief account of the 
interaction between Australia's shipbuilding industry and government policy 
development since 1789. As such, the chapter provides the political and economic 
context within which the TLSI cluster was to eventually develop. Secondly, this 
chapter provides an account of the events surrounding the emergence of the TLSI 
cluster between 1975 and 2002. This chapter, therefore, provides the basic historical 
context upon which the analysis and discussion of the research questions will be 
based. 
4.2 AN ACCOUNT OF THE HISTORICAL INTERACTION BETWEEN 
GOVERNMENT POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND AUSTRALIA'S 
SHIPBUILD lNG INDUSTRY 1789-1990. 
Australian shipbuilding has a history dating back to 1789, with the construction of the 
nation's first commercial vessel, the 10-ton convict carrier Rose Hill Packet (Inglis, 
1988). As the population of Australia's colonies grew (through the arrival of convicts 
and free-settlers) it became clear to those in government that a strong need existed for 
trade amongst the colony's  major centres (Hughes, 1968). The vastness of the 
Australian mainland (characterised by an absence of road or rail systems) and the fact 
that one of the British outposts was the island colony of Van Dieman's Land 
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(hereafter 'Tasmania'), meant that shipping lines presented the most efficient form of 
cargo transport available (Hughes, 1968). Fears were expressed, though, as to the 
possibility of convicts using the newly constructed ships in their escape plans. The 
need for colonial trading, however, outweighed many ofthe concerns surrounding the 
possibility of prison escapees, and the decision was taken by the New South Wales 
(NSW) colonial government to construct the first dedicated shipyard in Sydney Town 
in 1795 (Hughes, 1988; Inglis, 1988). 
The benefits of trade between the colonies were soon realised, and during the early 
part of the 19th century, a vibrant private sector shipbuilding industry developed 
(Hughes, 1988). The profit potential of the industry was quickly recognised by 
entrepreneurs at the time, with the first of many privately owned and controlled 
shipyards appearing in Sydney Town in 1798 (Flannery, 2000). By 1 820, in response 
to the increased shipbuilding activity undertaken by the private sector, the NSW 
Board of Trade Department relaxed the regulations governing the tonnage 
measurements and hull design of Australian colonial shipbuilding. The alteration 
effectively enabled Australian shipbuilders to undertake the design and construction 
of 'more innovative vessels' in line with the American and Spanish trend towards 
more 'racy' models (Inglis, 1988). 
By the 1830's, the ability of Australia's shipbuilding industry to innovate both ship 
design and construction was well established (Inglis, 1988). Nowhere in Australia, 
however, had the innovative spirit been more effectively adopted than in Tasmania. 
In Tasmania, shipbuilding was the logical response to the obvious needs of an island 
community with a prosperous whaling and sealing industry (Hughes, 1968). The 
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Tasmanian colonial builders began to construct vessels large enough to take their 
place on the lucrative Australia-England route, and between 1838 and 1 848, 107 
vessels were built in the island colony. By the 1 850s, five main centres of 
shipbuilding activity developed in the island colony: in the northern town Launceston, 
the capital of Hobart, the Huon River district, and at the penal settlements - first 
Macquarie Harbour, and then later at Port Arthur (Hughes, 1988). 
During this time, the Tasmanian shipbuilding industry was producing more ships than 
all of the other Australian colonies combined (Hughes, 1968). It was the five-year 
period to 1 853, however, that was the height of ship building in Tasmania, with 1 18 
vessels constructed at an average of 78 tonnes apiece. Included in these was the 
largest ship built at that time in Australia, the 580 tonne Tasman. The factor 
conditions cited for Tasmania's dominance in colonial shipbuilding was the 
associated labour and transport costs, which were significantly lower in Tasmania 
than in the mainland colonies, and the availability and excellence of the native timber 
for ship construction (Hughes, 1968). 
In 190 1, the s1x colonial governments undertook a constitutional agreement to 
incorporate a federal system of government, in addition to the colonial system already 
in place, to oversee issues affecting Australia as a Commonwealth nation. In 191 1 ,  
the federal Australian government undertook its first major naval shipbuilding 
program (Denoon, Wyndham & Mein-Smith, 2000). The prospect of World War I 
saw further increases in demand for ship construction, albeit driven by federal 
government demand for military vessels. Between 1912 and 1917, Australian 
shipyards completed 'an impressive number' of major vessels for the war effort, 
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especially given the relatively small sizes of shipyards throughout the country (Royal 
Australian Navy, 2001). 
By 1918,  the wartime losses to the Australian fleet were substantial, and the federal 
government undertook two main strategies to overcome the shortage. Firstly, the 
federal government established the publicly owned 'Australian Shipping Line', from 
which it hoped to recover wartime losses through the generation of demand for new 
vessels. Secondly, it launched a major localised shipbuilding design and 
manufacturing programs in each of the states to further alleviate the transport issues 
associated with Australia's inadequate ship numbers (Beeson, 1997). The federal 
government's  industry plans remained reasonably intact throughout the economically 
buoyant 1920s, but were somewhat ineffective in the context of the Great Depression 
that assumed global economic prominence in 1929. Indeed, by the nadir of the 
depression in 1933, there was virtually no shipbuilding in Australia, with most of the 
remaining shipyards diversifYing into heavy engineering products in order to remain 
open for business (Beeson, 1997). 
The Great Depression's influence upon economic activity was eventually overcome 
by the expectation of a second world war (Madsen, 2001). Germany, a nation 
unhappy with the reparation payments to the allies and the failure of the Weimar 
Republic after the First World War had increased its military capabilities and had 
begun to annex adjacent provinces (The History Place Web-site, 2001). Other nations 
emulated the German increases in production, especially in terms of military and 
naval manufacturing; Australia was no exception. Indeed, between 1933 and the 
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beginning of World War II, in excess of one thousand tonnes of ships were built to 
completion by Australian shipyards (Hughes, 1988). 
The prospect of World War II also witnessed the resurgence of Tasmanian 
shipbuilding in both the private shipyards and in the newly established state 
government yard at Hobart's Prince of Wales Bay. The government yard constructed 
wooden-hulled cargo vessels to 600 tonnes and at its peak employed more than 600 
people. Private yards at Battery Point in Hobart, and on the Tamar River in the 
northern city of Launceston, built shallow-draft hospital vessels and harbour defence 
motor launches. Australian shipbuilding received a further boost during the Second 
World War, with production increased to such an extent that during the war period 
itself, 120 vessels (an average of one per fortnight) were launched ready for duty 
(Royal Australian Navy, 2001). By the end of the war, approximately 20 000 people 
were directly engaged in the building of ships and in the production of machinery 
required for the shipbuilding industry. Given the extent of federal government orders 
and involvement in the industry during this period, it was less than surprising that by 
1945, the principal shipyards were those run by the federal government (Inglis, 1988). 
After the surge of activity associated with the war effort, the industry again declined 
and stabilised at a level commensurate with servicing the local demand for fishing 
vessels and other craft. In efforts to once again stimulate the private sector's  interest 
in the nation's shipbuilding industry, the federal government introduced the first of its 
subsidy schemes in 1947 (Beeson, 1997). The subsidy was aimed at protecting 
Australia's post-war industry from somewhat more efficient international competitors, 
and allowing domestic customers to purchase ships from Australian producers at 
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competitive prices. The subsidy itself was in the form of a 25 percent rebate to 
shipbuilders on the total costs associated with building a vessel greater than 500 gross 
tons (Beeson, 1997). 
The subsidy system heralded a golden age for Australian shipbuilders, with both naval 
and merchant shipbuilding programs maintained at levels not approached during any 
similar peacetime period (Beeson, 1997). The system was deemed so important to the 
survival and nurturing of the industry, that successive federal governments not only 
retained the subsidy, but also increased its influence and availability. For example, in 
1955, the subsidy was increased to 33 percent of the costs incurred in the manufacture 
of vessels greater than 500 gross tons. In 1964, the availability was increased to those 
manufacturers that produced vessels greater than 200 gross tons. In 1969, the subsidy 
was increased to a 45 percent rebate on total production costs, and lastly, in 1972, the 
subsidy was made available to all producers of vessels greater than 150 gross tons. 
Due to the policy initiative, the Australian shipbuilding industry throughout the 20th 
Century was characterised by the construction of large vessels for commercial 
activities, of which 90 percent were for the domestic market (Inglis, 1988). 
Federal government support was also forthcoming through other channels. In 1956, 
for example, the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation (EFIC) was established in 
order to increase demand for Australian ships in the international marketplace 
(Beeson, 1997). EFIC's  purpose was to promote the export sales of Australian ships 
by providing the finance to international buyers to purchase Australian ships. More 
specifically, EFIC provided up to 80 percent of the purchase price of new vessels to 
buyers at an interest rate of some eight percent per annum, for a maximum loan term 
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of eight and one half years (Beeson, 1997). Although the government schemes helped 
to protect the nation's  shipbuilding industry from international competition, thereby 
protecting jobs and issues of national security, they also had the quite deleterious 
effects of a 'false economy' that would eventually serve to cripple the industry 
(Beeson, 1997). 
The protectionist approach of successive federal governments, manifesting in marked 
increases in subsidy assistance, meant that Australian shipbuilding firms were not 
exposed to the demand cycles of the international market, a fact borne out by the 
economic shocks and rationalism that would characterise politics in the 1970s and 
1980s (Beeson, 1997). Due to major oil price rises in the mid 1970s, which saw 300 
percent increases in the cost of fuel, the western first-world economies experienced a 
new economic phenomenon of 'stagflation' , which was characterised by markedly 
increased production costs and simultaneously diminishing demand (Helliwell, 1988). 
The result for the shipbuilding industry was that demand for merchant shipping declined 
by 45 percent world-wide between 1974 and 1976, creating an over-supply of 
shipbuilding capacity of the order of 50 percent (Lloyd's Register, 1977). This slump 
continued through the 1970s and well into the 1980s, as the effects of the oil crisis 
impacted upon a shipbuilding industry endeavouring to recover from the first wave of 
economic instability (Lipietz, 1987; Strath, 1987; Todd, 1985). The resultant 
recessionary conditions in Australia were manifested in increased unemployment, 
significant inflationary pressure on commodity prices, and a decrease in governmental 
support for the 'Fortress Australia' economy afforded by numerous subsidy and tariff 
schemes. 
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The Australian shipbuilding industry, which had been heavily supported by direct 
government subsidies since 1947, suffered greatly during 1974-1976, but given the 
long lead-time associated with ship construction, the consequences ofthe 'oil shocks' 
took several years to noticeably take effect (Beeson, 1997). By the end of the 1970s, 
however, and even with a reduced subsidy of 25 percent of costs, the Australian 
shipbuilding had regressed once again to virtually nil production, and was viewed 
globally as being synonymous with inefficiency, low productivity (i.e. obsolete plant 
and equipment), poor management practices, and antagonistic industrial relations 
(Holland, 2001). Although the contraction of Australia's shipbuilding industry was 
not unique in the world at this time, the reduction was so severe that Australia 
shipbuilders alone accounted for fifteen percent of the world's  diminished production 
between 1975 and 1985, a figure second only to Sweden (Beeson, 1997). 
In an effort to rejuvenate the nation's  shipbuilding industry and partially dismantle the 
policies 'protecting' the nation's shipbuilding industry, the federal government 
introduced the Bounty Ships Act of 1980, which 'replaced' the existing subsidy 
scheme and effectively increasing the rebate to producers to 28 percent of production 
costs. Although the Act did allow shipbuilders partial relief from the economic 
downturn, it was essentially an identical policy platform to its predecessor, and did 
little to encourage the development of an internationally competitive sector. Indeed, 
the Australian shipbuilding industry continued to operate without reference to external 
competitive market forces and technological development (Beeson, 1997). 
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Given the demonstrable lack of shipbuilding industry reform in the deregulating 
Australian economy, the federal government undertook a further redesign of the 
Bounty Ships Act in 1984. The critical difference was that Australian shipbuilders 
could now only access the rebates available if they met targets associated with the 
export sales of their vessels; in short, the Act was only accessible to firms that could 
compete in the international market. The effectiveness of the Act was demonstrated 
by the fact that between 1984 and 1989, export orders for Australian built vessels 
increased from virtually nil to approximately $150 million (Shipbuilding Industry 
Report, 1992). The Bounty Ships Act also had the desired effect upon the structure of 
the industry, with a report from the Review Committee on Marine Industries, Science, 
and Technologies stating that: 
The [Australian] shipbuilding industry has successfully restructured itself in the last 
five years [1987-1992] to become a successful exporter with good prospects for the 
future, based on quality, innovation, entrepreneurship, management skills and 
improved technology (Shipbuilding Industry Report, 1992:1). 
Further revisions to the Bounty Ships Act were made in 1989, which redefined the 
gross dead weight criteria and export markets that qualified for the federal 
government assistance (Beeson, 1997). The changes included a restriction of the 
ship's  dead weight capacity to between 150 gross tons and twenty thousand gross 
tons, and further stipulated that the term 'export' did not include the country of New 
Zealand, nor to any authority governed by a Commonwealth nation. The renewed 
focus of the shipbuilding assistance program was upon the generation of export sales, 
and resulted in the need for Australian shipbuilders to incorporate world-best 
practices in their market research (i.e. identifying market opportunities) and research 
& design (i.e. improving its levels of quality and innovation) (Industry Audit, 1998). 
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In addition to the change in the Bounty Ships Act, the federal government also 
introduced new legislation in the form of the Shipbuilding Innovation Scheme Bounty 
Act 1989. The purpose of this Act was to encourage and strengthen the industry' s  
focus upon product research and development, as well as design innovation. It 
attempted to achieve this end by providing a 50 percent subsidy rebate on research 
and development expenses, as well as a two percent subsidy rebate for costs in 
changing methods of production (Shipbuilding Industry Report, 2001 ). Since the 
1990s, the Australian shipbuilding industry has received little additional federal 
government attention in terms of assistance packages, with the majority of its policy 
development directed at industrial relation reforms (see Holland, 2001). Given the 
diminishing federal protectionism for the shipbuilding industry since the 1980s, it is 
interesting to note the active role that the Tasmanian government undertook in the 
facilitation of the state's TLSI cluster during this time. Given the research questions 
posed in Chapter Two, the next section focuses on the incidents and interactions that 
lead to the inception and development of the TLSI cluster between 1970 and 2002. 
4.3 THE HISTORY OF THE EMERGENCE OF THE TLSI CLUSTER: 1970-2002. 
4.3.1 Tragedy and the inception of the TLSI cluster's hub firm: International 
Catamarans. 
During the early 1970s, there had been some political discussion concerning the 
reintroduction of a 'Trans-Derwent' ferry service in Tasmania (Wickham & Hanson, 
2002). It had been suggested that the service would be one that predominantly served 
the state's  tourist population, given the prominence of the Derwent River in the 
capital city's  landscape. Robert Clifford (hereafter 'Clifford'), a Tasmanian 
shipbuilder and entrepreneur, was keen to initiate this business opportunity, and in 
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1972, he and his father formed the Sullivan's Cove Ferry Company. Clifford was so 
enthusiastic about the new venture that he simultaneously approached two friends 
(Trevor Hardstaff and Bill Burnett) at the Hobart Marine Construction Company with 
some preliminary design plans for his proposed 'Derwent River Ferry' (Clifford, 
1998). 
Clifford was keen to have production underway immediately, and in fact, the details 
of his ferry' s  design were "'worked out by the builder and Clifford as construction 
progressed" (Clifford, 1998: 14). By mid-1972, construction of Clifford's first ferry, 
the 20-metre steel-hulled Matthew Brady (named after an infamous Australian 
bushranger) was completed by Clifford and of his friends. Armed with a suitable 
vessel to handle a passenger ferry service across the Derwent River, all that the 
Sullivan's Cove Ferry Company had to accomplish was a successful bid for the rights 
to service the market (Wickham & Hanson, 2002). 
Business proved to be highly profitable in the early stages of the newly formed ferry 
service, with both tourists and locals taking advantage of the novel attraction. In 
order for Clifford to generate sales growth, and indeed protect his source of income, 
he decided to build a second ferry. A second ferry was designed, commissioned, and 
built in 1973 by the same builders as the Matthew Brady. Again, the ferry was named 
after an Australian bushranger, this time James McCabe. Technologies had improved 
since the construction of the Matthew Brady, and as such, the new ferry was actually 
somewhat faster and more comfortable than the original (Clifford, 1998). The 
decision to construct a second ferry was to prove rather fortuitous given the tragic 
events in early 1975. 
9 1  
On the 5th January, at 9:27 p.m., the commercial bulk ore carrier Lake Illawarra 
crashed into the 19th pier of the Tasman Bridge, claiming twelve lives, and severing 
the well populated Eastern Shore's link with the city of Hobart by knocking out an 80 
metre section of the bridge (Wickham & Hanson, 2001 ). The physical separation of 
Hobart's  eastern shore residents from the west meant that the only access to the city's  
central business district was a single-lane, country road detour, which in peak traffic 
could take several hours to traverse (Wickham & Hanson, 2002). Tens of thousands 
of motorists and cyclists were now unable to travel easily to their required 
destinations, be it for work or pleasure; Clifford was in the enviable position of 'being 
in the right place at the right time' .  
4.3.2 Inception ofthe TLSI cluster: The emergence of the hub-firm. 
In response to the increased demand for river transport that resulted from the Tasman 
Bridge tragedy, Clifford's family business hurriedly built a third ferry, the Martin 
Cash. Such was the priority of the project that "records were broken in the rush to get 
the craft into service quickly" (Clifford, 1998: 18). Although the ferry service 
boasted a third boat, demand for the ferry service comfortably exceeded supply, and 
in late 1975, a fourth ferry was commissioned. Given the urgency of demand in the 
market, the latest ferry, the Lawrence Kavanagh, was constructed by Clifford's 
business in what was also described as a 'record time' .  As with the Martin Cash, 
there was little fanfare at its launch, simply a push into the Derwent River on her way 
to pick up a load of customers. The four bushrangers were to serve as a monopoly 
west-east link for three years, and transport in excess of nine million paying 
passengers whilst repairs to the Tasman Bridge were underway. 
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In order to improve customer service and increase the business' revenues, Clifford 
hired a technologically advanced, British-built fast ferry, the Michael Howe. The 
Michael Howe was twice as fast and twice as comfortable as the 'bushranger fleet' 
owned by Clifford, and was an instant success with the public. Unfortunately, the 
Michael Howe was also a maintenance intensive investment, with 75 percent of all 
company maintenance expenditure spent on the new vessel (Clifford, 1998). Clifford 
was unimpressed with the boat's design and maintenance requirements, despite the 
public's obvious delight with the faster service (Wickham & Hanson, 2002). The 
flaws that Clifford observed in the ferry's  design (for example, that the mechanics 
were far too complicated and maintenance intensive) motivated him to build and 
design his own range of fast catamarans. Clifford was noted as commenting that: "If 
the English can sell 34 heaps of rubbish like this [around the world], how many 
properly engineered fast ships could we sell from Tasmania?" (Clifford, 1998: 22). 
With this opportunity, the Clifford business began its foray into the fast-ferry building 
industry. 
The question for Clifford was how to develop a boat with the speed and the passenger 
appeal of a fast-moving vessel, yet maintain the basic economies of a conventional 
ferry. Clifford, with the help of friends that worked in other Tasmanian maritime 
businesses, studied the merits of numerous low-resistance hovercrafts and the 
catamaran-style hovercraft was chosen as the best available design template. Clifford 
used this hovercraft design, but altered it to include twin-hulls (somewhat wider that 
the norm for catamarans at the time) but to exclude the 'air-lift equipment' standard to 
the hovercraft altogether (Clifford, 1998). Under the tenets of recently introduced 
Tasmanian Strategy Plan (SSP), however, the 'thought provoking' ship design was 
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not sanctioned by the maritime authorities as a legal means for general public 
transportation. In accordance with the legislation supporting the SSP, whose aim was 
to ensure higher quality production from within the state's  industry (see Green, 
Garcia, Chaple, & Davis, 2002), Clifford (and indeed every shipbuilder within the 
state) was forced to seek the services of a qualified naval architect to endorse any new 
ship design. Given that no such expert existed in Tasmania, Clifford had to travel to 
New South Wales to meet the certified naval architect, Phil Hercus, who resided in 
Sydney. The plans were checked by Hercus for design flaws, and after he issued a 
certification of seaworthiness, the Jeremiah Ryan was conceived with the sanction of 
the government authorities (Clifford, 1998). 
Given the inadequacy of Clifford's own shipyard to accommodate the construction of 
the new vessel design, the Jeremiah Ryan was built in a Tasmanian government 
owned wharf shed at Hobart's Prince of Wales Bay in September 1977. Construction 
of the vessel was undertaken by collaboration between Clifford employees and a 
number of Tasmanian maritime tradesmen. Although not as stylish as Clifford may 
have liked, the steel catamaran was considered a major breakthrough, achieving some 
twenty-six knots in initial speed trials, considerably more than the eighteen originally 
hoped for in the design stage. After the success of the Jeremiah Ryan, Clifford and 
Hercus entered into a partnership to form International Catamarans (Incat) Pty Ltd of 
Australia, one of Tasmania's most successful business ventures (Wickham & Hanson, 
2002). 
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4.3.3 The Tasmanian shipbuilding industry in 1977: An introduction to the 
existing TLSI cluster firms. 
In 1977, Tasmania's shipbuilding industry consisted of a loose collection of single 
business firms, catering to the needs of specific target markets (such as specialised 
steel hull construction, winch construction, marine maintenance etc). Of the eleven 
entities that comprised the TLSI cluster in 2002, only five were operating in 1977, the 
year that the TLSI cluster's  'hub firm' - International Catamarans - was established. 
The five entities were Colbeck & Gunton, Skeel's & Perkins, Muir Engineering, FC 
Management, and the publicly funded Australian Maritime College (AMC). Colbeck 
& Gunton, established in 1976, began their operations as an insulation contractor 
involved in both the domestic (home insulation) and industrial market (providing 
insulation for existing commercial operations and new building constructions). 
Skeel's & Perkins, a foundry and machining business, specialised in the construction 
of general engineering products for commercial use. In particular, the firm focused its 
business on precision-machined components made from cast iron, alloy steel, stainless 
steel, bronze, and aluminium. Muir Engineering, established in 1968, specialised in 
the manufacture of winches and anchoring systems for the marine sector. FC 
Management was established to cater for the demand for steel hulled tuna fishing 
vessels; as such it specialised in both the design and construction of fishing vessels. 
In 1977, the federally funded AMC represented the only training institution serving 
the specific educational requirements of the nation's  marine sector. The AMC was 
formed three years prior to the establishment of Incat, and is located in Tasmania's 
second largest population centre, the City ofLaunceston. 
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4.3.4 An overview of the international success of /neat and the emergence of the 
TLSI cluster: 1977 - 2002. 
The AMC, originally formed in 1974, was charged with providing the training needs 
of Australia's domestically focused shipbuilding industry. However, given the 
Australian federal government's policy to improve the nation's standing as an 
international shipbuilding centre, in 1977 the AMC's role was fundamentally altered 
such that it responsible for the modernisation of the national industry's training 
programs to international standards. So important was this change, that almost 
immediately after its corporatisation the federal government provided it with a $3.4 
million fisheries training vessel (The Examiner, 1979a), as well as a new $3 million 
three-story state-of-the-art education complex (The Examiner, 1979b ). Of the new 
training centre, a representative of the state's  Labor government stated that: 
The development of the Australian Maritime College is one of the most important 
educational building operations to occur in Tasmania's history. Shipbuilding in 
Tasmania will continue to be buoyant as long as education continues to expand in the 
state. The extensive education complex being developed on the banks of the Tamar 
River at Newnham will do much to ensure shipbuilding buoyancy. The $3 million 
contract is for a three-story building, which will provide about 22 205 square metres of 
floor space for classrooms, laboratories and office accommodation (The Examiner, 
1979b). 
Despite the AMC's charter for improving the educational infrastructure for the marine 
sector, the firm driving the innovation within the local Tasmanian industry, Incat, 
didn't use the institution in its development of the world's first 'aluminium and steel' 
hull, nor the world's first all-aluminium hull in 1979. During this time, there existed 
no aluminium welding theory for the AMC to instruct; given the nature of the alloy 
itself there was little call for such knowledge (aluminium alloy contains wood as one 
of its major ingredients, and ignites at the high temperatures associated with the 
welding process). Instead, and given his desire to build lighter and faster catamarans, 
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Clifford was forced to call on the tacit knowledge and experience of other Tasmanian 
shipbuilders to help design, and construct, the required aluminium-based hulls in a 
trial and error fashion on the Derwent River (Clifford, 1998). 
The trial and error research undertaken by Clifford (and his network of maritime 
industry friends) was eventually successful, and resulted in the construction of the 
first steel-aluminium catamaran, the first of which to be sold was the James Kelly in 
June of 1979. The project was considered highly important, as it was the initial foray 
into new shipbuilding technologies and processes, the most important of which was 
arguably the perfection of aluminium-based welding. The radical design and building 
processes invented by Incat resulted in the company's  ferries being much faster and 
cheaper to run than the conventional ferry designs. Consequently, the purchasers of 
the James Kelly considered it a great success. The commercial success of the James 
Kelly soon became the talk of the maritime industry, and resulted in the first export 
orders for Tasmania's aluminium catamarans (Clifford, 1998). 
Although the Australian federal and Tasmanian state governments were not involved 
in Clifford's experimentation during the late 1970s, they were both involved in efforts 
to position Tasmania as a centre for maritime research. In an effort to take advantage 
of Tasmania's geographical location and resurgence as a centre for maritime 
innovation, a number of state government initiatives were implemented in the late 
1970s and early 1980s aimed at positioning Hobart as Australia's southern centre for 
Antarctic and marine research. In 1980, moves were made in the federal parliament 
(by Tasmanian senators) to transfer the oceanographic research unit of the 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and the 
97 
base for a new Antarctic research vessel to Hobart. The main argument supporting 
this move was Hobart's geographic location as Australia's closest port to Antarctica 
and the Great Southern Ocean (The Mercury, 1980). After the successful 
implementation of this strategy, the Tasmanian government undertook further 
measures in 1981 to boost the state's shipbuilding interests by planning a one-stop 
international ship repair and servicing industry to capitalise on the state's  growing 
reputation as a centre for maritime research and innovation (The Mercury, 1981 ). 
By 1982, the reputation and demand for !neat's aluminium fast ferries had increased 
to such a level that the Clifford claimed his company were unable to fulfill many 
orders, due to both the number, and size of boats requested (Clifford, 1998; The 
Mercury, 1982). Due to this increased workload, and missed sales opportunities, 
Incat began negotiations with the Tasmanian government to purchase part of the state 
owned 'Gasworks' site on Hobart's waterfront. The application was met with some 
governmental bureaucratic resistance, as the site in question was not specifically 
zoned for such use. However, after Clifford met with the Premier Gray to explain the 
importance of a new and larger factory to !neat's growth potential, and its feasibility 
to remain within the state, the Tasmanian government undertook direct action that 
cleared the way for the firm to purchase the site (The Examiner, 1982). The nature of 
!neat's negotiation with the Tasmanian government, a strategy that would be repeated 
in many of its future dealings, may be implied in a government press release that 
accompanied the announcement: 
. . .  the government is pleased to be able to open the way for Incat to stay in Tasmania. 
The company is an important employer in its own right, and created work for local 
suppliers and sub-contractors. [A government spokesperson] said that the company 
had developed reliable vessels and was reaping the rewards ofthe initiative and skill of 
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its founders . . . . he also gave credit to the local suppliers and sub-contractors who had 
contributed to the vessel construction (Cleary, 1982: 1). 
The Tasmanian government's facilitation of Incat' s relocation to the Gasworks site in 
Hobart not only served to secure the company's  employment of Tasmanian workers; 
it also had beneficial consequences for those firms associated with Incat. By the mid 
1980s, Clifford had begun to incorporate the production output of some other local 
marine manufacturers in his newly conceived vessels. For example, peripheral items 
to !neat's catamaran construction, such as safety equipment and insulation were now 
sourced from local manufacturers Muir Engineering and Skeel's & Perkins. In order 
to secure these orders from Incat, however, these firms were required to similarly 
innovate their products to suit the light-weight needs of lncat' s new generation of fast 
catamaran. 
Further Tasmanian government support was forthcoming for Incat in 1983, when 
Premier Gray backed a proposal from Incat to build a revolutionary wave-piercing 
catamaran for the Tasmanian government-controlled Bass Strait passenger ferry 
service (Clifford, 1998). Incat had approached the Tasmanian government with the 
idea, and a plea for financial assistance for the development of the vessel, which was 
estimated to cost between $6 and $8 million to produce (The Mercury, 1983). 
Clifford said of this plea that "government support is crucial to the development ofthe 
vessel. . .  and development grants are available and we have applied for them" (The 
Mercury, 1983: 7). The new wave-piercing catamaran was funded by grants from 
both the Tasmanian and federal governments in mid-1984. The Tasmanian 
government's  support for !neat's project came in the form of a loan guarantee for $8 
million, one that would have been paid by the Tasmanian taxpayer had Incat 
defaulted. The federal government grant was in the form of a dollar-for-dollar 
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reimbursement to Incat for the amount it spent developing the concept, an amount that 
equated to approximately $250 000 (The Examiner, 1984). The construction and 
testing of the new wave-piercing catamaran was also the first time that Incat had 
utilised the services of the AMC, which had recently been granted funds to install a 
state-of-the-art tank testing facility (The Advocate, 1984). The tank-testing facility 
was of critical value to the project, as it enabled Incat to cost effectively trial smaller 
prototypes than would have been impossible under their trial-and-error method on the 
Derwent River. 
In 1984, the Tasmanian government established a department charged with managing 
the states economic development - the Tasmanian Development Authority (TDA). 
Unsurprisingly, one of the department's  first duties was to aid the expansion of the 
state's  shipbuilding industry through the provision of public funds towards new 
shipbuilding projects within the state (Fisher, 1984). The major capital provisions 
were a $ 1  million loan guarantee for the construction of a new shipyard at !neat's 
Sullivan's Cove factory, a secured loan of $60 000 and bridging finance of $25 000 
for Incat to develop its research and development capabilities (Fisher, 1984). The 
department also entered into a loan agreement worth some $500 000 with another 
marine construction firm (FC Management, then known as 'Bridport Enterprises') to 
supply a 35-metre steel-hulled vessel to service the needs of the Flinders Island 
community (The Mercury, 1984). 
During 1985, a number of ferry tragedies had occurred in Europe, and Clifford 
decided to differentiate his product through the incorporation of safety features that 
exceeded those required by European regulations (Clifford, 1998). The strategy to 
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differentiate its product along the lines of safety resulted in Incat' s first approach to 
Colbeck & Gunton in 1986 to provide its fire safety expertise in the design and 
implementation of innovative fire fighting equipment for the Incat range of vessels 
sold into the European market. Incat had successfully constructed its prototype wave-
piercing catamaran earlier in the year, but found it unable to adapt its conventional 
fire safety equipment to the new lightweight design, a major concern given the 
increased interest in !neat's product from the United Kingdom. Of its relationship 
with Incat during this early collaboration, the managing director of Colbeck & Gunton 
recalls: 
There were two vessels that were actually built in '86 that were built as a contract to an 
English company, to buy them for Southampton to Isle of Wight and that is when we 
first got a taste of international style fire protection requirements - other than the 
[Australian] Code. From that [Clifford] developed the first of the fast ferries as we 
know them today; and the type of fire protection that was available at the time wasn't 
really conducive with the type of vessel he was building and the type of finishes that he 
wanted so he basically came and asked to have a specific attribute for the fire 
protection, i.e.: light weight as possible to get maximum speed, fairly damage resistant, 
water-proof and it would have to be removable because he wanted to put the services in 
behind the fire protection. So, we set to in the early days and designed the first 
system, which has been superseded now, and about to be superseded again by lighter 
and better/more conducive methods to allow other people to install so it widens our 
market (Mark Colbeck. Personal Interview, 2002). 
This relationship heralded the first cooperative interaction between Incat and the 
services of a non-marine manufacturer (Colbeck & Gunton were at the time focused 
on the house and office insulation market) in the formulation and installation of 
equipment vital to !neat's production. The benefits of the relationship were not one-
sided, however, with Colbeck & Gunton able to successfully change its business 
production focus away from home and office insulation to the now more lucrative 
marine manufacturing industry: 
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Our business was previously involved with house and office insulation services, but 
with the success of Incat changed into selling fireproofing and some soundproofing in 
many of [Clifford's] early vessels, which were the vessels built to ply the Derwent 
River. As his vessels changed in size and complexity, so did his fire protection 
requirements, and we just grew and grew from there (Mark Colbeck. Personal 
Interview, 2002). 
At around the same time, management at Skeels & Perkins also decided to align its 
manufacturing operations closely with that of !neat's operations. Skeels & Perkins 
had previously focused on the manufacture of brass plumbing fittings for households 
in the business' local area, but given the success of !neat's operations up until 1985, 
Skeels & Perkins' management decided to focus more closely on the plumbing 
requirements of lncat's new generation of catamaran. As with Colbeck & Gunton, the 
decision of the business to align with Incat was not driven by government incentives, 
but rather that the industry player recognised the potential of the innovative nature 
that !neat's brought to the industry with its shipbuilding strategies: 
[Skeels & Perkins] started off building or manufacturing brass-plumbing fittings for 
local areas. I started here 20 years ago, and it wasn't long after that that Incat started to 
make small vessels; we somehow got involved with Incat and the business has grown 
substantially since. I think it was a decision made by the directors more so - a general 
business decision. Closer to Incat, we could see a future with Incat, although it was 
fairly small at that stage. Seemed like a good idea at the time to start expanding and be 
in this area. We started with about 8 employees at the time, and now we have around 
50, all essentially because of shipbuilding. (Anthony LaFevre. Personal Interview, 
2002). 
As with Colbeck & Gunton, the alignment with Incat resulted in both firms altering 
their methods of production. For In cat, it was the ability to better design their 
plumbing and other fittings requirements for their new vessels (Clifford, 1998); and 
for Skeels & Perkins, the ability to innovate with the new PVC plumbing technology 
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that had recently been introduced into the global industry. Of the alignment with 
Incat, the manager of Skeels & Perkins stated that: 
Since obviously we got into the shipbuilding part with Incat and supported them for a 
number of years, but it has actually expanded further than that. We have actually got a 
lot of our own customers around Australia and overseas which are tied up in the 
shipbuilding industry also. I guess our main aim now is to obviously continue 
supporting the local shipbuilding but pursue the overseas contracts as well. I think the 
reason we are successful with those is probably, or from what we understand, is price 
obviously, but a lot more with quality and delivery on time (Anthony LaFevre. 
Personal Interview, 2002). 
By the end of 1986, !neat's reputation for innovative design had led to numerous 
domestic sales of smaller wave-piercing catamarans, as well as larger versions of the 
same for the United Kingdom. During this year, Incat was presented with a $6 
million order from British Sealink: Ferries for a 45-metre carrier for the Portsmouth-
Isle of Wight passenger service. The Premier and the TDA positioned themselves at 
the forefront ofthe international sale, with negotiations between Incat, the Tasmanian 
government, and the British Sealink: Ferries Company taking some six months to 
complete. The Tasmanian government's  effort appeared worthwhile. The British 
company's  successful operation of an Incat vessel in the European context provided 
valuable feedback to the international market that enhanced !neat's reputation, and 
fuelled additional international demand for the company's  product (Clifford, 1998; 
The Examiner, 1985). 
Despite the export success, Clifford once agam approached the Tasmanian 
government over his concern that it might not be economically viable for the 
company to remain in Tasmania. Clifford argued that the company's  Hobart 
waterfront location was no longer capable of supporting !neat's growth potential, and 
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therefore the state's economic development potential (Delaney, 1987). Highest on the 
company's  agenda was the partial funding of another shed; a requirement for the 
construction of the larger vessel given that the Sullivan's Cove shed (by now only 
three years old) was incapable of supporting a structure of this size. As was reported 
in the Mercury newspaper: 
Another month should tell whether innovative Tasmanian boat builder Incat has landed 
another multi-million dollar ferry deal with British Sealink. Ferries. However, a 
question mark hangs over whether it will be economically viable for the giant vessels 
to be built in Tasmania, or whether they will have to be built overseas. "It will depend 
largely on the level of support that we get from Government in setting up the facilities 
necessary for this type of expansion" Mr. Clifford said. The company would continue 
to build catamarans in Tasmania up to the size of the 30-metre vessels sold last year, 
but the cost-effectiveness of building larger ones in Tasmania would have to be 
reexamined (Togagnolo, 1986). 
In order to increase !neat's workforce and accommodate the increased workload, 
Clifford announced that a government-funded training school needed to be 
established, preferably at the new Incat factory. The alternative was for the company 
to act on several offers to move its operations interstate, where qualified labour and 
state government assistance was more readily available (Fyfe, 1988). Clifford argued 
that it would only be with more trained tradesmen that the company could continue to 
expand at its current rate. The news of the new multi-million dollar order from 
Britain meant that Clifford was in a strong position to negotiate for government's  
involvement with the construction of a new training centre. 
The Tasmanian government's  response to Clifford' s request was to partially fund 
!neat's new manufacturing sheds at Sullivan's Cove (which would include a new dry 
dock and a dedicated catamaran assembly line), as well as incorporate a college of 
aluminium welding from which workers could gain T AFE certification of their skills. 
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In addition, the Tasmanian government also provided Clifford in-principle support for 
the implementation of a fast catamaran service between Tasmania's northern port of 
Devonport, and the Australian mainland port of Melbourne. Construction of the new 
Incat shipyard began almost immediately, given the status of the potential orders from 
the UK, and the new yard was ready by the end of 1987. In addition to this relocation 
effort were public funds to incorporate the TAFE Aluminium Welding School on 
!neat's premises, as well as funding to locate !neat's most important suppliers to 
adjacent premises; a plan that met with some enthusiasm by those firms that relocated 
over time: 
Originally when we first started the business [Colbeck and Gunton] we worked out of 
my house - we had a workshop underneath. We then moved out to South Hobart 
where we shared a factory, we then moved to Pearl Street when we first started with 
Incat and then this building as soon as it was available to us. It was an ideal location, 
especially when they were building the vessels straight across the road, but we have 
been here since about '92 (Mark Colbeck. Personal Interview, 2002). 
We built the first life raft in a sail making lot, which was my previous business, a sail 
making lot in Battery Point. Then we moved, we outgrew that virtually overnight and 
we moved to a government department owned facility in Hunter Street, just at the 
wharf area. That was originally set up by the Department of Fisheries to hang nets, so 
we moved in there for about a year and then again we were bursting at the seams in 
there. We probably could have stayed there a bit longer but it just didn't have the 
space. However, !neat's move to Prince of Wales Bay opened up an opportunity to 
move to a new marine park - which allowed us to continue to manufacture and 
innovate our life raft systems at an extreme pace. Again, it is a central location and it 
had the space to allow us to control what we were doing (Michael Grainger. Personal 
Interview, 2002). 
The Tasmanian government' s  assistance to Incat was viewed in hindsight as critical to 
the industry's development, given the short-term flow-on benefits of the company's  
operations to the states economy. For example, in order to fulfil its export orders, 
Incat acquired some 500 tonnes of aluminium from Comalco (a Tasmanian based 
enterprise); it increased its demand for indirect employees in the form of sub-
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contractors; and ensured that the company's  vessels were fitted out with products 
manufactured by associated Tasmanian firms such as Colbeck & Gun ton, Skeel's  & 
Perkins, and Muir Engineering (Clifford, 1998; The Examiner, 1988). Colbeck & 
Gunton continued to adapt their insulation products to suit !neat's specific 
requirement, as did Skeel's  & Perkins with their precision components and Muir 
Engineering with their winches and anchorage systems. 
Elsewhere in the industry, the Tasmanian government indicated its intent to facilitate 
the expansion of the state's entire shipbuilding industry by attracting established 
interstate shipbuilders to the state to manage its under-performing shipbuilding assets. 
In particular, the TDA played a key role in bringing a major company, the Queensland 
Sea Management Corporation, to Tasmania to undertake its operations by buying out 
the struggling Tamar Steel Company. The TDA's general manager Robert Brand 
stated that negotiations on the matter had started earlier in the year between the TDA 
and the Queensland Sea Management Corporation, a successful interstate company 
seeking to expand its business nationally (The Sunday Tasmanian, 1988). 
In 1988, Australia's bicentenary year, the AMC hosted a series of three international 
seminars and workshops opened by the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. 
Javier Perez de Cuellar. The series, entitled 'Maritime '88 ', attracted delegates from 
all parts of the world, and focused the attention of the world onto Tasmania's newly 
found prominence in the fast-ferry construction industry (The Advocate, 1988). This 
prominence was evident by a growing number of orders for !neat's fast-ferry 
production, the most substantial of which were again ordered by a European firm, this 
time 'British Sea Containers' .  Their order, for two 7 1-metre vessels, resulted in Incat 
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unveiling plans to increase their directly employed workforce from 40 employees to 
around 150 over the next year (The Examiner, 1988). The increase in demand for 
Incat ferries was coupled with similar growth in demand for the products from !neat's 
supply firms, with Muir Engineering, Riley Industrial, and Skeels & Perkins receiving 
their international orders for their range of newly designed products. 
The election of the Field minority Labor government in June 1989 was accompanied 
by a continued effort by the government to improve the management systems and the 
reputation of the state's shipbuilding industry, although the new government was to 
find itself hamstrung by the legacy of government debt. One of the Field 
government's  first major policy launches was that of the Tasmanian Marine Industry 
Plan (TMIP), a policy aimed at promoting the TLSI (and supporting industries) within 
what was soon recognised as a major financial crisis for the state: 
. .  .in 1989, when we did the budget projections for the following year, the gap between 
income and expenditure on delivering on the same policy basis was $279 million which 
at that time was nearly 30% of the current budget. So, this was a huge gap between 
expenditure and income which had to be dealt with and therefore that distracted me � it 
meant the thinking in this area wasn't done enough by me because of my obsession 
quite rightly with dealing with that crisis (Michael Field. Personal Interview, 2002). 
The Tasmanian government, through the TDA however, continued in its efforts to 
develop the states shipbuilding industry throughout 1989. Of most significance was 
the announcement that the Tasmanian government had designed the TMIP, and that 
through this plan, the government would inject $10 million of public funds to provide 
impetus for the industry's  growth potential (Field, 1989). The TMIP formed part of 
the government's  employment summit for that year, and aimed at creating upward of 
350 new jobs within the state's shipbuilding industry over a three-year period. The 
funding was also to be utilised to offer flexible financial packages that may include 
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extended loan repayment terms, initial interest-only periods, and concessional interest 
rates to shipbuilding firms (Field, 1989). The package was implemented for, what the 
government called at the time, recognition that Tasmania enjoyed a growing 
international reputation for new an innovative ship and boat building designs, and the 
government, through the TDA, was determined to harness the potential for further 
growth. 
Field (1989: 2) added that "the TMIP recognised that to be viable today, companies 
engaged in ship and boat building (and the associated industries) needed to have a 
national and international perspective, and develop their operations accordingly", and 
that companies seeking assistance under the Plan would need to be committed to the 
growth of the marine industry in Tasmania. They would also need to display 
innovation in design, marketing, and production, want to work with marine academic 
and research organisations in the state and adopt appropriate capital investment 
programs. 
The TMIP also had the aim ofbuilding on Tasmania's already substantial reputation a 
marine manufacturing centre. Of the plan, Mr. Field stated "We have been building 
boats in Tasmania in a regular and conventional way since 1 814. As we seek to 
establish a solid economic base for the 21st century, nothing is more logical than to 
expand our marine industry" (1989: 2). In addition, Premier Field suggested that: 
Thanks to the expertise and national/international back-up provided by major 
companies, these Tasmanian organisations are providing the types of jobs, training 
and long-term prospects the state must have if it is to generate more of its own 
momentum (Field, 1989: 2). 
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Another important event to occur in 1989 was the establishment of Richardson 
Devine Marine, one of the current TLSI cluster firms. Richardson Devine Marine 
began its operations on the Hobart waterfront and specialised in the production of 
aluminium passenger and cruise/charter vessels, although to a smaller specification 
than that of Incat (i.e. vessels between twelve and 40 metres in length). In addition, 
the new firm limited its construction to the specific requirements of the customer 
orders, unlike Incat who had begun to build their vessels from their own 
specifications, and then later adapting the vessels where needed. 
The TDA's efforts to expand the state's shipbuilding industry were again evident, 
when it announced that a Tasmanian shipbuilding company had won a $4.8 million 
federal government contract to convert the CSIRO technological research vessel the 
Southern Surveyor into a fisheries research ship (The Examiner, 1989). The company 
that tendered successfully for the contract was the newly launched 'Launceston 
Marine' company, a joint venture between the Queensland based Sea Management 
Corporation (in their role managing Tamar Steel Boats) and the Port of Launceston 
Authority. This was considered a win for the TDA's management of the state's  
shipbuilding industry' s  expansion, as the Tamar Steel Company was struggling for 
economic survival just one year earlier. 
In 1990, it was announced that the AMC would introduce a new degree course in 
naval architecture beginning the following year, and that this would give strong 
support to Tasmania's shipbuilding industry, and help put Tasmania 'firmly on the 
map' as a centre of shipbuilding expertise (The Examiner, 1990). The head of the 
AMC, Mr. Seaton said that the accreditation recognised the states innovative industry-
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base, along with the AMC's world-class facilities and staff expertise. He further 
noted that the states major shipbuilders had expressed concern over having to import 
people from interstate and overseas to support their enterprises, and that the 
introduction of this course locally should alleviate the issue. Mr. Seaton stated, "this 
will give graduates reciprocal recognition in countries such as NZ, Canada, the US 
and Britain, and will increase the scope of graduates to work overseas", and the next 
step was to "ensure that the degree was recognised as a professional qualification by 
the Institute ofEngineers of Australia" (The Examiner, 1990: 5). 
At the same time, Clifford indicated that he had once again received offers from 
interstate interests to relocate his business. Offers were forthcoming from both the 
Cairns Council (of Queensland) and the Gosford Council (ofNew South Wales). On 
the matter of the offers, Clifford indicated that he was considering them as they 
provided a real opportunity for cost reductions and sales growth, although his 
preference was to remain in Tasmania. Coincidentally, 1990 witnessed the 
Tasmanian government provide a grant to Incat, worth some $1  million, to develop a 
new state-of-the-art factory at its Prince of Wales Bay site. This new factory was 
'required' by Incat in order to develop and build its latest generation of fast ferries. 
The grant was also provided so that Incat could establish a college of aluminium 
welding as part of its new factory, effectively giving the company full control over its 
course work and production output (Wickham & Hanson, 2002). In keeping with the 
increased focus on improving employee training and development, in 1991 ,  In cat 
introduced a number of government-subsidised scholarships for engineering 
doctorates for its staff at the University of Tasmania. These scholarships coincided 
with !neat's initial foray into yet another generation of fast ferry, this time 
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incorporating cargo transportation alongside its traditional focus on people and car 
transport (Wickham & Hanson, 2002). 
During 1992, another of the TLSI cluster firms, Lifera:ft Systems Australia, was 
formally established at the Prince of Wales Bay marine park. Lifera:ft Systems 
Australia specialises in the construction and fit-out of evacuation slides and inflatable 
life rafts for the marine manufacturing sector. The company located itself on Prince 
of Wales Bay in an adjacent site to that of Incat, and was contracted immediately by 
Incat to fit-out its latest generation of fast ferry. The demand for state-of-the-art 
safety equipment had recently been highlighted by a further series of tragedies in the 
European market, where a number of ferries (not Incat models) had sunk and/or 
caught fire when in service. By mid-1993, Incat, Colbeck & Gunton, Muir 
Engineering, Riley Industrial, Skeels & Perkins, and the newly formed Lifera:ft 
Systems arranged their operation such that they were able to work closely together on 
the construction and fit-out of !neat's newest generation of vessels (Wickham & 
Hanson, 2002). The successful interaction of the firms at the Prince of Wales Bay 
marine park was formally recognised by the newly elected Groom Liberal 
government early in 1994, when it bestowed upon Incat an official award for export 
services to the state. 
In mid-1995, Clifford once again indicated that Incat would consider leaving the state 
if the Tasmanian government failed to continue its financial support. Although 
Clifford indicated that his preference was to stay within Tasmania, transferring to an 
interstate location was a realistic possibility unless the Tasmanian government 
increased its commitment to the training schemes already in place (The Mercury, 
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1995a). In particular, this request was aimed at the Tasmanian government matching 
the $1  million federal training grant it received the previous year (The Mercury, 
1995b). Pressure was also applied by the Tasmanian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, whose spokesman, Mr. Tim Abey, urged the Tasmanian government to 
work out ways of solving !neat's chronic shortage of skilled workers. 
Further political focus was applied when the leader of the state Labor opposition 
party, Michael Field, said that he would hold talks with Clifford to discuss what could 
be done to keep the company's  expansion within the state. Mr. Field said that the lack 
of understanding about Tasmanian industry in general, highlighted by the Incat issue, 
indicated a need for a total industry audit process to be adopted (The Mercury, 1996). 
The Tasmanian government, after numerous meeting with Incat and the Tasmanian 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, agreed to the increase in financial commitment 
to the training requirements of the industry to match that granted by the federal 
government. 
Despite the increased commitment offered by the Tasmanian government in 1996, 
Incat indicated that it would begin licensing out construction of its vessels to a 
Chinese-based company (Wickham & Hanson, 2002). However, !neat's  management 
said that there was no suggestion that the deal would cut the size of his Tasmanian 
operation at the Prince of Wales Bay site, stating, "we have plans to increase 
production in Hobart from four to six vessels a year, but we need to expand overseas 
for a number of reasons" One ofthe major reason cited was the widely debated move 
by the federal government to dismantle the shipbuilding bounty rebate scheme. 
Clifford stated "the unlevel playing field created by the federal government, which is 
1 1 2  
removing the shipbuilding bounty in 1997, is seen as one contributing factor in 
choosing a non-Australian site" (Briggs, 1996: 2). Clifford suggested that the axing 
of the bounty in mid-1997, combined with a shortage of skilled labour in Tasmania, 
was likely to see a continuing trend towards overseas production of Incat vessels. 
!neat's call for greater assistance in training the company's  potential labour pool were 
answered late in 1996, when the Tasmanian government announced that a new $8 
million training complex for high-speed catamaran builder Incat was to be built (The 
Mercury, 1996). Premier Rundle stated that tenders had been called for the 
construction of the new training centre, which would be run by the Hobart Institute of 
TAFE, and constructed adjacent to the Incat factory site (The Mercury, 1996). In 
announcing the government' s  grant, Premier Rundle stated that the current training 
centre located at Incat was inadequate to accommodate the industry's  needs. The new 
training centre, to be named the College of Aluminium Training, was to include a 
greater training workspace, modernised equipment, and a greater and more 
experienced number of staff. Premier Rundle defended the government's  pledge of 
$8 million, stating, "lncat is an expanding enterprise which provides substantial 
opportunity for employment and export earning growth for Tasmania, and inadequate 
access to appropriately skilled labour has constrained the company from expanding its 
operations" (The Mercury, 1996: 4). 
The Tasmanian government also provided Incat with non-financial assistance in the 
form of the lobbying the federal government to maintain the Shipbuilding Bounty 
rebate, which was estimated to be worth some $3 million to Tasmania's industry 
annually (Wickham & Hanson, 2002). Although the Tasmanian government was 
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unable to guarantee the Bounty scheme's  continued support to the industry, early 
negotiations did lead the federal government ministry to seriously reconsider is 
decision to remove it immediately (The Advocate, 1996). In December of 1996, the 
Tasmanian government announced that it was the decision of Federal Treasurer, Mr. 
Peter Costello and the Minister for Industry, Science and Tourism, Mr. John Moore, 
to extend the operation of the shipbuilding bounty in its current form until the end of 
the following year (Rundle, 1996). The federal government also accommodated the 
State's  shipbuilding industry by amalgamating the AMC and the Australian Maritime 
Engineering to create a Cooperative Research Centre, a body responsible for 
sponsoring and coordinating research into super-fast aluminium catamaran 
construction (Peattie, 1996). The creation of the Centre followed a survey of the 
national industry' s  priorities, namely improved training and access to research and 
development grants, that were released in a shipping partnership report by federal 
Industry, Science, and Tourism minister (Peattie, 1996). 
Although the Shipbuilding Bounty had been secured for one additional year, the 
Tasmanian shipbuilding industry continued in its efforts to maintain the subsidy 
beyond that time through the continued lobbying of the Tasmanian government. In 
1997, moves within the federal senate to save assistance for shipbuilders linked to 
hundreds of Tasmanian jobs were made by the five Tasmanian Senators (The 
Mercury, 1997a). The main argument for the retention of the subsidy scheme was 
that of maintaining 'fair and just' international competition. Tasmanian politicians, 
acting on behalf of their industry, sought to retain the shipbuilding bounty at least 
until other major shipbuilding countries (i.e. competitors) agreed to remove theirs, 
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else have the Tasmanian (and Australian) industries operating at a significant 
competitive disadvantage. 
Tasmanian Senator Mrs. Sue Mackay specifically called upon the senate to 'save 
Incat', and the hundreds of jobs that 'at risk' ifthe Bounty rebate were to be removed 
(The Mercury, 1997a). Incat chief Clifford made his opinion known in an open letter 
to the senate, stating, "if the bounty was not extended, 200 jobs would be at risk" (The 
Examiner, 1997: 2), and sought a three-year extension to secure the future of his 
company, and those that were associated with it. Once again, the lobbying was 
effective, and the Shipbuilding Bounty was retained by the federal government, 
although it was altered to reflect the assistance Australia's major competitors received 
under similar legislation elsewhere. Soon after the announcement was made publicly, 
!neat's management announced that it would boost its workforce by 400 people over 
the next two years, and would expand the company's  Hobart-based operation to 
incorporate the expected increases in demand (Primsall, 1997). 
The Tasmanian government also released plans in 1997 to partially fund the 
construction of a 'world-class marine precinct' in the states northern City of 
Launceston. The rationale for the new marine complex was to attract new, but 
smaller-scale shipbuilding and maintenance firms to Tasmania, in order to diversifY 
the states industry, and to generate new jobs within the state (Rundle, 1997a). Rundle 
(1997a: 2) stated, "The move will offer marine industry customers a comprehensive 
range of services", and would cost the government $ 1 .2 million in addition to the on­
going expenditure on improving infrastructure and marketing the site's  capabilities, 
particularly to shipping operators and builders in the Asia Pacific state. 
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In a similar move, the Hobart Ports Corporation, in conjunction with businessperson 
John Fuglsang, applied to the Kingborough Council for approval to establish an 
export-oriented marine industry park at Margate, a small suburb south of Hobart 
(Rundle, 1997b ). The marine park was to be part owned by the Tasmanian 
government, who would finance the $6 million start-up costs involved with the 
project, as well as legislate to rezone the land such that it could be fast-tracked 
through the political system. The application included a request for a 17-hectare site 
already owned by the Hobart Ports Corporation, as well as permission to construct 
three separate shipyards capable of producing fishing vessels, luxury motor yachts, 
fast passenger ferries. In addition to the core business of shipbuilding and repair, the 
proposed Margate Maritime Industrial Park was to include a launching dock, a marina 
and related facilities, recreational amenities for employees and nearby residents, fish 
farm servicing facilities and a ships chandler. The rationale for the application 
included the prospect that 200 additional jobs would be generated in the state 
immediately upon approval, with a potential of up to one thousand over a ten-year 
period (Rundle, 1997b ). In addition, the groups suggested that the range of vessels 
produced at the Margate site would complement !neat's much larger ferries and 
therefore help to consolidate Tasmania's position as a pacesetter in modem 
shipbuilding, as well as create an additional stream of business for many of the small 
suppliers that have grown up as one-customer businesses around the Incat hub 
(Rundle, 1997b ). 
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As if suspecting complaints about the Margate marine park proposal, the Tasmanian 
Transport Minister urged all residents of Southern Tasmania to support the 
development of a shipbuilding facility at Margate. In support of the plan, a 
government minister stated that: 
Rather than looking for problems and ways to prevent the proposal, all people in 
Southern Tasmania should get behind the development and support it. Tasmania has 
already developed an international reputation as a leader in boat building technology 
and development, thanks to the initiative of Clifford at Incat. There is now an 
opportunity to further develop boat building in this state (Cleary, 1997: 1). 
Further efforts at developing the state's  shipbuilding industry were evident in late 
1997, when a charter agreement between the Tasmanian government and Incat for its 
Bass Strait passenger service was confirmed for the following summer (The Mercury, 
1997b). The agreement included a five-month lease of an Incat vessel for the 
transportation of tourists and cargo that would complement the existing overnight 
service. 
In 1998, the Tasmanian Maritime Network (TMN) was officially formed to recognise 
the synergistic strength of the states shipbuilding and associated industries (Napier, 
1998). The aim of the Maritime Network was to primarily market member's  products 
and services to the world, and indicate to the market that Tasmania has the innovative 
services and products for manufacturing an array of ships and related maritime 
products and services (Napier, 1998). The network itself was centered at the newly 
constructed TAPE Tasmania College of Aluminium Training at the Incat site, and 
although requested by the government was "an initiative of the firms involved, and 
includes companies that have an excellent reputation both within Australia and 
internationally for their respective services" (Napier, 1998: 1). The Maritime 
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Network members at the time were Incat, Richardson Devine Marine, Colbeck & 
Gunton, Muir Engineering, Liferaft Systems, Riley Industrial; Skeels & Perkins, 
TAFE Tasmania, and the AMC. 
Initially, the formation of the TMN was based on the TLSI cluster firm's recognition 
that a formally structured arrangement between the industry players was an 
economically beneficial strategy, especially in terms of cost reduction and improved 
communications and marketing coordination. The instigators ofthe TMN said of the 
arrangement that: 
I had just been visiting some shipbuilding ventures overseas, and had received some 
useful feedback from potential customers over there. So, when I got back to Hobart I 
thought it would be a good idea to set up some form of network so that I knew what the 
other industries did when I went away or I sent something away to publicise their 
capability - especially those that have been working with fast ferries. So, I went 
around every managing director ofthe companies that I knew were involved in this sort 
of work and put the idea to them that we form a network so that if any of us go 
overseas that we can transfer that and they were very anxious. Out of that grew the 
Tasmanian Maritime Network and TAFE being government naturally they copped the 
job of setting it up and naturally the poor old teachers found another little task they had 
to do on top of what they did (Terry Hall. Personal Interview, 2002). 
No, we knew about it. I have had some involvement with various government 
departments I suppose, and we also set up a Tasmanian Manufacturing Network, which 
has been a success story on its own, and that particular network was born out of local 
marine related businesses in this immediate area. Travelling a lot overseas and meeting 
up at trade shows overseas and sometimes we would meet overseas and we haven't 
seen each other in Hobart for three or four months, but we would meet in London or 
other parts of the world, attending a trade fare, and we sort of got together one day and 
said, "\Vhy don't we form a network so we can push all of our product, experience and 
promote our product and experience, and technology. Our industry is world class, we 
all know it is world class but we don't do a very good job of selling it." (Michael 
Granger. Personal Interview, 2002). 
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Interestingly, the TMN was not established by the TLSI cluster firms for their own 
benefit exclusively. At its inception, the coordinators of the burgeoning TMN 
undertook the responsibility to invite all of the state's shipbuilders and marine 
manufacturers to take part in the initiative. As noted by its director: 
What we did was brought every managing director of every company that was involved 
in manufacture and export of maritime products in Tasmania. At that stage we didn't 
care whether they were Launceston, St. Helens, anywhere that they wanted to be. So, 
we put it out, as widespread as we could, who would like to be involved, everybody 
that was approached joined, which is still an ongoing programme. They sit around this 
table, which is in the training school, have their meetings so we have got every 
managing director talking to one another, knowing what is going on and where the 
markets could be and all those sorts of things. The good part of that is, we can waltz 
up to anybody in the network and sit down and have a chat (Terry Hall. Personal 
Interview, 2002). 
The recruitment process was successful in attracting the majority of the state's  
economy's shipbuilders and marine manufacturers, which gave rise to a politically 
powerful group of firms. Indeed, one of the TMN' s most important selling points was 
the opportunity for smaller firms within the state's  economy to align itself more 
closely with the TLSI cluster firms, most notably Incat 
We found that there is 85 percent of the marine industry, export industry, in the 
network. So, if the marine industry needs to approach the government they have got 85 
percent of the weight behind them. If we want to lobby for support for attending trade 
expos or anything like that, it might need some additional funding from the 
government, we can ask the network, rather than as an individual which we have done 
in the last four years, we have attended a couple of these trade expos which have been 
very successful and very well set up by the Tasmanian government and the [Tasmanian 
Maritime] Network does congratulate them for what they have done (Terry Hall. 
Personal Interview, 2002). 
1 1 9  
It is important to note that the establishment of the TMN was instigated by the private 
firms within the TLSI cluster, and not by the Tasmanian government's representatives 
or departments. The Tasmanian Maritime Network (TMN) utilised its political 
power, however, to recruit the Tasmanian government, or more correctly its economic 
development arm - the TDA, as an important member of the network. The TDA's 
involvement in the TMN was to provide competencies that facilitated the realisation 
of the synergies within the network, but which were beyond the scope of the 
individual firms within the network to provide. These competencies centred largely 
on the generation of a consistent and internationally effective marketing and 
communications campaign, and the ability to lobby important federal ministers and 
agencies on the TMN's behalf. Another significant announcement was made in 1998 
concerned the success of the application for the approval of the $6 million Margate 
Maritime Park. Shortly after the announcement, the last of the current TLSI cluster 
members was established. Mr. Fuglsang, the businessperson involved in the Margate 
Marine Park application, won a $4.4 million grant for his company's  (North West Bay 
Ships - NWBS) plan to design and build the first aluminium trimaran ferry (The 
Mercury, 1998). 
A number of Tasmanian government departments were also created or renamed 
during the course of 1998. Of particular note was the change to the Tasmanian 
Development Authority, which changed its name to the Department of State 
Development (the DSD). The name change coincided with the department's  
increased focus on the training and development of the Tasmanian workforce. In 
particular, the restructuring of the TDA included the creation of the DSD Skills 
Response Unit, charged with the identification of skill-shortfalls within the state. One 
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of the DSD's first functions was to undertake a series of Industry Audits within the 
state to identifY the states key export earners, their infrastructural needs, and any 
potential barrier to their growth in the future. Federally, Austrade was established to 
facilitate Australian exporting firms. Initially, the department was charged with 
providing information pertaining to all aspects of international trade (i.e. Australian 
law, international law, cultural aspects of trading etc), and to provide a link to other 
government departments where necessary. 
The first stage in the construction of the Margate Marine Park began in early 1999, 
and included the construction of NWBS's $ 1 8  million facility to build its prototype 
trimaran fast ferry. NWBS's managing director, Mr. John Fuglsang, stated that the 
main reason for his choice to locate the company in Tasmania was the opportunity to 
build on the very strong local infrastructure and skills base developed by the 
Tasmanian government' s  interaction with Incat Tasmania over the past twenty years 
(Fuglsang, 1999). Mr. Fuglsang stated that the conceptual work on the company's  
innovative trimaran commenced two years previously, and culminated in NWBS 
being awarded an R&D grant from the Commonwealth government's  Department of 
Industry Science and Tourism. He also acknowledged, however, the positive aspects 
of the involvement in the project of the tiers of Tasmanian government, whom he 
recognised had all been very supportive and demonstrated an ability to work 
cooperatively with industry (Fuglsang, 1999). The Tasmanian government in 
particular provided equity funding to support the states newest shipbuilder, pouring 
$800 000 of public money into the new venture, money that was "critical to the 
project going ahead at all" (Bacon, 1999a: 1). 
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The Premier, Jim Bacon, defended the equity partnership in NWBS by stating that the 
deal was consistent with Labor's  election commitment to set aside $10  million over 
the term of the government to the states export industries (Bacon, 1999a). In 
particular, the Premier stated, "The new venture dovetails perfectly with Incat, even to 
the extent of utilising the aluminium training school at Prince ofWales Bay to train its 
workforce" (Bacon, 1999a: 2). The Tasmanian government also entered into a 
financial deal with Incat in the form of state-tax relief, and in particular, a reduction in 
its Payroll Tax liability. Premier Bacon defended this course of action as 
'appropriate', given that it remedied one ofthe Industry Audit findings that growth in 
Tasmania's shipbuilding industry was inhibited by the lack of skilled labour 
affordable by Incat (The Examiner, 1999a). 
In order to legitimate the payroll tax decision for Incat, the Premier stated that the 
company was only one among sixteen firms that qualified for, and would receive, the 
tax relief available under the Industry Audit recommendations. Incat were also 
successful in their contractual negotiations with two levels of government. Federally, 
Incat were successful in their bid to negotiate an agreement with Australian Defence 
Force, securing a contract that included a two-year trial of an Incat vessel for defence 
exercises and other related defence activities in Northern Australia (Bailey, 1999). 
The successful application of an Incat vessel to defense applications would enable the 
company to further diversifY its product portfolio. At a state level, Incat secured a 
further commitment from the Tasmanian government to maintain its Devil Cat Bass 
Strait passenger service over the following summer, despite its operating losses of $3 
million for the previous summer (The Examiner, 1999b ). In addition to this 
production support, the Tasmanian government also launched a 'performance 
122 
guarantee' to international buyers of the TLSI cluster's  product. In essence, the 
Tasmanian government's  guarantee ensured the purchaser of a TLSI cluster product 
that the price quoted to them would stand, and any unforeseen cost 'blow-outs' would 
be paid on their behalfby the Tasmanian government (The Mercury, 1999). 
The support for Incat and its supporting firms seemed reasonable when the results of 
its performance over the past three years were announced publicly in mid-year. By 
the end of the financial year 1999, the TLSI cluster recorded the most "spectacular 
growth of any sector in the state's  economy" (Daley, 1999: 4). On average, it was 
reported that the businesses in the TLSI cluster (by this stage officially recognised by 
the Tasmanian government) grew by 60 percent, the highest growth by an individual 
firms was in excess of 200 percent (Daley, 1999). In dollar terms, the TLSI cluster's  
performance over the previous decade was similarly impressive, with turnover 
increasing from $38 million in 1989 to $260 million in 1999 (Bacon, 1999b). 
It was announced late in 1999 that the DSD, under the guidance of Premier Jim 
Bacon, was to coordinate the State's  shipbuilding industry's  entry into the largest 
maritime and naval trade shows ever to be staged in the Asia-Pacific State, entitled 
'Pacific 2000'. Premier Bacon said of the Tasmanian shipbuilding entry that "This is 
one of the brightest success stories in Australian manufacturing and the companies 
involved will take a dazzling array of Tasmanian technology to the Pacific 2000 
exhibition" (Bacon, 1999b: 1 ). The DSD, in conjunction with each of the sixteen 
firms involved, coordinated the uniforms, signage, literature, and a percentage of the 
associated costs involved in attending the trade show, a role that was beyond the 
individual expertise ofthe firms involved (Bacon, 1999b). 
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By 2000, the Margate Marine Park's first industry resident, NWBS, had begun 
production of its first generation of vessels. The prototype trimaran was one of the 
first ships to be completed by NWBS, and its launch was attended by the state 
Premier. Of the launch, Premier Bacon said, "There is still a way to go, but the 
emergence in the near future of another world-class aluminium ferry would contribute 
to Tasmania's shipbuilding reputation and increase the critical mass of the local 
industry" (Bacon, 2000: 1). Premier Bacon added that the $20 million trimaran was 
an impressive example of Tasmania's commitment to innovation (Bacon, 2000). The 
Premier again praised the company in 200 1 ,  stating at the launch of a 55-metre ferry 
that the state may be witnessing the emergence of another world-class manufacturer 
oflarge-scale aluminium ferries (Bacon, 2000). 
In 2000, after intense lobbying by the Tasmanian government, the federal government 
retained the Shipbuilding Bounty, worth about $35 million in rebates to Incat alone. 
The Tasmanian government also implemented further payroll tax relief for Incat in 
response to the slump in demand for its vessels, a slump that was blamed on the world 
economic recession that had emerged during the year. Of greatest concern to Incat 
was the failure of several European ferry service operators, whose liquidation resulted 
in several 'new second-hand' vessels entering its market at significantly reduced 
prices - an eventuality that would have severe ramifications some 1 8  months later 
(Wickham & Hanson, 2002). 
In 200 1, the Tasmanian government contributed $421 000 towards the purchase of a 
$ 1  million, state-of-the-art Model Test Basin for the AMC, a purchase that helped 
position the training facility as the country's leading maritime research institute 
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(Bacon, 2001a). Premier Bacon said of the investment that the Tasmanian 
government pledged the cash in 1999 amid fears that the AMC's market edge could 
be lost if it didn't acquire a test basin before its competitors. Of the strategic 
importance of the investment, Premier Bacon commented that: 
The investment has certainly deterred other states from attempting to steal business 
away from the AMC and Tasmania. In fact, since late 1999, the AMC's newly 
established courses in Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering have had significant 
growth in student numbers. As well as its educational function, the AMC has an 
enviable maritime research reputation, which will also be enhanced by the 
commissioning of the Model Test Basin (2001b: 2). 
Although the Tasmanian government' s  investment m training infrastructure was 
viewed as a positive use of public funding, the state's leading shipbuilder, Incat, had 
experienced significant cash flow problems due to significantly reduced sales that 
resulted from the world economic recession of 200 1 ,  and the requisite large capital 
investment tied up in unsold vessels (Wickham & Hanson, 2002). In order to help 
Incat through this period, the Tasmanian government canvassed the option of buying 
a vessel from the troubled shipbuilder to replace the Devil Cat on the Bass Strait route 
(McLaren, 2001). Premier Bacon said that buying an !neat's vessel was one of a 
number of options the Tasmanian government was looking at, and that "The senior 
executives of the DSD have had a number of discussions and meetings with Incat, as 
well as with a series of other parties about potential sales of Incat vessels" (Bacon, 
2001b: 2). Incat, however, were facing issues other than just a downturn in sales. In 
mid-200 1 ,  Incat workers voted to stop work in protest of 'poor pay conditions despite 
the company reporting profits in excess of $25 million' (The Mercury, 2001). To 
compound the problems faced by !neat's management, there were warnings from the 
company's  bank that it might soon foreclose on its loan to Incat, and send in 
temporary receiver-managers to more closely monitor the firm's cash flow. 
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Other members of the TLSI cluster, however, had become proficient in securing their 
own export sales by the end of 200 1 .  In particular, Richardson Devine Marine 
(RDM) was publicly congratulated by the state Premier on securing a contract to build 
a $3. 1 million passenger vessel for an Italian operator. Of the sale, Premier Bacon 
stated: 
This is the first RDM vessel to be sold into Europe and will demonstrate to the 
Europeans that Tasmania has world-class capabilities in the building of fast-ferries. 
RDM has shown its innovation, determination to produce high quality ferries, and this 
has been clearly demonstrated with the fleet of vessels it has produced for the Gordon 
River (Bacon, 2001c: 1). 
Premier Jim Bacon also suggested that the contract reinforced Tasmania's 
international reputation for being able to build a number of different vessels, not just 
large ships such as those built by Incat (Bacon, 2001c). The General Manager of 
RDM, Mr. Toby Richardson, said in response to the Premier's  praise that, "RDM 
would like to take this opportunity to extend its appreciation to the Tasmanian 
government for supporting our company, and specifically thank the Export 
Facilitation Ann of the Department of State Development" (Bacon, 2001c: 2). 
Another of the cluster's  firms, Liferaft Systems, had also received orders from 
international buyers impressed with the innovative nature of their Marine Evacuation 
System, a system included on the last generation of Incat vessel. In particular, the 
company received enquiries concerning custom-made systems for extreme 
temperature conditions, such as those experienced in Arctic exploration, from which 
the company explored innovative design features and components to suit. 
In 2002, after Incat had sold its first vessel in over a year, it was revealed that the 
Tasmanian government had lent Incat $30 million of public funds to alleviate its 
'negative cash flow' problems (Paine, 2002). Premier Bacon confirmed that the 
126 
Tasmanian government made a fully secured $30 million loan to Incat in July of 
200 1 ,  stating that, "It is no secret that recently Incat has endured cash-flow problems, 
alleviated by the sale of a vessel, and I congratulate Clifford on his company's  recent 
success" (Paine, 2002: 2). The loan was justified by the Tasmanian government as 
protecting some 800 jobs directly associated with the firms operations, and that the 
Tasmanian government had the first claim on !neat's assets in the event that the 
company failed (Paine, 2002). Despite the Tasmanian government' s  commitment to 
secure !neat's future through secured loans, it did not extend to the continuation of the 
Incat fast-ferry service across Bass Strait, a service that was problematic and had 
failed to make a profit since its introduction. The Tasmanian government cited an 
independent study commissioned by the Tourism Council of Tasmania that found that 
growth in Tourism demand would be best served by two mono-hulls rather than one 
catamaran (Haley, 2002). 
In 2002 the decision was implemented, and two mono-hull vessels purchased from 
Europe were commissioned to service the Bass Strait route. !neat's immediate 
response to this decision was to suspend the employment of all 89 of its apprentice 
workforce without warning or pay. !neat's  management justified the action stating 
that there simply wasn't enough work to be done to maintain the current level of 
workers (Haley, 2002). The Tasmanian government' response to the action was to 
send a delegation of ministers and industry representatives to Canberra to seek 
Federal government assistance for the troubled company. In the meeting, Premier 
Bacon said that the short-term survival of Incat had reached a critical juncture, and 
that to help save the company, the Federal government needed to purchase or lease 
vessels in the near future (Haley, 2002). Premier Bacon also warned that Incat faced 
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at least a temporary shutdown without the implementation of a rescue package, a 
result that would have significant flow on effects to other TLSI cluster firms as well 
as to the international reputation of Australia's shipbuilding industry (Barbeliuk, 
2002). 
Despite the delegation's efforts to secure federal assistance, the federal government 
rejected a plea for help for the ailing Incat (Bailey, 2002). The federal government's  
Industry Minister, Mr. Ian Macfarlane said of the decision, "The federal government 
has already played a significant role in supporting Incat, and through bounties 
contributed almost $90 million to the company" (Bailey, 2002: 2). Shortly after the 
federal government's  decision was announced, Incat undertook measure to reduce its 
workforce by 60 percent (or some 400 directly employed individuals), but this wasn't 
enough to prevent it being placed into receivership management by the National 
Australia bank just one week later (The Saturday Mercury, 2002). 
Despite the predicament faced by Incat, the remaining TLSI cluster firms remained 
viable and ongoing businesses at the end of 2002. Their status as such has been 
largely attributed to their diversification of product lines, their individual success in 
securing international markets, and the fact that the states industry had evolved away 
from a hub-and-spoke network of supplier firms reliant on the international success of 
just the one firm - International Catamarans. 
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4.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY. 
This chapter provided a brief account of the interaction between Australia's 
shipbuilding industry and the government's  policy regime (since European 
settlement) within which the TLSI cluster was to eventually emerge. It then included 
a detailed account ofthe critical incidents that surrounded the international success of 
Incat and the subsequent emergence ofthe TLSI cluster between 1975 and 2002. This 
historical overview serves as context for the analysis and discussion in the following 
chapters. In order to remain consistent with the research recommendations of 
Audretsch and Feldman (1996), Peters and Hood (2000), and Walcott (1999), the 
analysis of the case history and the primary data gathered for this research occurs in 
four subsequent chapters, each representing a stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle. 
Using dates associated with critical incidents, sales revenues, and technological 
advancements, the analysis will segment the TLSI cluster's  industrial life cycle into 
an 'introductory stage' (Chapter Six, representing the years 1977 - 1984), a 'growth 
stage' (Chapter Seven, representing 1985-1998), and a 'maturity stage' (Chapter 
Eight, representing 1999-present). The following chapter, Chapter Five, will provide 
an overview of Porter's  (1990) diamond factors as they related to the Tasmanian 
shipbuilding industry in 1977, the year that the hub-firm International Catamarans 
was established. 
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CHAPTER FIVE. 
ANALYSIS OF THE CASE STUDY: 
AN OVERVIEW OF PORTER'S (1990) DIAMOND FACTORS AS 
THEY PERTAINED TO THE TASMANIAN SHIPBUILDING 
INDUSTRY IN 1977. 
5.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE CHAPTER. 
The objectives of this chapter are two-fold. Firstly, it provides an overview of the 
role that chance played in the formation of the TLSI cluster's  hub-firm International 
Catamarans. Secondly, using the primary interview data gathered during the research 
process, the chapter discusses the status of Porter's  diamond factors as they pertained 
to Tasmania's shipbuilding industry in 1977. As such, this chapter provides a 
summary of the general economic conditions to be developed by the Tasmanian state 
government over the TLSI cluster's  life cycle. 
5.2 THE TASMANIAN LIGHT SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY AND THE 
ROLE OF CHANCE. 
The partial destruction of the Tasman Bridge in 1975 served as perhaps the most 
important chance event surrounding the formation of the TLSI cluster's  hub-firm 
International Catamarans. The tragic event served to dramatically increase the 
importance of Robert Clifford' s ferry service in the state's south. Due to the dramatic 
increase in demand for the monopolised ferry service, Clifford's business was able to 
generate substantial profits during the three years of the Tasman Bridge' s  
reconstruction (Wickham & Hanson, 2001 ). These profits were reinvested by 
Clifford into the design and production of new ferries for the trans-Derwent passenger 
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service. As noted in Chapter Four, to improve customer service and increase the 
firm's revenues in the short term (i.e. before his own ferries were completed) Clifford 
hired a British-built fast ferry, the Michael Howe to compliment his passenger service. 
The flaws that Clifford observed in the Michael Howe 's design and structure caught 
his attention (it was responsible for 75 percent of the business' maintenance costs) 
and ignited his innovative flair: "If the English can sell 34 heaps of rubbish like this 
[around the world] , how many properly engineered fast ships could we sell from 
Tasmania?" (Clifford, 1998: 22). 
5.3 THE TASMANIAN SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY AND FIRM, 
STRATEGY, STRUCTURE, AND RIVALRY IN 1977. 
In 1977, Tasmania's shipbuilding and marine industry was represented by a loose 
collection of small to medium-sized single-businesses with limited growth potential in 
the stagnant domestic market, and virtually no realistic opportunities for growth in the 
international market. Although the firms were single business units serving specific 
market needs, the nature of the relationships between their owners proved to be far 
more extensive than just the line of products that each manufactured. Of the 
relationship that existed within the industry at the time, a number of the TLSI cluster 
firm's founding managers stated that: 
Hobart is a small place. Probably all marine engineering businesses in Hobart liked to 
know their competitors or on a first name basis - you would be amazed, there wouldn't 
have been one that I couldn't walk into and know everyone . . .  we work off one another 
-but that is halfthe point - if we get too much work we say "Go and see him or go and 
see whoever." It has all been personal over the years. We have had expertise from all 
over the industry over the years, you knew what their expertise was - and we just take 
[our problems] to them and sit down and work the things through (Richard Riley. 
Personal Interview, 2002). 
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We have been sort of friendly towards one another for a long, long time and as much as 
the fitters want to borrow something, they come and borrow something and if we want 
to borrow something from the fitters we go and borrow it off them (Anthony LaFevre. 
Personal Interview, 2002). 
That was the arrangement and still with Robert in charge it is still basically the same 
today. It is not, "When are you going to do it and what is it going to cost," it is, " Just 
get in here and do it." He said, "You're not going to rip me off, are you?" "No." So, 
that was that, a handshake agreement so well that is the way we have carried on ever 
since. (Richard Riley. Personal Interview, 2002). 
The Tasmanian shipbuilding industry's related and supporting industry was 
characterised, therefore, by the existence of a trust-based social network that had 
grown within the state's  marine manufacturing community over several generations. 
The maritime expertise, management systems, and physical assets (including their 
workforces) of the socially networked firms were at times traded as common assets 
among the group, and were often lent to others within the social network in times of 
need. In terms of Porter's  ICT, the social network represented an effort by 
Tasmania's shipbuilders to maximise the individual goals of the firms (i.e. profit and 
sales growth in stagnant domestic markets) with the survival needs of the industry, 
that is, the incorporation of efficient resource allocation systems within a collection of 
small and medium firms in a regional economy. 
5.4 THE TASMANIAN SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY AND DEMAND 
CONDITIONS IN 1977. 
By 1977, the Australian shipbuilding industry had enjoyed some 30 years of post-war 
protection from the federal government in the form of tariffs and subsidisation. As a 
result, the Australian shipbuilding industry became particularly uncompetitive on the 
world markets (Beeson, 1997). As an indicator, Inglis (1988) notes that by 1977, only 
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ten percent of the nation's shipbuilding production was manufactured to satisfY 
international demand. The Tasmanian shipbuilding industry enjoyed even less 
international success, with 100 percent of its output sold onto the stagnant domestic 
Australian market for commercial fishing vessels and recreational craft. 
The subsidy and tariff regime that was originally implemented by the federal 
government to help Australian shipbuilders survive the highly competitive post-war 
period, where domestic demand for replacement vessels was considerable, and where 
overseas manufacturers had significant cost advantages (Beeson, 1997). However, 
the subsidy scheme evolved to become fundamentally important to the profitability of 
the nation's shipbuilders, and powerful lobby groups soon formed to maintain, and 
indeed increase, the subsidy levels. As noted in Chapter Four, between 1947 and 
1972 the subsidy scheme alone increased from 25 to 45 percent of what the 
government deemed to be 'allowable shipbuilding expenses' (Beeson, 1997). After 
the surge of activity associated with the post-war effort diminished, however, the 
Australian industry' s  output declined to a level commensurate with servicing the 
relatively unsophisticated domestic demand for fishing vessels and recreational craft. 
With the onset of 'stagflation' in the mid-1970s, and the dramatic decrease in world 
demand for new ships, the Australian (and by association, the Tasmanian) 
shipbuilding industry and marine manufactures regressed to virtually nil production, 
and was perceived globally as being synonymous with inefficiency, low productivity, 
poor management practices, and antagonistic industrial relations (Holland, 2001). 
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5.5 THE TASMANIAN SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY AND FACTOR 
CONDITIONS IN 1977. 
Tasmania has a long history of building shipping vessels that pre-dates European 
settlement by several thousand years. Aboriginal inhabitants were sufficiently skilled 
in boat building for their craft to navigate the treacherous seas around Maatsuyker 
Island, where different tribes met each summer (Inglis, 1988). After European 
settlement, shipbuilding became a response to the obvious needs of an otherwise 
isolated island community that was in possession of a prosperous whaling and sealing 
industry. In order to satisfY the economic need for trade and employment, regular 
shipbuilding began in the state in the 1820s, with the construction of several 30 to 100 
tonne vessels for the purposes of coastal trade. Four main centres of activity 
developed in the state: Launceston, Hobart, on the Huon River, and at the penal 
settlements - first Macquarie Harbour and later at Port Arthur. In 1 826, a dedicated 
shipyard was established on the Tamar, which produced, amongst others, the schooner 
Rebecca, built at Rosevears, in which John Batman landed at Melbourne Town in 
1 834. 
The mid 1800s saw the expansion of the industry in terms ofboth the number and size 
of vessels being built. The colonial builders began to construct vessels large enough 
to take their place on the Australia-England route. Between 1 838 and 1 848, Hobart 
was producing more ships than the remaining Australian colonies combined. The 
major reasons for Tasmania's dominance in colonial shipbuilding were the associated 
costs, which were significantly lower in Tasmania than in the mainland colonies, and 
the availability and excellence of native timbers. 
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In 1977, with the help of a century of progressive shipbuilding technology, 
Tasmania's mam factors of shipbuilding production had become relatively more 
specialised and advanced than their interstate competitors, and centred around three 
main resources: its human capital; its physical resources; and its location. In terms of 
human capital resources, the Tasmanian population has an historical dependence on 
(and therefore a culturally ingrained knowledge of) innovative and high-quality boat 
and ship design and production (Industry Audit, 1998). In 2003, shipbuilding was 
described by Premier Bacon, as a 'natural industry' of the island state; one that has 
prospered and diversified its output (and by consequence demonstrating its innovative 
ability) over the past two centuries: 
. . .  I think that is an example of a characteristic that Tasmania has that maybe isn't 
unique in the world but has a very long tradition here so it is at least an area of activity 
which we have proved, over a very long time, that we can be very good at, because we 
are an island community so we have a relationship with the sea, we look at the sea 
everyday, a lot of people work at sea, we have our recreation on the sea, it just 
surrounds us (Jim Bacon. Personal Interview, 2003). 
In terms of the state's  basic physical resources, Tasmania maintained a moderately 
sized and somewhat specialised workforce able to satisfY the existing domestic 
demand for the state's  marine products. This coupled with the continued availability 
of high-quality basic factors (such as Tasmania's world-class woods for ship 
construction) meant that although international demand for Tasmanian marine 
products was negligible, the state's  reputation remained highly valuable in terms of its 
innovative abilities, a point of differentiation in Australia's domestic market. In 
terms of the state's  geographic resources, Tasmania's location off the southern coast 
of the Australian mainland enables it to be positioned by the federal government as 
the nation's  centre for specialised maritime research into the Great Southern Ocean 
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and Antarctica, internationally recognised responsibilities that had flow-on effects to 
the state's  reputation as a world-class maritime centre. As a longstanding federal 
government member for Tasmania suggests: 
. . .  there was also the [federal] commitment to designate Tasmania as the jumping off 
point for Antarctic related activity and that generated quite a bit of the university centre 
for Antarctic and Southern Ocean studies, the attempt to have the boats that go to 
Antarctica, the holding of meetings for the treaty here and the Southern Ocean 
Convention coming here so there was a whole range of activity that I suppose was 
conceptualising Tasmania as a maritime centre around the Southern Ocean and there 
was also the big fishing industry � the boom around that time of the Orange Roughie 
fishery, it sort of declined after the Orange Roughie was virtually fished out, but at that 
time, if you remember, there was a huge concentration of attention as developing quite 
a large processing and shore based side to it which was also thought to be generating 
demand for commodoring and supply of fishing vessels (Duncan Kerr. Personal 
Interview, 2003). 
5.6 THE TASMANIAN SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY AND RELATED AND 
SUPPORTING INDUSTRY IN 1977. 
As noted, in 1977, Tasmania's shipbuilding industry consisted of a collection of 
single business firms, catering to the needs of narrow target markets (such as 
specialised steel hull construction, winch construction, marine maintenance etc). Of 
the nine firms that comprised the TLSI cluster in 2002, only five were operating in 
1977. These five firms were Colbeck & Gunton (insulation manufacture and 
installation), Skeels & Perkins (a marine foundry and machining business), Muir 
Engineering (a winch and anchorage manufacturer), FC Management (a steel hull 
manufacturer), and of course, International Catamarans (pioneers of fast-ferry 
construction). Each of these firms was a profitable and ongoing concern in its own 
right during the late 1970s, and served the needs of specific target markets within 
Australia. The regional nature of the Tasmanian economy, coupled with the static 
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demand for their products, meant that Tasmanian marine manufacturing businesses 
were small to medium sized enterprises (gauged by their employment numbers), and 
that the standard of infrastructural support was largely 'basic and generalised' by 
Porter's  definition. 
The industry's supporting educational infrastructure comprised principally of the 
federal government's Apprenticeships Commission, which in 1975 was amalgamated 
with the TAFE system of trade education and qualification (Ray, 2001). The 
amalgamation resulted from the widespread recognition the TAFE system needed to 
focus on "the needs ofthe individual for lifelong vocationally oriented education, and 
that the manpower needs of industry should be the context of courses" (Kangan, 1974: 
23). Regarding the issue of trade training and qualification, this philosophy was well 
summarised in a 1976 Australian submission to the OECD: 
Mention was made of the narrowness and the high degree of skill and industry 
orientation of many TAFE courses. This is nowhere truer than in relation to the trades 
stream which has also had to carry the greatest share of the burden of low funding in 
such areas as equipment and facilities, which are often very expensive. When these 
disadvantages are coupled with the conservative outlook of many of the bodies 
advising on trade courses, the static condition of trade training becomes explicable. 
Many of the measures are designed to bring about change in emphasis in T AFE from 
the needs of industry to the needs of the individual. This change is especially 
important in the trade training areas where the needs of individuals (because they are 
usually younger and have no option but to attend courses) should occupy a more 
central position (Department of Education, 1976: 1 15). 
Other educational institutions included the existing primary and high school systems 
and the state's  university, although neither offered courses focused on developing the 
state's shipbuilding industry. The directly relevant government departments that 
existed at the time were the Department of Industrial Development and Trade, the 
Department of Labour and Industry, and the Office of the Premier (there was no 
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department specifically charged with state development). In 1977, the Department of 
Industrial Development and Trade was charged with facilitating export sales (of 
which the shipbuilding industry was not a major contributor at the time); the 
Department of Labour and Industry was focused on facilitating industrial 
relationships within the state; and the Office of the Premier was focused on the 
restructuring of the state's  industrial-based economy. Of greatest benefit to the 
state's  shipbuilding industry from the private sector was the state's  logging industry, 
which gave shipbuilding firms access to the state's  the high quality wood resources 
that proved ideal for hull, mast (and other) marine production. 
5.7 SUMMARY OF THE TASMANIAN DIAMOND FACTORS IN 1977. 
In 1977, the structure of the demand faced by the Tasmanian shipbuilding (and 
marine manufacturing) industry was almost exclusively from the domestic market, 
with little prospect for growth given the prevailing global economic climate. Such 
were the limitations for growth that several businesses involved in the TLSI cluster 
today undertook diversification strategies to improve their revenues. For example, 
Colbeck & Gunton expanded its insulation business to include the housing sector in 
order to augment its revenue stream. Tasmania's factor conditions were, however, 
suitably specialised to the requirements of a successful internationally oriented 
shipbuilding industry, with the state's human capital resources (in terms of innovative 
shipbuilding expertise) and reliance on sea transport particularly well developed by 
1977. Additionally, the state also had developed a stable set of related (however 
rather 'basic') physical resources, such as skilled maritime labour, an abundance of 
waterfront real estate, and excellent shipbuilding materials that remained largely 
intact and capable of supporting a marked increase in production. 
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The state's  related and supporting industry included a newly formed alliance between 
the Apprenticeships Commission and the TAPE education system, and an established 
logging industry which enabled the shipbuilding industry access to its quality wood 
products. The industry' s  firms' structure, strategy, and rivalry were based on a 
friendship network of marine manufacturer managers that spanned generations within 
the state. As such, and where possible, firms were ready to offer support (in terms of 
labour, expertise, and/or other sophisticated maritime inputs) when required to 
another business on the understanding that the goodwill would be returned if, and 
when, required. In addition, the state's  prestige as a maritime centre was significantly 
enhanced when the federal government undertook a policy direction that incorporated 
Hobart Port as a centre for Great Southern Ocean and Antarctic research. 
5.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY. 
This chapter provided a summary of Tasmania's diamond factors as they existed at 
the inception of the TLSI cluster in 1977. The development of Tasmania's diamond 
factors, and the role played by successive Tasmanian state governments' over the 
TLSI cluster's  life cycle, is the topic of the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER SIX. 
ANALYSIS OF THE CASE STUDY: 
THE INTRODUCTORY STAGE OF THE TLSI CLUSTER'S LIFE 
CYCLE 1977 - 1984. 
6.1 OBJECTIVE OF THE CHAPTER. 
The objective of this chapter is to provide an account of the critical incidents and 
interactions between the Tasmanian government and the TLSI cluster during the 
period 1977 - 1984. This period of time was associated with the introductory stage 
of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle, as it represents the formation of the cluster' s  hub-firm 
International Catamarans, whose foray into aluminium hull construction culminated in 
the launch of the world's first commercially built all-aluminium wave-piercing 
catamaran in 1984. In order to portray the governments' role in the development of 
the TLSI cluster during its introductory stage, this chapter includes a discussion of 
Tasmania's diamond factors, and the manner in which they were advanced (or 
otherwise) by the interaction ofthe Tasmanian government and the TLSI cluster. The 
chapter closes with a summary of the interaction between the Tasmanian government 
and the TLSI cluster in terms ofPorter's ICT. 
6.2 THE TAS.MANIAN GOVERNMENTS: 1977-1984. 
During the period 1977 - 1984, Tasmania was represented by two elected state 
governments, one representing the state's  Labor Party, and one representing the 
state's  Liberal Party. In 1977, at the formation of the TLSI cluster's  hub-firm 
International Catamarans, the incumbent government was Doug Lowe's  Labor Party, 
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which held power between December 1977 and May 1982. During its term in office, 
the state Labor party oversaw the formation of two important supporting 
infrastructures for the state's  shipbuilding industry. The first was the enactment of a 
macro-economic policy, known as the State Strategy Plan; the second was the 
formation of the Australian Maritime College (AMC) in the City ofLaunceston. 
In May 1982, the Gray Liberal government was elected to power, and would remain 
in office throughout the remainder of the introductory stage of the TLSI cluster's  life 
cycle. During its term in office, this government oversaw four critical policy 
initiatives during early development of the TLSI cluster. First was the Tasmanian 
government's  enactment of legislation clearing the way for Incat to purchase land at 
Sullivan's Cove in Hobart to accommodate the development of its new range of 
vessels. Second was the establishment of the Tasmanian Development authority in 
1984, a department charged with economic development of industry through data 
gathering and the distribution of loan guarantees and grants. Third, was the 
Tasmanian government' s  agreement to a proposal that Incat build a new generation 
fast-ferry catamaran for the government-run Bass Strait passenger service. Fourth, 
was the Tasmanian government's successful lobbying of the federal government to 
help fund !neat's initial expansion at Sullivan's Cove, and to increase the 
Commonwealth government's shipbuilding bounty grants by $8 million as part of the 
renewed Freight Equalisation Scheme. 
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6.3 GOVERNMENT ROLES IN DEVELOPING THE REGIONAL 
ECONOMY'S 'FIRM STRATEGY, STRUCTURE, AND RIVALRY'. 
!neat's initial experimentation with the design and construction of the world's  first 
aluminium-based hull did not involve the support from state or federal government; 
instead it included the input of other private sector firms within Hobart's marine 
manufacturing industry. Robert Clifford called upon the experience of his friendship 
network to help with the design, construction, and development of the technology 
required to shape the newly adopted shipbuilding material to the required 
performance and safety standards. Concerning the experimental stages of !neat's 
designs, one managing director within the friendship network said of the 
collaboration: 
So, we were at Bellerive with 44 gallon drums around the side of it [the vessel], filling 
them up one at a time to see what angle this would get with a certain weight. That is 
how it all started. It was actually a surveyor who suggested Robert get in touch with 
Phil Hercus in Sydney, a ship designer and Phil got on line and they started to do a few 
numbers. So, it made it legal after that. We sort of built at different times, different 
shapes of boats, and different types of boats. We had some terror ideas (Richard Riley. 
Personal Interview, 2002). 
During the initial period of experimentation, the Tasmanian government was largely 
unaware of the industry' s  efforts at creating the next generation of commercial 
shipping vesseL At the time, the Lowe Labor government was otherwise distracted 
from the causes of individual industries, implementing instead an economic 
restructuring policy that attempted to direct the state away from its reliance on hydro-
industrialisation, to one that had a greater emphasis on government-private sector 
linkages: 
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At the end of the Reece era [the previous state Premier] Tasmania had probably 
exploited those industries - not exploited but got the best that they could probably get 
out of it - and it was a bit of a turning point then. Basically, at that time, the 
departmental structure that had existed had very little to do with the functional 
obligation on government, in relation to its social and developmental and economic 
strategy and there needed to be a more formalised and more direct line of authority 
established, clear linkages between the agencies, a far different approach in regard to 
recruitment and development and even education of staff in these sector positions 
(Doug Lowe. Personal Interview, 2002). 
The Lowe Labor government undertook the responsibility of restructuring the macro-
economic environment of Tasmania, and given the resource constraints of a regional 
economy, had not achieved a similar focus on individual industries within the state. 
Of his government's  stance on the state's  shipbuilding industry in particular, Premier 
Lowe stated that: 
Well, we didn't perceive it as anything special. You have come one step further than 
the actual development of policy that lead to the establishment of the shipbuilding 
industry. The thrust of government industrial development policy in the mid 1970's 
was really evolving from a very bureaucratised public sector government structure 
advisory secretariat seated within government, predominantly from people who were 
experienced in the public sector as distinct from the commercial sector itself (Doug 
Lowe. Personal Interview, 2002). 
As such, the Lowe Labor government provided little direct assistance to Incat (or the 
marine manufacturing industry in general) in its efforts in developing the new 
aluminium shipbuilding technologies. That responsibility, and the associated costs 
and benefits, were left to !neat's entrepreneurial manager, Robert Clifford, and his 
partner Phil Hercus to organise. The SSP introduced by the Tasmanian government 
did, however, require that Clifford engage the services of Mr. Hercus, and can be 
credited somewhat with the formation of the partnership that was to become 
'International Catamarans'. The Tasmanian government's  position on restructuring 
the nature of the regional economy through the SSP, however, was of some 
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considerable benefit to the reputation of the state's  shipbuilding and marine industries. 
The Tasmanian government's  strategy was to go some way to improving the level of 
domestic and international demand for the state's  production and geographic location 
for shipbuilding and repair, and for its ocean research services (this will be discussed 
in more detail in section 6.4). The initial private sector reaction to the strategy was 
optimistic: 
Hobart shipbuilding interests yesterday cautiously supported Tasmanian government 
moves to establish a ship repair and servicing industry in Southern Tasmania. The 
Premier, Mr. Lowe, said after a meeting with the interests there was general support for 
the concept, but it was agreed that the next step should be to get a clear indication of 
the likely cost, guaranteed use and the overall viability. Mr. Lowe said that the 
Tasmanian government was keen to have Tasmania capitalise on its geographical 
location, and on the growing reputation internationally as the major centre for 
initiatives in the Antarctic and Southern Ocean (The Mercury, 1981). 
!neat's domestic exporting success was evident by the time that Gray Liberal 
government came into power in May 1982, as was the company's  efforts at perfecting 
aluminium-hull technology for a new generation of fast passenger catamarans. Again, 
however, the Tasmanian government was somewhat unconvinced about the potential 
of the 'new' industry to provide sustained economic growth for the state. As a result, 
the Gray government initially maintained an arm's length relationship with the firms 
involved. Of !neat's  experimentation with the development of aluminium (light) 
shipbuilding within the state, Premier Gray stated: 
I think we saw Clifford as one opportunity amongst many- but I don't think it was ever 
thought, "We could become a grand shipbuilding nation of the world?" Whatever. I 
think it was - "Let's see how if this one goes and we will get on with the next one 
then". It wasn't any great perception of this is going to be a marvellous thing. We 
didn't have a dream that we were going to be building great shipbuilder's names. I 
think the first thing was to try and support the fact that it was a central business and 
flowing from that there would be other offshoots of success to develop. I certainly 
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didn't have any great vision as I have explained about the shipbuilding industry. It 
was, here is an opportunity, let's support it (Robin Gray. Personal Interview, 2002). 
In 1982, !neat's management approached the Tasmanian government for in-principle 
support for the relocation of the Incat business to larger premises at Sullivan's Cove 
in Hobart. Clifford cited that the business of fast ferry catamaran construction was 
potentially a high growth industry, supported by the fact that the company had 
designed, built, and sold, ten vessels in that calendar year alone (The Mercury, 1982). 
Clifford also remarked that unless the government allowed the company to build a 
new state-of-the-art shed at Sullivan's Cove (which at the time was not correctly 
zoned for such industrial works), then the company's  growth and employment 
potential would be significantly restrained, and that the company may need to seek 
similar opportunities interstate (The Mercury, 1982): 
Mr. Clifford said that his Hobart shipyard had been unable to cope with recent orders 
and unfortunately they had gone to licensee builders in Cairns and Singapore. Mr. 
Clifford said that the possibility of Incat purchasing a portion of the old gasworks site 
was an important breakthrough for his company. It would mean that the Hobart 
shipyard would not have to tum orders away, and would enable the company to 
continue developing shipbuilding techniques and testing new ideas in Hobart (John 
Cleary. Tasmanian government Press Release, 1982: 2). 
With this claim in mind, the office of the Premier undertook measures to circumvent 
the issues surrounding !neat's request, clearing the way for the company to purchase 
and develop the required land. Utmost in the Premier's  mind at the time of the 
decision was the issue of job maintenance and creation: 
I guess every time you supported a new industry you did think about, to be presented 
with claims about how much employment it was going to create, over which period it 
was going to create, and that obviously is a factor. We would work our guys out to get 
an industry up, Incat, and at the same time try and create 200 jobs in the next year, at 
the same time you will find a couple of major industries go, including five others, so 
you are never winning - you are always going backwards, no matter how hard and how 
much effort you put in, just soul destroying sometimes (Robin Gray. Personal 
Interview, 2002). 
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I think, you know, if you go back and look through all the industries that got support 
and help over that period there have been some real successes and it has been a 
pleasure to have been associated with them. But it was part of a real concerted effort 
on the part of the government to do that - that was our major policy - that was what we 
were about - it was trying to create employment (Robin Gray. Personal Interview, 
2002). 
The acting Premier at the time, Mr. Cleary, released a press statement at the time 
supporting the government's action on the matter, and once again, job creation was 
the rationale provided: 
The government was pleased to be able to open the way for Incat to stay in Tasmania. 
The company was an important employer in its own right, and created work for local 
suppliers and sub-contractors. Mr. Cleary said that the company had developed an 
international reputation for fast, economical, safe and reliable vessels and was reaping 
the rewards of the initiative and skill of its founders. Mr. Cleary also paid credit to the 
local suppliers and sub-contractors who had contributed to the vessel construction 
(John Cleary. Tasmanian government Press Release, 1982: 2). 
In 1984, the Gray Liberal government undertook a maJor policy initiative that 
established a government department specifically charged with the economic 
development of Tasmania. The office of the Premier of Tasmania had involved the 
portfolio of 'state economic development' for some time, and the new government 
department, known as the Tasmania Development Authority (TDA), sought to better 
focus the portfolio's research efforts, strategy, and resources. A representative of the 
TDA said of its function that: 
. . .  the [TDA] has an overall function to look after the portfolio area of the Minister for 
State Development, the Premier, and this includes tourism, the Office of Sport and 
Recreation and the Office and affairs of the Department of State Development. The 
department is completely independent of whoever may be in power (John Keller. 
Personal Interview, 2002). 
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One of the TDA's first responsibilities was to research the claims of Robert Clifford, 
who in 1983 produced the prototype wave-piercing catamaran for passenger travel. 
Traditionally, the catamaran design was less than ideal for sailing in 'choppy water' 
of over one-metre waves. Clifford (1998: 44) stated that the idea for the new design 
culminated on "a particularly rough day . .  .I thought that it must be possible to produce 
a more comfortable vessel". Once again, Clifford utilised the input of his marine 
manufacturing 'friendship network' to brainstorm the specifications of the innovative 
design. The trial runs of the new design proved optimistic, and the entrepreneurial 
Clifford saw its potential for further international export success. Even though Incat 
had by this stage moved into its new Sullivan' s Cove shipyard, the company was 
unable to afford the cash flow requirements of the commercial construction of the 
vessel. In 1983, Clifford approached the state Premier for financial support in the 
commercial development of a new wave-piercing aluminium catamaran design, as 
well as seek support for its lease to compliment the Tasmanian government's  Bass 
Strait passenger service. Although !neat's domestic exporting success was well 
established, as was his entrepreneurial flair for shipbuilding and design, the 
Tasmanian government remained reticent at providing the considerable sum requested 
for the production of a commercialised vessel. As Premier Gray recalls: 
I was never convinced - in those times Clifford had run a few ferries - his nickname 
was "Bean Head". He didn't have a record apart from success runni g those ferries at 
a time when he was bound to be successful anyway because there was no alternative -
after driving the one through the bridge - going through Campania to get to Hobart -
so I was really hoping that the judgment of the TDA would do the underwriting and I 
was very conscious of the risk to the government of doing it. If it hadn't come on, we 
would have worn it (Robin Gray. Personal Interview, 2002). 
Well, we obviously had to - since building those million dollars boats - we kept our 
fingers crossed and hoped for the bloody best. You can never be sure on these things -
it could have been an absolute disaster (Robin Gray. Personal Interview, 2002). 
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Albeit with some initial concerns, the Tasmanian government, through the TDA and 
office of the Premier, lobbied the federal government grants commission, and itself 
granted a Tasmanian government-guarantee for the finances required to construct the 
world's  first commercially viable wave-piercing aluminium catamaran. Although the 
loan scheme ensured that Incat would have access to the required funding, the nature 
of the government's  action was not solely a benevolent one: 
The Tasmanian government loan guarantees were given not to ensure the industry had 
access to cheap money, but rather so that the Tasmanian government could influence 
the company's strategic outcomes. In other words, it gave the Tasmanian government 
the power of moral-suasion. Financial support for Incat was very necessary during that 
stage of its life cycle. What we provided was a government guarantee - it was as good 
as a government cheque. In the end - it was $6 million that I guaranteed Clifford 
(Robin Gray. Personal Interview, 2002). 
So, Robin gave a guarantee at that stage to Incat and that was quite critical, getting 
their funds, starting up and developing their business and getting up to Prince of Wales 
Bay and building their first shed, and that sort of thing. So, we kept obviously close 
contact with Clifford and his operation and we recognised that as a business of real 
potential and Clifford has always been an impressive fellow, some would say he is a . . .  
but he is a goer and he has achieved a lot. We were working closely with him (Ray 
Groom. Personal Interview, 2002). 
The Australian federal and Tasmanian government loans and grants afforded to Incat 
at the time comprised of funding allocations for both the construction of the wave­
piercing vessel itself, as well as bridging finance for the required $ 1  million re-tooling 
of !neat's Sullivan's Cove shed. A minister in the Gray Liberal government stated 
that in hindsight, the government's loan guarantee and moral-suasion was 
fundamental to the well-documented growth and success of the TLSI cluster in the 
proceeding years. 
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\Vhen I was a minister in Robin Gray's government, we gave a guarantee to Incat 
which was fundamental to them starting up the business we know today. So, this idea 
of private enterprise in a state like Tasmania, is rare, there is always some degree of 
government involvement when there has to be, obviously in planning arrangements, 
that sort of thing, but also support. We are bit isolated and we are a small community 
and I think compared to most states, and it is probably true of all states, but in the 
comparative sense but we probably have a greater role to play as a government in 
supporting industry (Ray Groom. Personal Interview, 2002). 
However, whilst Tasmanian government ministers were aware that the driving force 
behind the early innovative success achieved by Incat was that of the entrepreneur 
Clifford, they recognised that the company's  relationship with the government was 
crucial to its success: 
You have got to give Clifford full marks for the innovative design, they have done a 
fantastic job, really have, I wouldn't want to create the impression or take the credit 
from them because they were blokes that did it once we provided the wheels to make 
it happen. The bank helped him of course, as did the AMC with its complimentary 
tank testing technology- it was really a question of providing that first lot of 
assistance, I think that was the most important, probably without it he wouldn't have 
gone too far (Robin Gray. Personal Interview, 2002). 
6.3.1 Summary of the government roles in developing the regional economy's 
('firms strategy, structure, and rivalry" during the introductory stage. 
In terms of facilitating the regional economy's 'firm strategy, structure, and rivalry' 
during the introductory stage of the TLSI cluster's life cycle, the Tasmanian 
governments' role was initially removed from any direct interaction with the TLSI 
cluster firms. The state's  shipbuilding and marine manufacturing firms enjoyed the 
interdependencies and support infrastructure of a close 'friendship network' that had 
developed over a number of generations prior to the establishment of Incat in 1977. 
As such, instead of allocating government resources in developing relationships 
between the state's  shipbuilders and marine manufacturers, the Tasmanian 
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government was intent on restructuring the state's  economy away from its 
dependence on industrialisation, whilst building its reputation as a producer of high-
quality export merchandise. 
The Gray Liberal government's  decision in 1984 to provide a loan guarantee to Incat 
for the development of the world's  first wave-piercing catamaran represented the first 
major policy directive by the state. It allowed Incat, and its 'friendship network' of 
marine manufacturing firms, to experiment with the wave-piercing catamaran design 
and the related innovations required for its successful launch. The Premier's  rationale 
for the loan guarantee was that the Incat innovations were strongly linked to 
significant job creation opportunities within the state, a priority for the Gray Liberal 
government at the time. A policy initiative focused on the longer-term development 
of the state's  'firms strategy, structure, and rivalry' was the creation of the TDA, a 
government department specifically charged with the economic development of the 
state. Through the TDA, the Tasmanian government undertook research and 
development schemes tailored to the private sector's  needs, as well as provide 
government grants and other assistance in the development of key industries, 
including the TLSI. 
6.4 GOVERNMENT ROLES IN DEVELOPING THE REGIONAL 
ECONOMY'S 'DEMAND CONDITIONS'. 
As noted, Australian shipbuilders experienced declining international demand for 
their production post World War II largely due to its reputation as an uncompetitive 
and problematic industry with which to deal (Beeson, 1997). As part of its economic 
restructuring efforts away from industrialisation and ineffective government-private 
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sector relationships, the Tasmanian government undertook major policy initiatives to 
position the state of Tasmania as Australia's premier port servicing the Great 
Southern Ocean region. Premier Lowe commented on Tasmania's geographic 
advantages in terms ofthe government' s  economic restructuring plan: 
The next step in my judgement was to make sure that we made Tasmania, as far as 
possible, a super centre for southern oceans activity and we looked specifically at 
developing not so much ship building but ship servicing facilities, particularly in the 
Port of Hobart but also looking at the Tamar Valley, it had developed of its own 
initiative a lift operation for smaller vessels, both for construction and for overhaul, so 
we had, at both ends of the state. In 1980 I went overseas after consultation over an 18  
month period with a number of local businesses who were prepared to move into a 
consortium for the purposes of purchasing a very large floating dock to bring to the 
southern estuary and that it would have basically seen Tasmania become the major 
servicing centre for salient vessels operating in the southern oceans (Doug Lowe. 
Personal Interview, 2002). 
The Tasmanian government's effort at repositioning Tasmania, therefore, 
concentrated on the development of the state's  reputation as a centre for 
oceanographic excellence in the southern ocean region, a reputation from which 
individual firms within the state could potentially increase their profitability. As such, 
the Tasmanian government pursued an indirect strategy of increasing the size of both 
international and domestic demand for Tasmania's maritime production through its 
investment in reputation development for the state. The first step in the repositioning 
of the state's  reputation in this area was the Tasmanian government' s  lobbying of the 
federal government concerning the relocation ofthe CSIRO's oceanographic research 
unit to Hobart: 
If the oceanographic research unit of the CSIRO is transferred to Tasmania, Hobart 
may become the base for a new research ship. During question time in the Senate 
yesterday, the Tasmanian Liberal senator mentioned a CSIRO report, which he said 
supported the establishment of the oceanography group at Hobart in conjunction with 
the Antarctic division (The Mercury, 1980: 2). 
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As noted, in 1983, Incat had approached the newly elected Gray Liberal government 
to help fund the commercial construction of the world's  first wave-piercing 
catamaran, and to undertake a lease agreement for the vessel to complement the 
Tasmanian government's  existing Bass Strait passenger service. Again, the 
Tasmanian government held reservations about allocating public funding into an 
otherwise untested commercial operation. The Tasmanian government, however, was 
faced with an unattractive situation that itself had helped to create. Firstly, the state 
Premier, through the TDA, had made some $6 million available to Incat to construct 
the new wave-piercing catamaran. Secondly, Incat could not afford to construct this 
vessel and then have it remain unsold (or unused) for any length of time, given the 
significant capital investment in the product. It became a responsibility of the 
Tasmanian government to both help fund and employ the vessel for the Bass Strait 
passenger ferry route, and indirectly help advertise the merits of the company, and 
Tasmanian government's, investment in the new technology: 
We were initially reluctant operators of a passenger service across Bass Strait, we 
really didn't want to do it but we had to do it and we recognised that if we didn't it was 
going to be disastrous . . . .  We hoped that eventually someone else would run a private 
enterprise passenger service, someone like Incat (Robin Gray. Personal Interview, 
2002). 
6.4.1 Summary of the government roles in developing the regional economy's 
"demand conditions" during the introductory stage. 
During the initial period ofthe introductory stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle, the 
Tasmanian government undertook little direct action to improve the size or 
sophistication of the international or domestic demand for the state's  shipbuilding and 
marine manufacturing industry. Instead the government focused on the issue of 
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modernising the state's economic orientation away from the industrialisation of the 
late 1940s and 1950s, to one that could more effectively compete in an increasingly 
globalising economy. As such, the Tasmanian government's 'economic reorientation' 
strategy was generic in nature, that is, one that aimed to serve the interests of the 
entire set of industries operating within the regional economy by improving the 
international reputation of the state, not solely that of its shipbuilding industry. The 
change of government towards the end of the introductory stage, however, witnessed 
the government undertake a promise to lease one of lncat's wave-piercing catamarans 
upon its successful completion. The Tasmanian government provided Incat with 
increased local demand for its output, and an opportunity for the company to display 
the value of its innovative design to both the domestic and international market for 
passenger ferries. 
6.5 GOVERNMENT ROLES IN DEVELOPING THE REGIONAL 
ECONOMY'S 'RELATED AND SUPPORTING INDUSTRY'. 
The priority of the Lowe Labor government between 1977 and 1982 was to reform 
the Tasmanian economy, and one of its first major undertakings was the reformation 
of the roles played by public service organisations and departments in relation to the 
private sector. In order to achieve this, the Lowe Labor government utilised an 
independent (but government commissioned) Callaghan Report into the issues facing 
the Tasmanian economy, and the manner in which the government could best support 
sustained economic growth. The Callaghan Report, commissioned by the 1975 
Neilson Labor government, was released in 1977, and examined Tasmania's special 
situation as a regional island economy. It studied the structure of the economy, its 
demographic characteristics, its resource endowments, the (un)employment situation, 
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and the nature of the federal government' s  assistance to Tasmania. The Premier said 
of the public sector restructuring initiative: 
Out ofthe Callaghan Plan there developed a 12-point plan, basically to lift the region's 
economy. Part of that change was to make the public service up to date and relevant, 
having structures that would ensure that it worked efficiently, it also highlighted the 
need to diversify Tasmania's industrial base, and by that time Brendon O'Kelly [an 
Irish national economic consultant] was already here and with the feedback from the 
Callaghan Report, there were good guidelines for us to follow in the period that 
followed. In relation specifically to shipbuilding, I actually went directly to Canberra 
in the August of 1980 and presented to them a detailed outline of the strategy that we 
were trying to seek with the development of the floating dock facility here in Hobart. 
It gave us an ability to present a proposal whereby vessels up to the 15-20,000 tonne 
capacity could possibly, in the long term, be serviced through facilities established in 
the state (Doug Lowe. Personal Interview, 2002). 
The findings of the Callahan Report were used as a bargaining tool for the Tasmanian 
government, in terms of it seeking greater federal government funding for the 
restructuring process to be undertaken by the state's public sector. As Premier Lowe 
noted: 
It was a matter of trying to persuade the Federal Government to assist in financing 
infrastructure using the guidelines that were provided through the Callaghan Report 
and that related as much to the development of infrastructure as it did research and 
development and the provision of targeted grants, tax relief and policies to encourage 
people, entrepreneurs and developers to actually move into the area - it was an 
important one - and the development of consortiums and coalitions of interest. It was 
another area that we were able to act very significantly on. We had that in relation to 
shipbuilding and sea fishery strategies, the same can be said in relation to the poppy 
industry and the growth and expansion there, the development of the essential oils 
industry and the hop industry, the way it moved into research and development through 
our own local research and development capability here, both in the public and private 
sector, both moving to new strains of hop that were far more efficient in their 
production, better in terms of disease resistance and everything else, it was all part of 
the expansion of activity that took place, basically through the decade of the '70 (Doug 
Lowe. Personal Interview, 2002). 
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In order to transform the public service's role in this regard, the Tasmanian 
government hired international consultancy expertise in its strategy to rid the state of 
its reliance on hydro-industrialisation as a source of job creation and economic 
growth: 
Brendon O'Kelly came out [from Ireland] for a considerable amount of time as an 
advisor in that area but he also brought with him a lot of the knowledge of what Ireland 
was at that stage doing, it was confronting pretty similar problems to ours, or it had 
done in the five years prior to his arrival out here. He had been involved in the 
development of strategies for the Ireland nation, bearing in mind the fact that in area it 
is exactly the same as Tasmania virtually, and we sought to build upon that. By the 
end of the process, there was a core of considerable ability within the government's 
policy advisors; the linkages with the commercial sector and the significant areas of the 
commercial sector, both within the state and nationally, had developed quite broadly. I 
had established a local planning and industry co-ordination advisory council that had 
many of the representatives of the captains of industry here locally . . .  (Doug Lowe. 
Personal Interview, 2002). 
In 1982, the Gray Liberal government undertook steps to support !neat's business by 
passing legislation that allowed the company to purchase land at Sullivan's Cove in 
Hobart. Sullivan's Cove was, at the time, incorrectly zoned for the establishment of a 
major shipbuilding yard in the area, and in order to remove the bureaucratic systems 
involved with the delay of the company's  required expansion. Clifford had hinted at 
relocating his business, and his employment potential, interstate, should the 
company's  planned move be delayed, or disallowed by local government. Premier 
Gray stated of the Tasmanian government's  intervention into local government 
activity that: 
I think at that stage, that was considered where the shipping activity should be � that's 
the port and therefore we should build ships there. Probably it was Clifford's favoured 
location. He later moved on, of course, but that was when he outgrew where he was. I 
think that was pretty much � that would be the reason . . .  .1' d say yes, for sure, by 
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encouraging Incat in particular, and some of their other sub-contractors, defmitely had 
a marked impact on marine business. However, I don't think the impact would have 
been so big if Incat hadn't been around at the time to do it (Robin Gray. Personal 
Interview, 2002). 
Once agam, the employment issue was the rationale behind the Tasmanian 
government's  willingness to support Incat in its request to relocate to its favoured 
location. The Premier stated that Incat was perceived to be the 'driving force' behind 
the state's  resurgent shipbuilding industry, and that the employment potential (both 
directly and indirectly) of maintaining !neat's presence in Tasmania was an argument 
that the government could not afford to ignore. 
6.5.1 Summary of the government roles in developing the regional economy's 
(•related and supporting industry" during the introductory stage. 
During the introductory stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle, the Tasmanian 
governments' economic restructuring away from its dependence on industrialisation 
necessitated its reorganisation of the public sector organisations (i.e. the state 
government departments). The rationale for this Tasmanian government department 
reorganisation was to achieve a streamlined and relevant set of service organisations 
that facilitated the interaction between the Tasmanian government and the state's  
private sector industries. The reorganisation resulted in a reduced set of departments 
through which the private sector firms had to engage when interacting with the 
government, and therefore, fewer channels to negotiate when attempting to engage the 
influential services of the state's  Premier, who by this stage had begun to assume 
greater responsibilities for the state's economic development. In terms of the 
facilitation of the TLSI cluster, the Tasmanian governments' reorganisation facilitated 
the speedy resolution of Incat' s growth and training issues by more efficiently 
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identifYing the barriers to the company's  growth potential, and overcoming these 
barriers through the direct involvement of the state's  parliament, the Premier, and his 
department of economic development, the TDA. In essence, the government itself 
undertook measures that enabled it to become a more effective supporting 
infrastructure to the growth needs of Incat directly, and the remainder TLSI cluster's  
firms indirectly. 
6.6 GOVERNMENT ROLES IN DEVELOPING THE REGIONAL 
ECONOMY'S 'FACTOR CONDITIONS'. 
At the beginning of the introductory stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle, a number of 
factor conditions were evident in Tasmania that were important to the state's  
industries, however were not directly associated with innovative shipbuilding, nor 
directly influenced by the government's  policy initiatives up until that point in time. 
One of the most important factors cited by the cluster firm managers relates to the 
availability of relatively affordable land suitable for the construction of ships and 
other marine manufacturing: 
It is based on a lot ofthings actually, one of the most important is that it's economically 
sound to build here because the real estate, deep waterfront real estate or thereabouts. 
It's at a logical price whereas in Sydney it is totally unaffordable and illogical; 
Melbourne is pretty much the same - that's one of the major reasons (Alan Williams. 
Personal Interview, 2002). 
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Another factor identified by the cluster firm managers relates to the lifestyle 
conditions enjoyed by people living in the state: 
Lifestyle, Tasmania is a great place to live. \Vhat I mean by that, it is a good place to 
live but, of course, that and the cost of operation is certainly an offset to being 
interstate or some other place in Australia (John Muir. Personal Interview, 2002). 
Well, we are fond of Tasmania and the work was a progression, like a series of 
managed companies, and it was an easy transition just to start up our own maritime 
business in this state. As for the lifestyle, we enjoy living in Tasmania and being away 
from the rat race (Terry Gunton. Personal Interview, 2002). 
Because I was born here, I have traveled a bit but never really decided to go anywhere 
else, there's no place quite like here (Richard Riley. Personal Interview, 2002). 
In terms of further developing the state's  factor conditions such that they were 
conducive to its emerging innovative shipbuilding and marine manufacturing 
industries, the Tasmanian governments' major policy initiatives involved the lobbying 
of federal government for the funding and relocation ofkey national maritime training 
and research facilities to the state. The efforts of the Tasmanian government were 
somewhat successful in achieving financial support from the federal government; the 
most notable of which was the funding of the first undergraduate degree courses 
offered by the AMC (which began in 1980) and the announcement that a CSIRO 
Ocean Research centre was to be established in Hobart. When asked whether !neat's 
development of aluminium vessel technology was viewed as being an opportunity for 
the Tasmanian government to provide direct assistance in the provision of more 
advanced shipbuilding infrastructure, Premier Lowe stated that: 
The government was not prepared to bankroll Clifford's development specifically, as it 
was largely incremental, it moved from small scale vessels to larger and just 
progressively has grown since there (Doug Lowe. Personal Interview, 2002). 
158 
In terms of the state's  shipbuilding industry development, the Tasmanian 
government's  major concern surrounded the development of the state's  human capital 
resources (i.e. educational advancement at the tertiary level) rather than the provision 
of advanced infrastructure for an as-yet proven technological experiment by Incat and 
other members of the maritime manufacturing industry. The Tasmanian government 
was also intent on capitalising on the state's  location as Australia's southern most 
port, and therefore, a prime candidate for Great Southern Ocean and Antarctic 
research. As Premier Lowe indicates: 
It was at that stage that we recognised, or I personally became very much involved in 
looking at, I had already been instrumental in developing the commission for marine 
living resources in Tasmania through the Antarctic Treaty Nation process. The next 
step in my judgement was to actually make sure that we made Tasmania, as far as 
possible, a super centre for southern oceans activity and we looked specifically at 
developing not so much ship building but ship servicing facilities, particularly in the 
Port of Hobart (Doug Lowe. Personal Interview, 2002). 
The election of the Gray Liberal government in 1982 witnessed the continued support 
for the AMC's educational infrastructure, with the purchase of a world-class tank-
testing device, one that scientifically tested miniaturised hull designs in variable 
weather conditions. This tank was utilised by Incat during its trials of the new wave-
piercing hull designs in 1983, trials that culminated in the successful construction of 
an 8.5 metre prototype wave-piercing catamaran in the same year. 
6.6.1 Summary of the government roles in developing the regional economy's 
"factor conditions" during the introductory stage. 
During the introductory stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle, the Tasmanian 
governments were intent on the advancement of the educational infrastructure 
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supporting the state's shipbuilders and marine manufacturers, although it remained 
focused on the 'traditional' methods of boat design and construction. Similarly, the 
state government's  investment in new ship-testing technology for the AMC, although 
state-of-the-art at the time, was also only intended to support the expedient 
construction of 'traditional' shipbuilding designs, not the innovative hull structures 
designed at Incat. As well as improving the international reputation of the state, the 
state government's  lobbying effort to relocate the marine division of the CSIRO to 
Hobart was also an attempt to improve the educational and scientific infrastructure in 
the state's  marine manufacturing industry. However, it appeared not to be an attempt 
to aid !neat's efforts at perfecting its aluminium hull design, an effort that was left to 
Clifford and his 'friendship network' of maritime manufacturers to perfect. 
6.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY. 
This chapter provided an account of the governments' role in developing Tasmania's 
diamond factors during the introductory stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle. The 
introductory stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle was characterised by the arm's 
length relationship between the Tasmanian governments and the entrepreneurial 
efforts of Clifford and his Tasmanian maritime manufacturing industry 'friendship 
network' . Instead the Tasmanian governments focused on the reorientation of the 
state's  economic strategy away from a reliance on industrilaisation towards one based 
on international competitiveness and an improved reputation as a quality 
manufacturer of export goods. Indeed, reflecting on the early stages of his 
company's  development, Clifford (1998) suggested that the government owned (and 
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ill-fated) Lake Illawarra 's collision with the Tasman Bridge was the first and only 
government assistance that he received. 
At the change of Tasmanian government in May 1982, Incat had achieved 
considerable domestic market success (largely through positive word of mouth 
feedback from satisfied customers), and was designing, manufacturing, and selling 
vessels to a number of commercial ferry services on the Australian mainland. Incat 
had successfully lobbied the Tasmanian government in gaining clearance for the 
expanding company to build new, and larger premises at Sullivan's Cove. 
Maintaining the company's  focus on innovation, !neat's management sought to 
produce a wave-piercing catamaran design utilising an all-aluminium hull. A 
prototype vessel was successfully produced by the company, which then sought 
significant financial support from the Tasmanian government to commercially 
manufacture the new design. After some initial reticence, the Tasmanian government 
decided to support !neat's  request for both a loan-guarantee, and a leasing 
arrangement whereby the new vessel would be able to generate mcome for the 
company. The loan guarantee was the turning point for In cat, and the introductory 
stage of the TLSI cluster as a whole, as the new wave-piercing catamarans received 
worldwide media coverage and excellent reviews from its operators. Incat was also 
fortunate enough to have their vessels highlighted during international television 
coverage of Sydney's  New Year's Eve celebrations, an event that witnesses 
unprecedented international interest, and growth, in Tasmania's shipbuilding output. 
The following chapter analyses the state governments' role in the resultant growth 
stage ofthe TLSI cluster's  life cycle. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN. 
ANALYSIS OF THE CASE STUDY: 
THE GROWTH STAGE OF THE TLSI CLUSTER'S LIFE CYCLE 
1984 - 1998. 
7.1 OBJECTIVE OF THE CHAPTER. 
The objective of this chapter is to provide an account of the critical incidents and 
interactions between the TLSI cluster and the Tasmanian government between the 
years 1984 - 1998. This period of time was associated with the growth stage of the 
TLSI cluster's  life cycle, and represents the period where the TLSI cluster 
incorporated major technological advancements into its aluminium vessel and related 
production (to the stage where it was able to export this knowledge). It also 
represents the period where the TLSI cluster's  production achieved a 40 percent share 
of the global market for fast-ferry catamarans (Industry Audit, 1998). As with 
Chapter Six, this chapter discusses each of Tasmania's diamond factors in turn, and 
discusses the manner in which they were advanced (or otherwise) by the interaction of 
the TLSI cluster and the Tasmanian governments. The chapter closes with a summary 
of the interaction between the TLSI cluster and the Tasmanian government during this 
growth stage. 
7.2 THE TASMANIAN GOVERNMENTS: 1984-1998. 
During the period 1984 - 1998, Tasmania was represented by four elected state 
governments, one representing the state's Labor Party, and three representing the 
state's  Liberal Party. At the end of 1984 the prevailing government was Robin Gray's  
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Liberal government, which held office until June 1989. During its term in office 
between 1984 and 1989, the Gray Liberal government oversaw the implementation of 
three important policies that impacted upon the development of the state's  
shipbuilding industry. 
The first was the Tasmanian government's  continued support for !neat's development 
of the world's  first wave-piercing fast catamaran, and its pledge to use such a vessel 
for the Tasmanian government's  Bass Strait passenger service. Fundamental to this 
policy was the Tasmanian government's  financial commitment to the new and larger 
premises for Incat at Sullivan's Cove. The second Tasmanian government action was 
the rationalisation of its departments, and the subsequent establishment of the 
Training Authority of Tasmania in 1986, and the Department of Employment and 
Training in 1987. The Training Authority of Tasmania was charged with the 
continued organisation and coordination of the TAFE system and the apprenticeships 
commission. The third government action, also in 1987, was the approval of a marine 
park zone at the Riverside Industrial Estate at Prince of Wales Bay, a site that !neat's 
management said was required for its planned expansion into the production of a 
larger range of fast catamaran for the world market 
In June 1989, the Gray Liberal government was removed from office in favour of a 
minority Labor government lead by Michael Field, which held office until February 
1992. The Field Labor government was able to take office only after an agreement 
with a Tasmanian environment party (otherwise known as 'the Greens')  enabled the 
two parties to seize a majority in the state parliament's  Lower House. During its term 
in office, the Field Labor government implemented one major policy that directly 
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influenced the TLSI cluster's  formation. The policy, known as the Tasmanian Marine 
Industry Plan and announced in 1989, was a capital injection of $10  million over three 
years, into the state's marine industry infrastructure. This capital injection coincided 
with !neat's expansion at the new Prince of Wales Bay site, which included larger 
premises for its shipbuilding production, as well as the establishment of the 
company's  state-of-the-art Aluminium Welding School. 
In February 1992, the Field Labor government was removed from office in favour of 
a majority Liberal government lead by Ray Groom, which held office until March 
1996. During its term in office, the Groom government undertook two major policy 
initiatives that influenced the development of the TLSI cluster. The first was the 
decision to award Incat with an 'export services' award, a measure that was to 
enhance the reputation of both the state and the company in terms of shipbuilding 
competency. The second was a series ofvisits (spanning the term of the government) 
by Premier Groom to the Prime Minister's  office that aimed at lobbying the federal 
government for additional grants, assistance packages (most notably the retention of 
the Shipbuilding Bounty scheme), and international trade meetings with Japan to help 
Incat secure further international sales, and its future within the Tasmania. 
In March 1996, the Groom Liberal government was removed from office in favour of 
an alternative Liberal government, led by Tony Rundle, who held office until the end 
of the growth stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle. During its term in office, the 
Rundle Liberal government undertook three major policy initiatives that influenced 
the development of the TLSI cluster. The first policy was the continued lobbying of 
the federal government, the main focus being the retention of the federally funded 
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Shipbuilding Bounty. The second policy initiative was that of two planned marine 
parks centred in Launceston (Tasmania's second largest population centre in the 
state's  north) and Hobart (at the southern regional town of Margate) to attract further 
marine manufacturing investment in the state. The third policy enacted by the Rundle 
government was to fund the $8 million expansion of the Aluminium Welding School 
at the Incat premises that was to be amalgamated with the TAFE system as a 
cooperative training venture between the government and !neat's  management 
7.3 GOVERNMENT ROLES IN DEVELOPING THE REGIONAL 
ECONOMY'S 'FIRM STRATEGY, STRUCTURE, AND RIVALRY'. 
In terms of developing the regional economy's firms strategy, structure, and rivalry 
during the growth stage of the TLSI cluster's life cycle, the focus of each of the 
Tasmanian governments centred on the continued enhancement of the state's  
reputation as an innovative centre of shipbuilding and maritime expertise. 
Specifically, this was achieved through three main policy initiatives. The first was the 
Gray Liberal government's  support for !neat's innovative wave-piercing catamaran 
design, both in terms of providing a loan guarantee for the project, as well as 
promising to use the new technology should the design prove to be commercially 
operationaL The second was the approval (and the associated funding) for In cat and a 
number of its key supply firms to relocate to new state of the art premises at Prince of 
Wales Bay. The third was the marketing support given to the TLSI cluster firms by 
Tasmanian government politicians in their international trade missions, and by 
bestowing of internationally recognised awards upon Incat Federally, the 
Commonwealth government undertook an initiative to utilise the AMC for a series of 
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internationally recognised maritime seminars that attracted prominent academics and 
practitioners to the state. 
In relation to the policy initiating the growth stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle, the 
Gray Liberal government undertook a policy that supported Clifford's aspiration to 
construct a new generation of aluminium catamaran with wave-piercing technology; a 
design suitable for the safe carriage of passengers over greater stretches of water than 
the traditional design could manage (Clifford, 1998). The support manifest in 
legislation allowing the company to build a new factory at Sullivans Cove in 1983 (to 
accommodate the construction of its wave-piercing catamarans), bridging finance to 
fund the construction of the new Incat shed, and a promise to use an Incat vessel for 
its Bass Strait passenger service if it proved suitable. A newspaper interview at the 
time made this government assistance clear: 
The Premier, Mr. Gray, yesterday backed a proposal by a Hobart company to build a 
revolutionary wave-piercing catamaran for the Bass Strait route. The developed vessel 
is estimated to cost between $6 million and $8 million, which is considerably cheaper 
than a cruise ship. "Government support is crucial to its development", Mr. Clifford 
said (The Mercury, 1983). 
The loan guarantee and the associated promise to Clifford did not represent an equity 
arrangement with Incat, with the Tasmanian government undertaking no direct 
involvement in the company's  innovative processes or strategies. The Tasmanian 
government did, however, insist that Clifford utilise the services of a naval architect 
before any of his new designs could be legally constructed for commercial use; as 
such, the Tasmanian government can be somewhat credited with the formalisation of 
the relationship between Clifford and Hercus. 
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Clifford's designs proved to be commercially viable, and by 1986, !neat's reputation 
for innovation and quality had led to increased domestic sales of smaller wave-
piercing catamarans, as well as larger versions of the same from the United Kingdom. 
Soon after the international orders were received by Incat, the company increased its 
pressure on the Tasmanian government to implement its second major policy, namely 
the provision of specific infrastructural upgrades within the state. Highest on the 
company's  agenda was the partial funding of a new, and more technologically 
advanced shed to accommodate the construction of a larger aluminium catamaran. As 
was reported in the Mercury newspaper: 
Another month should tell whether innovative Tasmanian boat builder Incat has landed 
another multi-million dollar ferry deal with British Sealink Ferries. However, a 
question mark hangs over whether it will be economically viable for the giant vessels 
to be built in Tasmania, or whether they will have to be built overseas. "It will depend 
largely on the level of support that we get from Government in setting up the facilities 
necessary for this type of expansion" Mr. Clifford said. The company would continue 
to build catamarans in Tasmania up to the size of the 30-metre vessels sold last year, 
but the cost-effectiveness of building larger ones in Tasmania would have to be 
reexamined (Togagnolo, 1986). 
Given the prommence of the international orders, and !neat's resultant ability to 
employ a greater number of Tasmanians, the new shipyard was ready for operation by 
then end of 1987. At his election as state leader in 1989, Premier Field increased the 
Tasmanian government's  commitment to the Prince of Wales Bay marine park by 
injection of a further $10 million of public funds as part of his TMIP, a plan that 
sought to improve the reputation of the state's  industry. Incat was a major 
beneficiary of the TMIP funding, with $1  million offered to establish the TAFE 
School of Aluminium Welding at the Incat factory. The TAFE School of Aluminium 
Welding was designed primarily for the benefit of Incat, although it was also 
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designed to incorporate the needs of the remaining TLSI cluster firms in their efforts 
to be similarly innovative in their own product markets. Of the plan, Premier Field 
noted that: 
The TMIP recognises that to be viable today, companies involved in ship and boat 
building needed to have a national and international perspective, and develop their 
operations accordingly. We have been building boats in Tasmania in a regular and 
conventional way since 1814. As we seek to establish a solid economic base for the 
21st Century, nothing is more logical than to expand our marine industry (Field, 
1989:2). 
Central to the Field Labor government's  policy was an effort to signal to the state's  
marine manufacturing firms that to survive in the current economic situation, they 
also needed to strive for international sales growth of their own. This strategy 
included an effort by the Tasmanian government to influence the strategic choices of 
the state's marine manufacturing firms. Of the TMIP, Premier Field stated that: 
I think you need to create the circumstances whereby there is a greater likelihood of 
doing business, and I think you have to identify where you can go and go out and 
achieve it. I think that any government is going to have some work to do in this area; it 
has to develop a culture whereby there is a narrow and definite economic development 
role for government in a place like Tasmania. I think you have to be strategic about 
where you want the economy to go, and plan it, and widely communicate it to business 
(Michael Field. Personal Interview, 2002). 
As with the Tasmanian government's  actions during the introductory stage, the 
innovative drive characterising the industry remained with the private sector firms, 
with the Tasmanian government largely responsible for the facilitation of the required 
infrastructure to accommodate the industry's growth potential and reputation as an 
innovative centre of shipbuilding. As a testament to the value of the Prince of Wales 
Bay marine park, the general manager of Liferaft Systems and Skeel's & Perkins 
stated that: 
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We are so close geographically now that if we need assistance in an area of expertise, 
we would normally call on our neighbours. So, it is a very close-knit community out 
here I must admit. If we want specialised tooling made up we wouldn't go to 
somewhere in the northern end of the state, we would go to APCO Engineering 
[formerly Skeels & Perkins] or Riley Industrial or to Colbeck & Gunton. We would go 
and talk to them about it because they are as innovative as we are in their own field and 
have a reputation for quality and a high standard of work, so we don't need to go 
anywhere else (Michael Grainger. Personal Interview, 2002). 
I think for us it is a family business. I can't imagine, that after being established here, 
there would be any reason to move. No doubt Incat had a lot of bearing on why we are 
here, we actually moved to [Prince of Wales Bay] because of Incat. There is just no 
reason to be elsewhere (Anthony LaFevre. Personal Interview, 2002). 
The Tasmanian government's  third major policy initiative was to include a direct 
emphasis of !neat's product in its international trade missions. The Tasmanian 
government had been somewhat constrained financially since the treasury audits in 
the late 1980s had revealed a considerable debt burden, and as a result, the Tasmanian 
government was forced to emphasise the non-financial support to the TLSI cluster 
where possible. As a former state Premier indicates: 
The state's funds were under pressure all of the time. If we were on an overseas 
mission you talked where you could about Incat. I took a number of missions overseas, 
Japan and South East Asia, Hong Kong, Taiwan and we always had information about 
Incat, promoting Incat when we could. In Korea we went to see some potential 
purchasers and told them how much we were impressed with Incat, what a successful 
company it was, the product was very good and we had all the information there - our 
people were well informed. That sort of selling role was important (Ray Groom. 
Personal Interview, 2002). 
In a similar initiative, the Tasmanian government also sought to officially reinforce 
the innovative reputation and success earned by the TLSI cluster's  hub firm Incat, by 
bestowing upon it an award for export service to the state. Of the rationale for the 
export award, Premier Groom noted that: 
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A lot of the companies and governments around Asia particularly are very impressed 
with these sorts of things - "Won this big award, must be a good company." It gives 
the company status, as they are not handed out lightly. Obviously we were impressed 
with the development, officials were impressed with what Incat was doing at the time, 
and they won that award. But, we did play a part in helping to promote Incat at the 
international and national level - through government - and when a company is 
recognised by government as being a first class operation it certainly helps them sell 
their vessels (Ray Groom. Personal Interview, 2002). 
It is apparent that the Tasmanian government maintained their focus on the innovative 
Incat product, with a passing acknowledgement of the innovative success of its 
accompanymg supplier firms. As such, the Tasmanian government continually 
endeavoured to maintain the competitive pressures within the TLSI cluster firms to 
maintain their innovative output and reputation as sophisticated suppliers that had 
resulted in its globally successful production: 
We obviously recognised Incat as a major business in the state with huge potential and 
we did understand that there would be other businesses that would be part of that 
success and would develop alongside Incat. If you provide support to any large 
industry or large company you will find it does benefit lots of other little companies 
around the place, providing the essentials for that one central business. I just felt that if 
you could keep this business on the right path and do what we could to back it then 
there would be other benefits for the peripheral businesses, and indeed the state as a 
whole (Ray Groom. Personal Interview, 2002). 
During 1988, Australia' s bicentenary year, in addition to the Tasmanian governments' 
initiatives, the federal government undertook measures to improve the nation's  
reputation as a global innovative shipbuilding centre by orgamsmg a senes of 
international semmars and workshops under the banner of "Maritime '88" at the 
AMC. The importance of the occasiOn was highlighted by the presence of the 
Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar, whom acted as 
the official host ofthe series. Of the seminars, the Premier ofthe day noted that: 
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It really was a boon for the state, although it was marketed as a national event. Clifford 
had recently sold a number of his larger vessels overseas, with my and the TDA's help 
by the way. Word of mouth in the UK, and continental Europe for that matter, about 
!neat's ferries, and the world focus on the seminar in Launceston added more prestige 
to the state's industry - no doubt about it. I think it was soon after the close of the 
seminars that quite a few orders were generated for Incat ferries (Robin Gray. Personal 
Interview, 2002). 
The federal government's  initiative, therefore, indirectly benefited the TLSI cluster 
firms by focusing the world's  maritime industry on the AMC, and the manner in 
which it was involved in the aluminium ferry revolution that was occurring in the 
state's shipbuilding and maritime manufacturing industries. 
7.3.1 Summary of the government roles in developing 'firm structure, strategy, 
and rivalry' during the growth stage. 
During the growth stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle, Tasmania's governments 
concentrated on the continued enhancement of the state's  reputation as a world-class 
centre of shipbuilding excellence, whilst leaving the innovation process itself under 
the management of the private sector firms. The actions and policy initiatives 
undertaken by consecutive Tasmanian governments served to enhance the state's  
maritime reputation in three main ways. 
Firstly, the Gray Liberal government's  financial guarantee to the entrepreneurial 
Clifford (and promise to utilise his new wave-piercing vessels) enabled him to design 
and trial his new catamaran design. Importantly, and a as a precursor to the formation 
of Incat, the Tasmanian government had recently introduced legislation that required 
all such innovations pass an inspection of a qualified naval architect before any 
applications for funding could be granted. 
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Secondly, the state Premiers, through the TDA, also undertook numerous 
international trade missions, and were actively involved in the sales contract 
negotiations with !neat's potential international customers, a move that helped to 
reinforce the image of Incat' s products to the international market for fast ferries. 
The Tasmanian governments' efforts also influenced !neat's supplier firms to 
similarly (and continually) innovate their product offerings, such that they remained a 
preferred supplier to Incat, and also that they met the expectations of international 
marine customers interested in purchasing related products from the state. 
The reputation building efforts undertaken by the Tasmanian governments 
necessitated it implementing its third policy initiative to fund the infrastructural 
support required. In particular, this equated to the funding the newly developed 
aluminium training courses at the TAFE School of Aluminium Welding, the 
continuation of funding for trade missions, the development of consistent marketing 
message for the TLSI cluster firms, and the facilitation of the growth potential of 
Incat (by partially funding the company's  relocation costs to larger premises with 
more advanced capabilities). Perhaps of greatest note was the Tasmanian 
government's  efforts to rezone the council's land at Price ofWales Bay to incorporate 
larger and more advanced shipbuilding sheds (for Incat), and later, the establishment 
of a marine park for Incat' s equally innovative suppliers to relocate to. 
As part of its Prince of Wales Bay marine park policy initiative, was the Tasmanian 
government's  agreement to incorporate the TAFE system into !neat's Aluminium 
Welding School, reinforced the status of the training courses offered by the school, 
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and ensured that they were directed by the needs (and interactions) of the TLSI 
members: 
As far as I am concerned if there is a change in industry and industry wants to change, 
we change with it. As I said with our teaching staff they just don't stick to what they 
think they know the best, they are willing to learn and go through retraining themselves 
and do anything. If all of a sudden it became an industry where we had to be sail 
makers, we would do it. As long as somebody gave us the skill to be able to pass on. 
So, if Life Raft Systems decided they needed 600 people to sew their life rafts, they 
would need training in it, I would go and see Mike Granger and say, "Can you train 
some of our people to do this?" At the moment I am looking into the plastics industry, 
there is a new training package just been released in that (Terry Hall. Personal 
Interview, 2002). 
7.4 GOVERNMENT ROLES IN DEVELOPING THE REGIONAL 
ECONOMY'S 'DEMAND CONDITIONS'. 
In terms of developing the regional economy's demand conditions during the growth 
stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle, the focus of each of the Tasmanian governments 
was on ensuring that the transactions between the TLSI cluster members and their 
international customers were negotiated and finalised as efficiently as possible. The 
Tasmanian government's focus on the facilitation of sales into the international 
market was justified on two grounds. First was the importance of the TLSI cluster's  
ability to generate employment and incremental and multi-million dollar export 
revenues for the state. The second was that the TLSI cluster's  domestic market was 
relatively insignificant, accounting for approximately five percent of its total sales 
(Industry Audit, 1998). 
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During the Gray Liberal government's  term in office, the Premier and his department 
of economic development (the TDA) undertook a major role during the six-month 
negotiation process with the manager of the UK shipping line British Sealink, Mr. 
Jim Sherwood. Of the government's  role in the process of securing !neat's initial 
international sales, the Premier Gray stated that: 
I think at that stage the TDA were carrying a lot of the peripheral marketing costs 
involved in getting Incat together with Sealink. It was never shown up as a direct grant 
to lncat � because they were paying up front� I think the fares and expenses of people 
tracking backwards and forwards. This bloke Sherwood, to the best of my memory, it 
was TDA that attracted him to coming to talk to us about organising the terms of 
agreement for the purchase of a couple of !neat's boats (Robin Gray. Personal 
Interview, 2002). 
The Tasmanian government's  marketing of !neat's product extended beyond the 
negotiation of contracts with specific international customers. At each opportunity 
the Premier, or his ministers, would extol the benefits of the Incat range of product to 
their counterparts overseas. For example, numerous ex-Premiers state that trade 
missions often centred on !neat's innovative production: 
If we were on an overseas mission you talked about Incat. You had the information. 
Clifford wasn't on the visit but we had people there who were well informed about it. 
That sort of selling role was important (Ray Groom. Personal Interview, 2002). 
We sang the Incat song and extolled the virtues of their ships at every opportunity so 
there was that back up but I think that it would be true to say that the government per 
se was instrumental in really bringing these overseas contracts � I think that really is 
Bob Clifford's � that is what he has been successful in bringing about. I don't think it 
would be fair to say that the government had been responsible for much of that (Tony 
Rundle. Personal Interview, 2002). 
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The Groom and Rundle Liberal governments also focused on two other important 
policies that helped to raise the profile of the state's  shipbuilding industry, although 
largely through further promotion, and utilisation, of Incat' s catamarans. The Groom 
Liberal government's  export award, presented to Incat in 1994, was an effort to 
further support its claims that Incat was a producer of quality vessels for the world 
market. Of the award, Premier Groom notes that: 
A lot of the companies and governments around Asia particularly are very impressed 
with these sorts of things - "Won this big award, must be a good company." It gives 
the company status, and they are not handed out lightly. Obviously we were impressed 
with the development, officials were impressed with what Incat was doing at the time, 
and they won that award. But, we did play a part in helping to promote Incat at the 
international and national level - through government - and when a company is 
recognised by government as being a first class operation it certainly helps them sell 
their vessels (Ray Groom. Personal Interview, 2002). 
It is clear that the Tasmanian government was aware that bestowing an official award 
upon its leading exporter was useful in generating increased and more sophisticated 
demand for that company's  product amongst international customers, especially those 
in the Asian region; a market of significant interest to !neat's management at the time 
(Clifford, 1998). It is also notable that the Tasmanian government's efforts to 
communicate the world-class status of !neat's production also had the effect of 
driving other TLSI cluster members to continuality prove and improve their 
innovative abilities: 
We supply a lot of equipment to Canadian ferries, the Philippines, and we are hoping to 
get a big order from America.. . We are known as a supplier to Incat, and on one of 
these Canadian orders, we had to develop an aluminium manifold that was as sturdy as 
the traditional design, but had to be half the weight. Our design worked, and has now 
been adopted by a lot of other companies around the world and is a fairly complex 
arrangement; we just had to keep the weight down to get that order (Richard Riley. 
Personal Interview, 2002). 
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I'd say yes, for sure, by encouraging Incat in particular and some of their other sub­
contractors, definitely had a marked impact on the development of Tassie's marine 
business. However, I don't think the impact of the government's actions would have 
happened at all, or have been so big if Incat hadn't been around at the time to spur us 
all on (John Muir. Personal Interview, 2002). 
The Tasmanian government also influenced the TLSI cluster's  demand conditions by 
way of undertaking a leasing agreement with In cat for the use of one of its vessels for 
the Bass Strait passenger service. The lease itselfwas a boost to !neat's reputation as 
a producer of people and cargo carriers, given the Tasmanian government had now 
reinforced its international trade mission dialogue with action that underscored its 
confidence in !neat's product. The Minister for Transport at the time, Premier 
Groom, said ofthe transaction: 
I phoned Bob up and said, "Look, we need to get this thing cracking, what do we need 
to organise a vessel? How can we best do it?" He said, "What are you doing 
tomorrow?" This was a Friday and I said, "I can find time tomorrow." He said, "I'll 
come to your office at 7am in the morning to see if we can do a deal." Actually I was 
a minister at that stage, I had been Premier� I was then the Minister for Tourism, so I 
arranged to go in with Tony Rundle who was then the Premier and Clifford arrived and 
he had some fellow from Canada who was a potential purchaser. It was Bob Clifford, 
Tony Rundle (the Premier), myself (as the Tourism Minister responsible for the TT 
Line) and this other bloke who didn't know much about the arrangements. We worked 
out an agreement there and then and I said, "Bob, you will need to see your lawyers." 
He said, "We don't need the lawyers." He signed an agreement there and then and I 
said, "You will probably need your company's stamp on it to make it official." We 
drafted it and he went and got his company's seal. So, it was done in a couple of hours 
� chartering a vessel for the Bass Strait run (Ray Groom. Personal Interview, 2002). 
Premier Rundle endorsed the lease agreement even though the suitability of an Incat 
vessel for the waters of Bass Strait was yet to be established commercially. Despite 
the questions and concerns surrounding the suitability of twin-hulled catamarans in 
waters that regularly exceed four metres, Tony Rundle recalls that: 
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We did charter the first Incat vessel that was run across Bass Strait - that was in I think 
'97 from memory and we know there has been a lot of debate since about whether that 
was successful. But, we undertook the lease for two reasons, one because we knew 
there was an unfulfilled tourism capacity, or capacity that couldn't match up to the 
demand over those critical months before and after Christmas. We thought that it was 
obviously going to be a big boost for both the tourist industry, and for the shipbuilding 
industry, when we get some other transport on Bass Strait, so that is why Devil Cat 
came on the run and I think to some extent it was a success (Tony Rundle. Personal 
Interview, 2002). 
We were bringing in an extra 25-30,000 passengers over that summer window. We 
have then had the debate go on about whether they were suitable, the reliability factor 
was a problem, but certainly in 1997 when we made that decision was two-fold - (a) to 
help the tourist industry and (b) to help Incat further its business profile (Tony Rundle. 
Personal Interview, 2002). 
7.4.1 Summary of the government roles in developing the regional economy's 
'demand conditions ' during the growth stage. 
During the growth stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle, consecutive Tasmanian 
governments again focussed on the improvement of the TLSI cluster's  reputation in 
the international market for fast ferries, in tum generating increased levels of 
sophisticated demand for the state's  innovative maritime output. Firstly, consecutive 
Tasmanian governments were intent upon involving themselves in the export-
orientated sales process, from the generation of international demand for !neat's 
vessels (through overseas trade missions, and the bestowing of export awards on the 
company), to the sales negotiation and contraction process itself with !neat's 
international customer. Secondly, the Tasmanian governments' policy to endorse 
!neat's 90-metre 'people and cargo' catamarans by leasing one for its Bass Strait 
passenger and cargo service, was an effort (albeit a potentially risky one) to send a 
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message to the international market that the technology was available from Tasmania, 
and that it was ready for sale. 
7.5 GOVERNMENT ROLES IN DEVELOPING THE REGIONAL 
ECONOMY'S 'RELATED AND SUPPORTING INDUSTRY'. 
In terms of the developing the regional economy's related and supporting industry 
during the growth stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle, the Tasmanian governments 
concentrated on four separate issues. The first was the continued rationalisation of 
the Tasmanian government's departmental structure; a focus that would attempt to 
lower the barriers to the effective governmental facilitation of Tasmania's private 
sector firms. The second was the continued focus on the state's  tourism potential, and 
the utilisation of an Incat ferry for the Bass Strait passenger service. The third, and 
perhaps most significant policy development, was the establishment of the marine 
park at Prince of Wales Bay at which a number of the TLSI cluster firms were to 
locate their operations. The fourth, and directly related to the marine park 
development, was the establishment of the TAPE infrastructural support at !neat's 
newly built Aluminium Welding School. 
By 1984, one of the main focuses of the Gray Liberal government was the reduction 
in the numbers, duplications, and costs within its 58 government departments: 
At the time, the Tasmanian government was overrun with departments, none of 
which knew or cared what the other was doing. They only cared about how much 
money they were getting. Tassie has always struggled to raise enough money to run 
its government, and these blokes were wasting money by doing stuff that had already 
been done by others, and it was time to get rid of the excess. So around 1985 we 
began to change the structure and numbers of departments, the training ones you 
mentioned were very important in terms of helping the private sector tell us what it 
needed (Robin Gray. Personal Interview, 2002). 
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As a result of the rationalisation process undertaken between 1984 and 1987, a 
number of departments were created. Of greatest note to the TLSI cluster was the 
creation of the Training Authority of Tasmania in 1986, a body that oversaw a 
number of the state's  training programmes, including the amalgamation of the TAFE 
system and the state apprenticeships commission. A related department, established 
one year later and entitled the Department of Employment and Training, was 
established to better coordinate the activities of government concerned with the 
monitoring and updating of the training requirement of the state's  private sector firms. 
The restructuring process was an incremental one, and remained in place under the 
Field Labor and Groom Liberal governments: 
As far as the state's resources was concerned, the structure of the Tasmanian public 
service was horrific when we got in there, there were 52 government agencies and 
therefore the bureaucracy was totally unyielding and incapable of bringing about 
change in the state . . .  so that the government departments become more project based 
rather than procedural based. At that time a big advantage we had was that virtually no 
one was in their position in 1990 that was there in 1989 because we reduced the 
agencies from 52 to 18  and virtually every one of those, the heads of agency, had been 
in that agency in that area. So, therefore there wasn't that level of entrenchment or 
vested interest and that enabled there to be greater change that there otherwise would 
have been (Michael Field. Personal Interview, 2002). 
There was a predecessor to the Tasmanian Training Authority that brought many 
elements together, in one body, to organise training in the state and to supervise or 
oversee efforts in training in the state, to upgrade training in a number of areas and that 
was an issue that commenced in '92 and we took office as government in early '92 so 
that was certainly part of our efforts. We established that department, Employment, 
Industrial Relations and Training, to bring all those different elements together, as one 
state entity. Tasmanian Development and Resources was a department I established 
when I was Premier and responsible for this particular area of activity. Again we saw a 
need to upgrade that developing area. From time to time you need to bring in some 
new ideas and to regenerate some interest and activity and enthusiasm and that was part 
of that - apart from some rationale in reorganising the departments and bringing some 
resource elements into it as well as the development aspect of it, that was quite a major 
issue at the time (Ray Groom. Personal Interview, 2002). 
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During the restructuring process, the Gray and Groom Liberal governments were 
concerned with the removal of duplication within the government' s  departments, and 
the improvement of the its ability to identify and provide for the private sector's  
needs, in turn improving the state's employment potentiaL 
One need that existed in terms of the state's tourism industry was the ability of the 
government to provide greater passenger numbers for the state's  Bass Strait passenger 
service. The passenger service that existed at the time was essentially an overnight 
one, with tourists (and other users of the service), required to sleep on the vessel 
during the crossing. The Tasmanian government, through its lease of an Incat fast 
ferry that could complete the j oumey in a mere four hours, was an attempt to increase 
the number of services, and therefore passenger movements, between Tasmania and 
mainland Australia. The Tasmanian government, however, were keen to privatise the 
Bass Strait passenger service, but recognised that as a related and supporting industry 
to the TLSI, was an excellent opportunity to promote and support !neat's growing 
reputation. Of the passenger service, Premier Gray stated that: 
We were initially reluctant operators of a passenger service across Bass Strait, we 
really didn't want to do it but we had to do it and we recognised that if we didn't it was 
going to be disastrous. We decided that we could get more tourists to Tassie if we had 
more services, and the Incat option seemed like a natural extension of what they were 
trying to achieve. We hoped that eventually, someone else would run a private 
enterprise passenger service, someone like Incat (Robin Gray. Personal Interview, 
2002). 
The Tasmanian government, therefore, were keen to satisfy the needs of the state's  
tourism industry whilst concomitantly broadening !neat's reputation as a 'people and 
cargo' carrier, a niche market that the company had identified as a major growth 
opportunity. During the same period, the federal government was also introducing 
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new government departments charged with the facilitation of private enterprise in a 
rapidly globalising economy. Two departments focused on facilitating the efforts of 
the country's export traders were created in the 1986: Austrade and the 
aforementioned NIES (now known as Auslndustry). The newly created departments 
have been received positively by the TLSI cluster firms, whose managing directors 
praise for augmenting the Tasmanian government's  efforts at promoting their 
businesses overseas: 
Ausindustry have actually improved themselves a lot in recent times - made things a 
lot easier to apply for. They also promote their product more. We only knew about the 
tax concession because of our accountant back in the old days but today there is 
information that comes on a regular basis. We have actually been asked on behalf of 
Ausindustry to say what I think, and I am quite happy with the services and especially 
with the fact that they have sought us out and asked us to look at a grant, which we did 
over time. It is all beneficial really (Mark Colbeck. Personal Interview, 2002). 
We have used Austrade on a number of occasions, mainly because of our overseas 
contracts. We have used them, used their people in other countries to assist us with 
language difficulties and unique market issues, as in the Italians are different to deal 
with than the Greeks and the Greeks are different to deal with than the Scandinavians -
and they are really different, we have learnt that over the years, again with our own 
experience (Andrew Lafevre. Personal Interview, 2002). 
Arguably, the most important Tasmanian government facilitation during the growth 
stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle was the policy that allowed Incat to relocate to a 
new and larger site at Prince ofWales Bay in 1987. By this time, Incat had begun to 
produce vessels that exceeded 90 metres in length and the Incat shed at Sullivan's 
Cove was inadequate to support the company's  growth potential (Clifford, 1998). As 
part of its policy implementation, the Tasmanian government also provided an 
opportunity for !neat's  suppliers to relocate their operations to adjacent lots over the 
ensuing years. The offer was accepted by a the majority of the TLSI cluster firms, 
whom now site the following advantages to the move: 
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We are so close geographically if we need assistance in an area of expertise, we would 
normally call on [the cluster firms at Prince of Wales Bay). So, it is a very close-knit 
community out here I must admit. If we want specialised tooling made up we wouldn't 
go to somewhere in the northern end of the state, we would go to Apco Engineering 
[once Skeels & Perkins] or Riley Industrial or to Colbeck & Gunton. We would go and 
talk to them about it because they are as innovative as what we are in their own field 
and have a reputation for quality and a high standard of work so we don't need to go 
anywhere else and we use them. Because we are all involved in this marine industry 
they understand very quickly our requirements and we understand very quickly what 
they can do so it does work pretty well (Michael Grainger. Personal Interview, 2002). 
Originally when we first started the business we worked out of my house - we had a 
workshop underneath. We then moved out to South Hobart where we shared a 
factory, we then moved to Pearl Street when we first started with Incat and then this 
building at Prince of Wales Bay became available and it was an ideal location for our 
interaction, especially when they were building the vessels straight across the road 
(Terry Gunton. Personal Interview, 2002). 
The company was formed in 1992, at the request of Incat really, in the sense that they 
were purchasing marine evacuation systems from overseas and they were of the opinion 
that the product that they were purchasing wasn't as good as it could have been, in the 
sense that it was heavy, took up a lot of space, things that are detrimental to fast ferries. 
(Michael Grainger. Personal Interview, 2002). 
The relocation of the cluster firms to a common geographic location served to 
increase the level of communication, Improve the innovative capabilities, and 
resultantly increase the sophistication of supply between the cluster firms. The 
majority of the suppliers' relocations to Prince of Wales Bay occurred under the 
Groom and Rundle Liberal governments, however, even during the late-growth stage 
ofthe TLSI cluster's  life cycle (between 1992 and 1996) the policy to relocate !neat's 
suppliers to adjacent premises remained focused on the support of the cluster's  hub­
firm: 
If you support any large industry or large company you will find it does benefit lots of 
other little companies around the place, providing the essentials, and easing the 
pressures on production for that one central business. But, the sort of suggestion that 
we had in mind developing a cluster of businesses or industries that wasn't, I suppose 
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in all fairness, the way that certainly I saw it, as a minister and later as Premier. I just 
felt that if you could keep this central business on the right path and do what we could 
to back it then there would be other benefits for the state (Ray Groom. Personal 
Interview, 2002). 
I think with Incat we were probably thinking the firm and the spinning off that would 
occur. Some of the spinning off that would occur were with the skilled operatives that 
would go there and work, as they do in many companies, engineering companies 
dealing with steel fabrication, the bright ones sort of saying, "Here I can do this," and 
off they go and spin off little embryonic operations that will grow. I don't think we set 
out to build a shipbuilding cluster but I think it was always apparent that if Incat was 
successful it was going to spawn a range of other industries - some of them actually 
building boats some time down the track, some of them developing powerful 
international industries as a result of the expertise they gathered up as they worked over 
the years for Incat and I think Life Raft Systems is probably a good example (Tony 
Rundle [speaking as his time as a minister in the Groom government). Personal 
Interview, 2002). 
Up until 1996, therefore, successive Tasmanian governments' focus remained on the 
facilitation of !neat's future production requirements rather than on the development 
of the marine manufacturing industry as a whole, which remained very much in the 
hands of the TLSI cluster's  entrepreneurs. Premier Rundle, whose Liberal 
government held power between 1996 and 1998 was the first to recognise the 
synergistic relationship that had developed between Incat and its suppliers, noting that 
a critical mass of innovative marine manufacturing competency had been developed 
within the state at the Prince of Wales Marine Park: 
I think it was partly due to Incat's expertise and international recognition and partly 
because of the expertise that we had developing in training of skilled people and also 
the growing number of companies who were out there doing internationally 
competitive and technically innovative products and services. Colbeck & Gunton, they 
are a company that sells overseas, Richardson & Devine, I've talked about, Muir 
Engineering, they have been on the international market now for a quarter of a century 
or more, etc., etc., etc. So, it was a logical bringing together of all ofthe expertise and 
skills that had been created over a period of probably 20 years - and they had reached a 
sort of critical mass, at a point where you really did have something to offer because 
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they were companies that you could be confident in, had the expertise and there was a 
diverse range of maritime products and expertise that gave you a very marketable 
package. That was basically the result of an evolutionary cycle rather than say the 
government coming in at day one and saying, "This is what we are going to do." It 
sort of evolved through various brilliant individuals, some help from government and 
then we arrived at a point where we thought we had critical mass (Tony Rundle. 
Personal Interview, 2002). 
7.5.1 Summary of the government roles in developing the regional economy's 
'related and supporting industry' during the growth stage. 
During the growth stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle, Tasmanian governments 
concentrated on its continued support for Incat, although its policies to enhance the 
reputation of the state's  shipbuilding industry did encourage the other cluster 
members to innovate in accordance with the international success enjoyed by Incat. 
Firstly, the Tasmanian governments sought to maintain their support for !neat's 
expansion, especially in times where the company's  management indicated their 
willingness to move interstate should they not receive certain levels of public support. 
Perhaps the most notable action undertaken by the government was the establishment 
of the Marine Park at Prince of Wales Bay, which directly supported !neat's 
expansionary needs, but also resulted in the establishment of an 'innovative milieu' 
for the region's  marine manufacturing industry. 
Secondly, the rationalisation of the Tasmanian government departments resulted in 
the removal of the red-tape barriers that existed between the Tasmanian government 
and the private sector, allowing the government to ascertain the private sector's  
requirements for growth. Federally, the Tasmanian government's  rationalisation and 
reorganisation of its departments provided private sector firms with access to the 
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federal government's  knowledge of international trading (through Austrade), and its 
understanding of the importance and practicalities of business networking (through 
the NIES). 
7.6 GOVERNMENT ROLES IN DEVELOPING THE REGIONAL 
ECONOMY'S 'FACTOR CONDITIONS'. 
In terms of the developing the regional economy's factor conditions during the 
growth stage of the TLSI cluster's life cycle, the Tasmanian governments 
concentrated on the further advancement and specialisation of the training 
infrastructure available to marine manufacturing firms within the state. During the 
introductory stage ofthe TLSI cluster's  life cycle, the existing training facilities were 
based around the apprenticeship scheme, and dealt with the traditional methods of 
marine manufacturing. The growth stage of the life cycle, however, required a 
reinvestment in, and reorganisation of, the Tasmanian government's training 
infrastructure. At the beginning of the growth stage in 1984, the incumbent Gray 
government had recognised the potential inherent to the state's 'new' industry, but 
mainly in terms of its employment potential. As noted in Chapter Six, Premier Gray 
stated of the industry that: 
I think we saw Clifford as one opportunity amongst many- but I don't think it was ever 
thought, "We could become a grand shipbuilding nation of the world?" . . .  I think it 
was - "Let's see show if this one goes and we will get on with the next one then". It 
wasn't any great perception of this is going to be a marvellous thing. We didn't have a 
dream that we were going to be building great shipbuilder's names (Robin Gray. 
Personal Interview, 2002). 
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One of the most important training aspects to occur under Gray's  Liberal government 
was the establishment of the Training Authority of Tasmania in 1986, which 
fundamentally altered the nature of the state's  apprenticeship scheme. Instead of the 
Apprenticeship Commission operating independently, the Training Authority of 
Tasmania was set up to incorporate the resources of the TAFE infrastructure in the 
training and development of the state's trade employees. !neat's work with 
aluminium hulls was so innovative, that the formal system of education for the marine 
manufacturing industry had no courses dealing with such expertise . 
. . . it was part of a real concerted effort on the part of the government to better organise 
the government's interaction with the private sector - that was our major policy - that 
was what we were about - it was trying to create employment (Robin Gray. Personal 
Interview, 2002). 
The change of regional government in June 1989 was accompanied by a continued 
effort to capitalise on the success of !neat's new catamaran designs. The newly 
elected Field Labor government's  first major policy surrounding the TLSI cluster was 
that of the Tasmanian Marine Industry Plan (TMIP), which was formulated to provide 
$10  million over three years to improve the educational factor inputs and 
infrastructure for the industry: 
Well, it was a perception that it had a great deal of potential but there was a perception 
that there wasn't a skills base to enable it to flourish and therefore it was a view taken 
that there had to be an integrated approach. I think the most significant thing that 
happened was enabling the technical college to train on site because there were so 
many people who needed to be trained, in aluminium shipbuilding, which enabled it to 
grow much faster than it otherwise would have (Michael Field. Personal Interview, 
2002). 
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Mr. Hall, the manager and course coordinator of the TAPE Aluminium Welding 
School, recalls the lack of skilled in aluminium construction and welding during 
!neat's expansion in the early 1990s: 
It began in 1990, Easter time, way back then, Incat started in the car ferry business and 
probably towards the end of '89 they rose from about 30 employees to 300, and at that 
stage there was no real expertise in aluminium welding and fabrication. So, then in '89 
they moved out here, which is the prince of Wales Bay site, and built a couple of halls 
and then they had to try and employ people. Well, they were employing whomever 
they could get. They were pastry cooks and whatever they may be, brickies, anybody 
that wanted to walk through the door, they would grab. Their ambition at the time was 
to just skill them up and afterwards, be able to produce a boat (Terry Hall. Personal 
Interview, 2002). 
As such, the strategy driving the TMIP was focused on the creation, and protection, of 
the state's  employment within the growing industry, rather than a concerted effort at 
promoting and facilitating the idea of an industrial cluster. An advisor to the Field 
Labor government indicted that: 
Our policy was fairly pragmatic, in my view. There was a chance to build an industry 
here, there were perceived impediments to the growth of that industry, the government 
intervened to try and lessen the impediments and enable there to be growth. The 
Tasmanian government's greatest focus was to ensure the continued growth of Incat as 
a "novelty' job-creating venture for the state. Job creation was always the 
government's highest priority (Bob Rutherford. Personal Interview, 2002). 
Of particular note, however, is the realisation of the Field Labor government that the 
aluminium-based technologies developed by Incat (and their maritime manufacturing 
colleagues) required similarly innovative policy initiatives, policies that involved the 
specific funding of aluminium welding courses for the state's  labour market. Premier 
Field states of this policy realisation that: 
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Incat had begun to show real success in the development of their aluminium hulls, with 
sales coming from left, right, and centre. The Incat success was driving the industry by 
this stage, and looked to be the source of its future growth. The problem that presented 
itself to us was the fact that the skill of aluminium workers was rare. So, developing 
that skill base was critical to the industry's success, and was an impediment to growth 
so therefore the government had to intervene to provide those skills, not to provide so 
much actually, but to facilitate the development of it (Michael Field. Personal 
Interview, 2002). 
Again, the Tasmanian government remained reactive to the needs of the industry 
cluster, and provided the necessary training infrastructure after the need was made 
apparent by the cluster firms. Perhaps more importantly, the government's  policy 
development was based on the removal of impediments to the TLSI cluster's  growth, 
not on the determination of how the growth itself should occur, which was left to the 
managers of the cluster firms. The method by which the training needs of the cluster 
were communicated to the Tasmanian government, through !neat's periodic threats to 
relocate its operations to another state, appears to have been congruent with the 
influence that Incat had with the Tasmanian government as one of the state's largest 
employers. 
During the first months of his government, Premier Field undertook an audit of the 
state's  treasury, which found that the state was in the midst of a major financial crisis. 
As Premier Field recalls, his government's policy development during his 
Premiership was somewhat influenced by the financial crisis that had befallen the 
state: 
From my point of view there were a couple of major distractions � one, it had to be my 
obsession as Treasurer, and Premier, to deal with the financial crisis, and if you want to 
examine it was well documented, the level of that fmancial crisis, but the figure that 
stuck in my mind was that in 1989, when we did the budget projections for the 
following year, the gap between income and expenditure on delivering on the same 
policy basis was $279 million which at that time was nearly 30% of the current budget. 
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So, this was a huge gap between expenditure and income which had to be dealt with 
and therefore that distracted me - it meant the thinking in this area wasn't done enough 
by me because of my obsession quite rightly with dealing with that crisis (Michael 
Field. Personal Interview, 2002). 
In light of the financial crisis, and the importance of Incat as an employer within the 
state, the Field Labor government undertook a number of its efforts based upon the 
state's  ability to formulate sustainable policy initiatives. As such, it would appear 
that the Tasmanian government's policy initiatives were efforts to sustain and protect 
employment in the state's  shipbuilding industry, not to specifically facilitate the 
growth of industrial clusters. The Field Labor government, therefore, was somewhat 
focused on the provision of supportive measures that, although beneficial to the TLSI 
cluster firms, were of low cost to the treasury. One strategy in particular that gained 
prominence was the Premier's  direct involvement in the generation of international 
sales for !neat's  product. In particular, Premier Field made himself (and the TDA) 
available for on-site visits to the Incat factory with Clifford and his potential 
customers, and where possible, made the offices of the Premier available for the 
continued negotiations of a potential sales contract. In addition, and where possible, 
the Field Labor government also invited its federal parliamentarian colleagues to visit 
the Prince of Wales Bay Marine Park, both to secure additional federal funding for 
Incat and the Aluminium Welding School, and to generate brand equity for the TLSI 
through highly publicised demonstrations of government support for its product. Of 
this strategy, Premier Field notes that: 
With potential customers that happened more than once. I was Premier when we did 
that but there were other levels that it happened too, at bureaucratic and at a political 
level. So, if there were visitors that Bob wanted to show, "Yes, the government is 
supporting me." There were visits out to Incat, they were making sure Hawke, when 
they got in, Hawke and Keating if they were around, bang, and they were out there. 
There were delegations to Keating so there was all that sort of stuff as well as working 
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with people to ensure that the training needs and all that sort of thing was met. We did 
as much as probably any Tasmanian government could rationally do with the funding 
we had available (Michael Field. Personal Interview, 2002). 
With the change to a Groom Liberal government in February 1992 came a renewed 
effort to further streamline the numbers and scope of the Tasmanian government 
departments. The Premier of the day, Ray Groom, sited that the further restructuring 
of the government was based on more than just the need to reduce costs and remove 
duplication. In addition to this, was the Tasmanian government's  perceived need to 
improve the innovative capacity of the government departments to serve the needs of 
the state's  private sector firms. Of his government's  restructuring process, Premier 
Groom commented that: 
The Tasmanian Development and Resources was a department I established when I 
was Premier. We established the it so that a number of other departments dealing with 
employment, industrial relations and Training, could be brought together, as one state 
entity. Again we saw a need to upgrade that developing area. From time to time you 
need to bring in some new ideas and to regenerate some interest and activity and 
enthusiasm and that was part of that - apart from some rationale in reorganising the 
departments and bringing some resource elements into it as well as the development 
aspect of it, that was quite a major issue at the time (Ray Groom. Personal Interview, 
2002). 
The restructuring process also served to support the Groom Liberal government's  
policies that were aimed at maximising the state industry' s  economic growth 
potential, of which the marine manufacturing industry received particular attention, as 
Premier Groom notes: 
Obviously we saw a need to encourage any industry where we had some special 
advantage. Look at the industries where we have an advantage - I think we are a 
maritime state -being an island state, it is particularly relevant to Tasmania and we saw 
this as something which had potential. You take into account all the expert advice you 
can receive -we engaged consultants in some areas to get some advice as to what we 
might do to help, recognising all the time that largely it is a private enterprise operation 
and they are largely dependent on their own skills and abilities (Ray Groom. Personal 
Interview, 2002). 
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It was during the Groom Liberal government therefore, that the Tasmanian 
government recognised that the state's  shipbuilding industry's success was based on a 
particular 'special advantage' inherent to the state. It is also notable that the 
Tasmanian government recognised that it had a rather limited role to play in 
encouraging the industry to maintain its innovative character, and that the success of 
the cluster's  firms in the international market remained "largely dependent on their 
own skills and abilities" (Ray Groom. Personal interview, 2002). The statement also 
recognises that a regional economy may have a latent set of 'natural competencies' 
that can remain dormant for quite a number of decades (e.g., the Tasmanian 
shipbuilding industry accounted for a nil share of the international trade for 
shipbuilding during the period 1950 to 1970) but can be reinvigorated through the 
marketable ideas of a small number of entrepreneurs. It also suggests that the 
government perceived that it was the maritime industry as a whole that was capable 
of driving the region's  economic growth, not merely the shipbuilding industry that 
forms one distinct subset ofthe maritime industry. 
The change ofthe Tasmanian government's leadership in March 1996, from a Groom 
to a Rundle Liberal government, witnessed the continued effort by the Tasmanian 
government to remove the barriers of economic growth posed by the human capital 
shortfalls in the state's  labour market. As part of the Tasmanian government's  policy 
that enabled Incat to move to new and larger premises at Prince of Wales Bay, the 
new Aluminium Welding School (with TAFE support) was similarly relocated, with 
new state-of-the-art equipment included as part of the Incat complex. The policy 
was not without its problems, however, given that the Prince of Wales Bay site was 
not correctly zoned for the purposes of establishing an industrial development of the 
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size required by Incat. In order to allow the development to go ahead, Incat was 
required to conform to a number of local government regulatory requirements and 
applications for the rezoning of the land, a process that could have potentially lasted 
for several months. Given the importance of !neat's relocation to the state's  
economic and employment growth, the Tasmanian government's  issued fast-tracked 
legislation to overcome the local government's  applications requirements. Of the 
situation, the Premier Rundle states that: 
We had to deal with quite a few planning issues there. I think there was a public road, 
or something, right in the middle of the complex and we had to have the status of that 
road changed. That required legislation. So, the TDR worked with local government 
and with planning authorities to try and speed up and facilitate the creation of that site 
down there. That was the normal difficult bureaucratic conundrum to entangle and I 
think we did that fairly quickly and got that through the parliament and got him on the 
road (Tony Rundle. Personal Interview, 2002). 
A major initiative, funded by the Tasmanian government, was to allow Incat to use 
the labour of the Aluminium Welding School to produce the parts it required to 
complete its vessels. As noted by then Premier Rundle, the nature of the human 
capital barriers to the TLSI cluster's  growth was an enduring one that needed 
innovative government policy to mitigate, given the size of the state's  population: 
The big problem was that Bob Clifford was always faced with a skills shortage here, a 
skilled worker shortage here in Hobart. The fabrication of marine grade aluminium is a 
very specialist field, and obviously the technical demands on a shipbuilder to be 
producing a high speed high are quite high, may be not as high as the aircraft industry 
but certainly approaching that. Therefore to get skilled people was important and the 
decision was made to have an annex of T AFE right next door to his shipyard and 
construction facility, and that we would train some of his people, apprentices and 
others, on the job and that was a well equipped factory and Bob Clifford has always 
spoken highly of it (Tony Rundle. Personal Interview, 2002). 
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After meetings with !neat's management on the issue, the idea that the Aluminium 
Welding School's  training should include practical courses in production of the 
required parts for !neat's catamarans gained almost immediate support. Again, it was 
after the opportunity (or indeed 'need') was identified by the cluster firm and 
presented to the Tasmanian government, did the government examine the issue, and 
provide the legislation and funding required to satisfy the request. Interestingly, the 
government's  actions received bipartisan political support, both from the state's  
opposition party and the incumbent federal Labor government: 
. . .  we were certainly aware of the fact that there were difficulties getting skilled people 
and the Education Department and T AFE made a successful submission through the 
Education Minister to allow the school's training courses to include the construction of 
catamaran parts for Incat to use, so that is how it happened. We accepted the evidence, 
and the need, and ever since that has gone on there we have had nothing but good 
reports. It has also had bipartisan support, with the Labour Opposition at the time 
supporting it, and obviously the Federal Government did. Simon Crean [a member of 
the federal Labor Party] was down here for the opening of that facility so it had very 
good political acceptance (Tony Rundle. Personal Interview, 2002). 
7.6.1 Summary of the government roles in developing the regional economy's 
'factor conditions ' during the growth stage. 
During the growth stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle, the Tasmanian governments 
facilitated the advancement and specialisation of the regional economy's factor 
conditions by concentrating on the removal of the major barriers to the TLSI cluster's  
continued growth, most obviously characterised by the scarcity of suitably educated 
labour. Interestingly, the Tasmanian governments did not take a proactive role in the 
determination of the industry's educational requirements, but rather provided the 
infrastructural support (i.e. funding and legislation) required by the industry after it 
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was identified as a necessity for continued growth. The physical infrastructure 
provided by the Tasmanian government (i.e. the building and equipment at the TAFE 
Aluminium Welding School) was similarly determined by the firms involved in the 
TLSI cluster, as was the course content taught therein. The TLSI cluster firms each 
provided ongoing input into the number and types of courses required in their efforts 
to maintain the innovative ability ofthe industry. 
7.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY. 
This chapter provided an analytical account of the Tasmanian governments' role in 
developing Tasmania's diamond factors during the growth stage of the TLSI cluster's  
life cycle. The growth stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle was characterised by 
continued efforts by consecutive Tasmanian government to capitalise on the state's 
growing reputation as a world centre for innovative shipbuilding and maritime 
production. During the early-growth stage, the Tasmanian government's policy 
initiatives were focused on the firm that was seen as driving the innovations within 
the industry, International Catamarans, as they were creating valuable employment 
positions and generating real economic growth for the state. The Tasmanian 
government's  involvement in leasing an Incat vessel for its passenger service across 
Bass Strait, and its negotiations for !neat's international sales, was a major policy 
initiative focused on reinforcing the industry's reputation internationally. As an 
indirect result of the Tasmanian government's  support for Incat in the early-growth 
stage, there was pressure placed upon !neat's Tasmanian-based supplier firms to 
similarly innovate their products, so that they remained a preferred supplier to Incat. 
The pressure for Incat' s supplier firms resulted in the individual firms receiving both 
194 
solicited and unsolicited orders from their own international buyers of related 
products, such as fireproofing equipment, specialised ship fittings, and personal 
safety devises. 
As with the introductory stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle, the innovative drive 
within the industry came from the private sector firms themselves, with the 
Tasmanian government largely responsible for the facilitation of the required 
infrastructure to accommodate and/or minimise the barriers the industry's growth 
potential, and improve its reputation as an innovative centre of global shipbuilding. 
Similarly, the Tasmanian government's  policy initiatives and facilitative 
infrastructure provlSlon appears only to be provided for after the industry had 
recognised its necessity to support future growth, and was able to demonstrate this to 
the Tasmanian government. Towards the end of the growth stage, a major economic 
slowdown occurred in the world economy, largely attributed to the 'Asian Financial 
Crisis' of 1997. Due to a significant reduction in demand for new shipping vessels 
worldwide, the growth achieved by the TLSI cluster between 1984 and 1998 was 
unable to be sustained in the period immediately following. This change in the world 
economic circumstances triggered a need for a new set of government policy 
initiatives that reflected the changing needs of the TLSI cluster in what now 
represented the mature stage of its life cycle. The following chapter analyses the 
Tasmanian government's role in the resultant maturity stage ofthe TLSI cluster's  life 
cycle. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT. 
ANALYSIS OF THE CASE STUDY: 
THE MATURITY STAGE OF THE TLSI CLUSTER'S LIFE 
CYCLE 1998 - 2002. 
8.1 OBJECTIVE OF THE CHAPTER. 
The objective of this chapter is to provide an account of the critical incidents and 
interactions between the Tasmanian government and the TLSI cluster during the 
period 1998 - 2002. This period of time was associated with the maturity stage of the 
TLSI cluster's  life cycle, a stage characterised by the deceleration of the TLSI 
cluster's  sales growth and innovative output. As with Chapters Six and Seven, this 
chapter discusses each of Tasmania' s diamond factors in tum, and discusses the 
manner in which they were advanced (or otherwise) by the interaction of the TLSI 
cluster and the Tasmanian governments. The chapter closes with a summary of the 
interaction between the TLSI cluster and the Tasmanian government during the 
industry' s  maturity stage in terms of Porter' s  ICT. 
8.2 THE TASMANIAN GOVERNMENTS: 1998 - 2002. 
During the period 1998 to 2002, Tasmania was represented by two elected state 
governments, one representing the state's Liberal Part, the other the state's  Labour 
Party. At the beginning of the TLSI cluster's  maturity stage in 1998, the incumbent 
government was that of the Rundle Liberal government, which held office until 
September of that year, when it was replaced by the Bacon Labor government. 
During the initial stages of the TLSI cluster's maturity stage, the Rundle Liberal 
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government oversaw one of the most important networking developments to occur in 
the shipbuilding and marine manufacturing industries, namely the formal 
establishment ofthe Tasmanian Maritime Network (TMN). 
During the period of September 1998, and the end of this research project, the newly 
elected Bacon Labor government oversaw the formation of six important policy 
initiatives that facilitated the continued development of the TLSI cluster. The first, in 
late 1998, was the restructuring and renaming of the TDA into the Department of 
State Development (DSD), which now incorporated a Skills Development Unit 
focused on advancing the state's  human capital resources. The second policy 
initiative, undertaken in 1998, was the Tasmanian government's purchase of equity in 
a recently formed shipbuilding company (North West Bay Ships, hereafter NWBS) 
located at the state's  newly formed Marine Park at Margate. 
During 1999, the Tasmanian government implemented its third major policy initiative 
by introducing its Industry Development Plan (IDP). The IDP was established in 
order to facilitate an increase in export and import-replacement businesses in 
Tasmania by identifYing and developing the growth and export potential within the 
state's major industries. The Tasmanian government undertook its fourth major 
policy initiative, also in 1999, by providing Incat with financial relief in the form of a 
reduced payroll tax liability. The pay roll tax relief was justified by Premier Bacon 
as being consistent with the recommendations of the Industry Audit process, and 
noted that another 15  businesses also qualified for the relief under the guidelines of 
the policy initiative. 
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The Tasmanian government's fifth policy initiative involved the lobbying of the 
nation's  Prime Minister on the key issue of federal grants and loans for Incat, such 
that the company could meet its cash flow and debt servicing requirements. Also 
during 200 1, the Tasmanian government undertook similar lobbying efforts with the 
federal government to purchase a $ 1  million state-of-the-art Model Test Basin for the 
AMC, an effort that included a $421 000 contribution on the Tasmanian government's 
behalf. The sixth policy initiative was represented by a direct government loan to 
Incat of $30 million, and was granted after its lobbying efforts for federal grants to the 
company were rejected outright by the Prime Minister. 
8.3 GOVERNMENT ROLES IN DEVELOPING THE REGIONAL 
ECONOMY'S 'FIRM STRATEGY, STRUCTURE, AND RIVALRY'. 
In terms of developing the regional economy's firm strategy, structure, and rivalry 
during the maturity stage of the TLSI cluster's life cycle, the focus of the Tasmanian 
governments surrounded the formalisation and enhancement of the synergies inherent 
to the TLSI cluster's  network arrangement. The Tasmanian government's  subsequent 
involvement in the provision of an internationally effective marketing campaign for 
the TLSI cluster (through the TMN) will be addressed in the subsequent discussion 
concerning demand conditions. 
Ofthe Tasmanian government's involvement in the marketing ofthe TMN, the acting 
Premier, Mrs. Sue Napier stated in a press release that: 
Tasmania is to be marketed as a "one stop shop" for international customers requiring 
shipbuilding services . . .  the aim of the network [TMN] is to jointly market members' 
products and services to show the world that Tasmania has the innovative services and 
products for manufacturing their ships (Napier, 1998:1). 
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The change in state government from a Rundle Liberal government to Jim Bacon's 
Labor government in September 1998 resulted in the introduction of three major 
policy initiatives concerning the development of the regional economy's firm strategy, 
structure, and rivalry. The first policy initiative surrounded the renaming and 
reorganisation of the TDA into the Department of State Development (DSD), which 
included a specialised division called the State Skills Development Unit, and the 
introduction of an Industry Development Plan to ascertain the drivers and inhibitors to 
the regional economy's growth potential. Ofthe IDP, Premier Bacon stated that: 
The Industry Development Plan (IDP) is a structured and systematic approach to 
rebuilding the Tasmanian economy. The Government's aim in conducting industry 
audits in its early months in office was to ensure a strong, information-rich foundation 
for the IDP, so that a sound framework would be created for engagement with, and 
assistance to, business (Bacon, 200ld: 1). 
The second policy initiative centred on the creation of Industry Councils within the 
state (councils that represented each of the state's  most prominent exporting 
industries), whilst the third resulted in the Tasmanian government undertaking an 
equity partnership with an innovative new shipbuilding company at the Margate 
Marine Park. 
The renaming and reorganisation of the DSD did not alter its association with the 
TLSI, where it remained an integral member of the TMN. However, its role within 
changed quite considerably, from that of merely a resource provider to one that 
attempted to ascertain the growth needs ofthe shipbuilding and marine manufacturing 
industries. In order to achieve this end, the DSD implemented its Industry 
Development Plan, which required it to undertake a research role known as the 
Tasmanian Industry Audits Programme: 
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\Vhen we came to government though, the first thing we did, in terms of the Industry 
Development Plan, was a very comprehensive industry audit and that was focused on 
what I was saying � we were trying to identify "what are the industries that for natural 
advantage reasons can prosper?" \Vhat are the problems or obstacles to that? How do 
we remove them? How do we assist those to grow? The TLSI cluster was seen as one 
where we have these natural advantages. (Jim Bacon. Personal Interview, 2002). 
Well, the government basically did this to help industry . . .  but let me assure you we 
didn't merely send a questionnaire out. In the case of the maritime industry, the audit 
was conducted at its busiest time � summer. That was most inconvenient for them, we 
recognised that and we acted accordingly. So, what I did in many cases I actually 
went out and filled the survey form in with them basically in the workshop to cause 
minimum disruption to whatever they were doing and also to basically sit there, "is that 
what you want to say?" Filled it in and they signed it. Of course, in some instances 
we got very competent responses to questions, all filled out electronically and so on 
and got a mix of them. We had a large turn out basically, a high rate of compliance 
(John Keller. Personal Interview, 2002). 
The Tasmanian government, therefore, undertook a significant information-gathering 
role in the maturity stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle. In particular, the Tasmanian 
government was keen to ascertain the growth needs of what Premier Bacon identified 
as 'natural industries' within the state. In addition, Premier Bacon discounted the 
state's  traditional policy of subsidising employment opportunities in industries where 
the region has no 'natural advantages' as an unsustainable policy choice: 
It was totally unsustainable because the minute another government grants a greater 
subsidy, they packed up and left. Largely because there was no reason for them to be 
here other than the fact that the government had come and offered them so much money 
- they would have been mad not to. It was unsustainable. So, we are very careful now 
not to financially support activities that haven't got reasons independent of the fmancial 
support to profit in business in Tasmania (Jim Bacon. Personal Interview, 2002). 
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One of the first recommendations to arise from the Industry Audit Programme was the 
establishment of Industry Councils for each of the state's  'natural industries' through 
which the DSD could more effectively provide a role for the Tasmanian government. 
The Tasmanian government in the past two years decided that it would be a good idea 
to form industry councils - Manufacturing Industry Councils, and a few others. What 
they found there, through surveys and everything else, it was difficult to bring people 
together and gain commitment. Now, what we had already, in a way, was one of these 
councils. It had already formed by our own efforts in the [TMN). So, we were able to 
encourage the rest of industry to join in the council as a group (Terry Hall. Personal 
Interview, 2002). 
Our role in the industry council is to provide the secretariat. We don't run the industry 
council, the industry councils they run themselves, we provide secretarial services, that 
is, they produce minutes of meetings, distribute the minutes, they produce agenda, mail 
that out and we do position papers, the industry council tells us to go away and get 
some information, we do that. For example, they may want to know a bit more about 
Workplace Health and Safety, so we [the DSD] line a team of speakers from the 
Workplace Standards Authority who can give, we get an inspector actually talking 
about, how does it work on the ground, the head of the agency who gives a half hour on 
agency policy and so on and how they see it. We also have a lot of very innovative 
programs and it is amazing how the people of the industry council said, ''we didn't 
know that, we didn't know that," and to some extent that sort of diffusion of 
government activity is an interesting and important outcome of the industry council 
program (John Keller. Personal Interview, 2002). 
I think it has benefited us in a couple of ways. I mean it has actually brought all the 
industry together, work a little closer together. Also as a cohesive unit it has given us a 
lot more prominence as the second major boat builder in the industry (Allan Williams. 
Personal Interview, 2002). 
Importantly, the Maritime Manufacturing Industry Council (MMIC) did not 
differentiate between the firms it represented. The Tasmanian government, through 
the DSD's involvement, interacted with the MMIC as a collective of firms with equal 
weighting, not one that was focused on the needs of the TLSI cluster's  hub firm, Incat. 
Of the nature of the MMIC, a number of private-sector members commented that: 
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No, it's not just another platform for Incat, because the [MMIC] is actually a group of 
companies that includes Incat, but when any one of this group have a concern, or 
question, they have the floor, and the government, through the DSD addresses those 
concerns or questions. We have actually got some brochures on the advantages of the 
[MMIC] that we give out. It is not just about making Incat happy (Terry Gunton. 
Personal Interview, 2002). 
One of the messages that came through from the Department of State Development that 
as an industry we should tell them more - we think that should happen and they will 
help facilitate it. They don't necessarily want to go out there and tell us what to do -
as a maritime network we should tell them what we want to do and get them to help. 
That is my understanding (Anthony LaFevre. Personal Interview, 2002). 
At the marine industry meetings we have been to, ourselves and others have certainly 
passed onto the government ideas and the government will certainly listen and 
generally they analyse and in more cases they go along with it rather than disagreeing 
with it - people in the industry certainly know in most cases better than the government 
what we need to do get there (John Muir. Personal Interview, 2002). 
As such, the Tasmanian government, through its DSD, established and galvanised a 
close formal relationship with the TLSI cluster (and Tasmania's shipbuilding and 
marine manufacturing firms in general) but remained at an arm's length in terms of its 
assistance to them. That is, the Tasmanian government did not attempt to become 
involved directly with the innovative nature or processes of the industry's interaction, 
but rather provided assistance that enabled the TLSI cluster to communicate more 
effectively with other government representatives and departments. 
Perhaps the most significant government policy initiative to emerge from the Industry 
Council framework was the need for the Tasmanian government to establish a number 
of other key hub firms within the state's  shipbuilding and marine manufacturing 
industries, and therefore, to dilute the importance of Incat to the TLSI cluster. Of the 
policy initiative to dilute the TLSI cluster's  reliance on the success of Incat, the 
incumbent Premier and head of the DSD stated that: 
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One of the big problems that were identified with the industry was that it was too reliant 
on Incat, and that having one major company does not a healthy cluster make! You've 
got everybody relying on this one company, and we saw that as a weakness of the 
industry, that it was too reliant on one company (Jim Bacon. Personal Interview, 2002). 
One of the concerns that we had was that the cluster had too much reliance on a single 
customer, that customer being Incat. They were as aware as us of that being unhealthy 
in the long run, and they collectively worked very hard with us to expand their non­
Incat business and I think they are glad of that now. (John Keller. Personal Interview, 
2002). 
The Tasmanian government's assumption resulted in its implementation of the third 
important policy initiative dealing with the regional economy's 'firm strategy, 
structure, and rivalry', namely, the equity partnership deal with NWBS in 1999. Thee 
newly established shipbuilder, located at the state's  Margate Marine Park, was also 
involved in the construction of aluminium fast ferries, although it sought to 
differentiate from Incat by focusing on much smaller catamarans, and introducing the 
world's  first aluminium trimaran. Of the equity arrangement with the NWBS, 
Premier Bacon noted that: 
So, we assisted . . .  to establish North West Bay Ships at the Margate Park, we have 
given them considerable assistance over the four years, in terms of finding them land, 
purchasing equity, and removing barriers such as zoning issues etcetera. North West 
are a valuable addition to the cluster, as they are in a different part of the market than 
Incat, and therefore not taking business away from Incat, but generating new business 
for the state. As a result, the other companies in the cluster have all strengthened, as 
well because they have realised relying on Incat is a bad move - or relying solely on 
Incat is (Jim Bacon. Personal Interview, 2002). 
The Tasmanian government also strongly favoured the policy to inject 'new' 
innovative management into the TLSI cluster that was significantly departed from 
Incat and its product offering, with Premier Bacon stating of the policy initiative to 
introduce NWBS's trimaran technology into the state that: 
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But you see the NWBS technology represents a completely different vessel, that is a 
trimaran and the company argues very strongly that it is far more fuel efficient than the 
Incat vessels and more stable in the sea. It is problem for the Incat vessels because 
whenever you are on the seas it is simply a fact that no aluminium ship that goes at 
those speeds is allowed to operate anywhere in the world when the seas are over four 
metres. I think you do need people who are prepared to, not only people who are 
capable of coming up with the innovations for things that do make it different and 
better, you need people who are prepared to take the risks (Jim Bacon. Personal 
Interview, 2002). 
The equity relationship between the Tasmanian government and NWBS allowed the 
Tasmanian government to directly influence the nature of the new company' s  
operations, representing a significant departure from the Tasmanian government's  
traditional arm's length role with the cluster. For the first time in an official capacity, 
the Tasmanian government was able to determine the strategy of a key private sector 
entity within the TLSI cluster. Commenting on the nature of the relationship, the 
manager ofNWBS said that: 
The equity arrangement is managed through DSD. So, we brief them on what our 
prospects are and what we are doing and keep them informed and give them our 
financials and that sort of thing. The DSD have helped out tremendously in the past, 
but I think the government are at the point now they feel we should be going and doing 
trade shows and trade missions ourselves. Besides that the DSD administer a few 
government audits - the government has a shareholding in our company and they 
administer that shareholding so they are aware of what we are doing and where we are 
going so we have an on-going relationship with a case manager there, just knows what 
we are up to and what we've got in mind (Nigel Burridge. Personal Interview, 2002). 
The government's investment and effort at establishing NWBS as another driver of 
innovative shipbuilding within the cluster was received favourably by the TLSI 
cluster firms (including NWBS) of whom a sample of TLSI cluster firms managers 
said that: 
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The feeling I got was that the government felt that this was an industry that they could 
foster a little but more; probably just make them more supportive of a new entry like us 
to get started. With hindsight they would have to say that their decision to help us has 
been a good one, adding to the diversification of the industry and the different vessels 
we are building. We have actually just won a contract for a motor yacht, which further 
diversifies the industry away from just reliance on ferries, and we will provide two 
years of work for about 100 men, outside the ferry industry. I think the government's 
decision to support that diversification is bearing some fruit (Nigel Burridge. Personal 
Interview, 2002). 
Since that there is a very clear and direct policy, which has been, it is not written, but it 
has been stated publicly, that the Premier is pushing to have diverse marine industry in 
Tasmania that is not totally reliant on Incat, that is spread between markets, that covers 
the whole market (Allan Williams. Personal Interview, 2002). 
8.3.1 Summary of the government roles in developing the regional economy's 
'firm strategy, structure, and rivalry' during the maturity stage. 
In terms of facilitating the development of the TLSI cluster's  firm strategy, structure, 
and rivalry, the Tasmanian governments' role focused on the enhancement of the 
synergistic characteristics inherent to the TLSI cluster. Through the reorganisation of 
the TDA into the DSD, the Tasmanian government undertook a critical research role 
in the maturity stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle; the most important of which 
involved the determination of the drivers and inhibitors of the TLSI cluster firm's 
growth potential. The research agenda included a series of Industry Audit 
Programmes targeting each of the regional economy's leading export earmng 
industries, from which a State Industry Development Plan was established. 
Simultaneously, the DSD implemented a policy initiative that allowed the cluster 
firms an increasingly direct communication channel with the Tasmanian government 
through its establishment and representation on the Marine Manufacturing Industry 
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Council (formerly known as the TMN). Interestingly, the Marine Manufacturing 
Industry Council comprised of approximately 85 percent of the state's  entire 
shipbuilding and marine manufacturers, allowing all of these firms to associate more 
closely with (and learn from) the success of the TLSI cluster. 
The inclusion of the non-TLSI cluster firms within the Marine Manufacturing 
Industry Council reinforced Premier Bacon's policy choice to strengthen the diversity 
the state's  product offering, and incorporate an integrated 'community' of 
shipbuilding and marine manufacturers within the regional economy. Further to this 
policy initiative was the Tasmanian government's  facilitation, and equity 
arrangement, with a firm undertaking a niche marketing strategy with their innovative 
trimaran technology - NWBS. The equity arrangement allowed the Tasmanian 
government to influence the strategic direction of the new venture (something it had 
not attempted before) and effectively diluted !neat's importance as the primary driver 
of innovation, and generator of export sales, within the TLSI cluster. The Tasmanian 
government's  policy initiative also helped broaden the demand for the goods and 
services of the TLSI cluster's  supplier firms beyond that of a single, albeit significant 
firm (i.e. !neat's demand alone would no longer determined the existence ofthe TLSI 
cluster). 
8.4 GOVERNMENT ROLES IN DEVELOPING THE REGIONAL 
ECONOMY'S 'DEMAND CONDITIONS'. 
In terms of developing the regional economy' s  demand conditions during the maturity 
stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle, the focus of the Tasmanian governments centred 
on the enhancement of the state's reputation as an innovative marine manufacturer, 
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and the implementation of a consistent marketing strategy for set of cluster firms to be 
communicated to the international marketplace. In particular, the Rundle Liberal 
government attempted to realise the economies of scale available in the marketing of 
the state's innovative industries as a set of interrelated firms, and the economies of 
scope that existed in marine manufacturing at the single geographic location. Of the 
initiative, the acting Premier Sue Napier stated that: 
Tasmania is to be marketed as a "one stop shop" for international customers requiring 
shipbuilding services . . .  the aim of the network is to jointly market members' products 
and services to show the world that Tasmania has the innovative services and products 
for manufacturing their ships (Napier, 1998:1) 
The change to a Bacon Labor government in 1998 was accompanied by a continuance 
of the state sponsored ministerial trade missions, although the focus of the efforts 
changed to include the entire maritime production within the state, not simply that of 
Incat. This change in focus was undertaken in order to be consistent with the IDP 
recommendations, and the DSD's involvement with the TMN, and therefore, the 
entire set of shipbuilding and marine manufactures within the state. On the subject of 
ministerial trade missions under the Bacon government, Premier Bacon stated that: 
Yeah - so really the point of all of that is to say that, yes, government assistance with 
trade missions and with meeting key people which only a Premier or minister can get 
access to, and the trade shows with the department and the assistance helps 
enormously. We have grown our participation in the trade shows substantially because 
far more than just being Incat we are now trying to get the whole cluster there, indeed 
the whole of the state really, so that the others can get independent orders quite away 
from what is happening in Tasmania. Ultimately all that it comprises, other than ones 
that only service the local community, all have to obtain as much of their income as 
possible from outside the island - if they don't it is inevitable that they are going to go 
under (Jim Bacon. Personal Interview, 2002). 
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This policy initiative was aimed at both supporting the state's  entire shipbuilding and 
marine manufacturing industries, as well as broadening the market's  perception of 
what goods and services could be purchased from the state. Importantly, the 
Tasmanian government attempted to avoid marketing the regional economy as a 
producer oflncat range of vessels alone, as the manager of the DSD commented: 
If you look at it Inc at alone, they had a range of vessels, ranging from 7 4 to 1 12  metres 
and within that range they would build you a vessel if you order it. They would 
always prefer to build bigger vessels to building smaller vessels if they had the orders 
because they see themselves pushing out the frontiers and so on. So, if you get a 
contract for building 98 metre boats, why bother building a 50 metre one. We don't 
want someone to come to Tasmania and say, "I want a 55 metre vessel" and Incat says, 
"Sorry, go away, we are not doing that we are building bigger ones." So, what we 
want is someone to take advantage of such orders and you notice that the envelope that 
has been looked at by North West Bay Ships is in the 45-55-metre class and that is 
below the Richardson Devine. Now if you say Richardson Devine, well I am not sure 
if they will take on a 40 metre vessel, but they certainly wouldn't take on a 45 metre 
vessel - they would say, "it is too big for us, can't manage the cash flow, haven't got a 
workshop big enough, they haven't got the number of staff that you need to work on 
that." So, there is a perception of a range of product and we want to have this range 
(John Keller. Personal Interview, 2002). 
The Tasmanian government recognised, therefore, that for the regional economy's 
shipbuilding and manne manufacturing industry to remam internationally 
competitive, each of firms involved needed to focus on deriving real sales growth 
from their export markets. This recognition, and the Tasmanian government's efforts 
to include all of the state's  shipbuilding and marine manufacturing firms in their trade 
missions, resulted in the continued demand for the state's  output. As one of the TLSI 
cluster member general managers noted: 
The state politicians have been very supportive of the company. The Premier has 
actually taken time out of European tours to go to another country and support us in our 
quest. He actively supports our business, and this has directly resulted in extra sales 
for us (Alan Williams. Personal Interview, 2002). 
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As part of its trade mission effort, the Tasmanian government's  representatives, 
including the Premier, ensured that the 'natural advantages' of the Tasmanian regional 
economy were identified and included as a point of differentiation within the 
international marketplace. The promotion of Tasmania's 'natural advantages' was 
rationalised as a significant policy direction by Premier Bacon when he stated: 
\Vhat we wanted to do was identify what the national advantages for Tasmania are and, 
simply put, because I don't believe it is possible for regional economies to prosper in a 
globalised economy unless they are based on characteristics which the state has, and 
which no one else can take off you (Jim Bacon. Personal Interview, 2002). 
As an exemplar, Premier Bacon noted that: 
A great example is that of Richardson and Devine Marine. I had trade meetings with 
Bells & Russel three years ago; I have had meetings here and hosted dinners for people 
from Bells, which is all about Richardson and Devine Marine getting into the European 
canal and river market. One over there is a real problem with water damage, and 
therefore a good market for these low wash hulls - which were designed and developed 
for the Gordon River where they had to had very low wash to avoid damaging the 
fragile soil and plant life on the shore. They have developed a design that is the best 
for the canals and rivers in Europe, there are a lot of canals that are very old now so 
they can't take a lot of heavy wash. At the same time cities like Brussels are just 
absolutely unbelievable for traffic, if they had the canals going they could get more 
public transport back onto the water like it was once and then they could ease the traffic 
problem. We are very confident that eventually they will, Richardson and Devine will 
crack it because they have got a product that is perfect for a big problem in Europe (Jim 
Bacon. Personal Interview, 2002). 
Perhaps the Tasmanian government's most notable effort at driving international 
demand for the TLSI cluster's  production occurred under the Bacon Labor 
government in 1998. During 1998 the DSD undertook a major marketing role on 
behalf of the TLSI cluster for the 'Pacific 2000' trade show, the largest such event to 
be held in the southern hemisphere. Of the DSD's effort at coordinating the TLSI 
cluster's  entry to pacific 2000, the head of the department stated that: 
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The DSD exercised a co-ordinating function and they performed the role of ensuring 
that there was a reasonable similarity in looks and feels of reports and all that sort of 
thing, because otherwise, if you get trendy professional each doing a report everyone 
has their own ideas. So, there has been a sort of, we have put a stamp of uniformity 
contextually. We have co-ordinated the production of the documents and all that sort 
ofthing (John Keller. Personal Interview, 2002). 
The marketing role undertaken by the DSD on the TLSI cluster's  behalf was well 
received by the cluster firms, whose managing directors noted: 
I was taught a lesson a long time ago when I was doing some work in Japan. I went to 
Japan to sell the Japanese a product, that product was made up of various components 
of grand prix sailing yachts, America's Cup had been won by Australia and we went up 
there with mast makers and sail makers and boat designers, we had the best in 
Australia, go to Japan to market our product and take over the Japanese market. All I 
saw was the mast maker arguing with the sail maker who was arguing with the 
designer, and this was our own people. The New Zealanders came in, dressed in the 
jackets and ties, totally professional with what they were doing, totally supporting each 
other and took the market out of Australia -just took it away, overnight virtually. The 
DSD helped us to avoid repeating our bad behaviour at what was a very grand event for 
the industry (Michael Granger. Personal Interview, 2002). 
Yes - they [the DSD] organised it all-they were really good, they organised the whole 
set up of the display, quite effectively, support of the companies that go there and 
exhibit. They co-ordinated everything so the marine group looks the same - like a 
group rather than mismatch (Anthony LaFevre. Personal Interview, 2002). 
The DSD, therefore, provided the TLSI cluster firms with marketing competencies 
that were beyond the scope of any of the individual firms to supply. As such, the 
DSD provided an enabling policy for the TLSI cluster firms (and a number of TMN 
member firms) to present a cohesive and consistent marketing message for the 
Tasmanian shipbuilders and marine manufacturers to the potential customers 
patronising the 'Pacific 2000' trade show. This enabling policy was highly valued by 
the cluster firms, whose newest member's  manager commented: 
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We were wholly conscious of that and the cluster effect was adding to the industry. We 
used the local suppliers, but I think the more important effect of the cluster is in the 
marketing of the products and selling the boats, which is by for the hardest work. 
International eyes are on Tasmania when you are casting around looking for somebody 
to build ships like we build down here. I think that the connection between the brand 
that Tasmania has developed, and its relevance in the marketplace, has been the most 
important to our success (Nigel Burridge. Personal Interview, 2002). 
8.4.1 Summary of the government roles in developing the regional economy's 
'demand conditions '  during the maturity stage. 
In terms of facilitating the development of the regional economy's 'demand 
conditions' during the maturity stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle, the Tasmanian 
governments' role centred upon the continued enhancement of the state's  reputation 
as an innovative world centre of shipbuilding and marine manufacturing. The major 
departure undertaken by the Bacon Labor government was the inclusion of the entire 
set of the state's  shipbuilding and marine manufacturing firms in efforts to market the 
state as a 'one stop shop' for international consumers. As a result, the TLSI cluster 
(and to a lesser extent the set of firms involved in the TMN) were able to be marketed 
as an integrated network of firms, thereby associating all of these businesses with the 
innovative success enjoyed primarily by the TLSI cluster. The marketing efforts 
undertaken by the Tasmanian government (largely through the DSD and ministerial 
trade missions) were consistent with its aim to reduce the state's  reliance on Incat as 
the driver of future innovation, and as the generator of the majority of export sales 
revenue for the industries. 
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The DSD's a1m was develop and market Tasmania's shipbuilding and manne 
manufacturing industries as a 'one-stop-shop' for the international customer. The 
inclusion of the non-TLSI cluster firms within the Marine Manufacturing Industry 
Council reinforced the Tasmanian government's  policy to strengthen the diversity the 
state's  product offering, and incorporate an integrated 'community' of shipbuilding 
and marine manufacturers within the regional economy. In order to achieve this end, 
the Tasmanian government, through the DSD, undertook some important research, 
marketing, and coordination efforts, the most important of which involved the 
determination of the drivers and inhibitors ofthe TLSI cluster firm's growth potential. 
The research efforts included the provision of a more effective communication 
channel between the state's  shipbuilding and marine manufacturing industries and the 
Tasmanian government (through its role in the TMN), its continued involvement in 
the TLSI's sales negotiation process, and the implementation of the IDP's Industry 
Audit Programme. 
Further to this was the Tasmanian government' s  facilitation, and equity arrangement, 
with a firm undertaking a niche marketing strategy with NWBS. The equity 
arrangement allowed the Tasmanian government to influence the strategic direction of 
the new venture and effectively diluted Incat' s importance as the primary driver of 
innovation, and generator of export sales, within the TLSI cluster. The Tasmanian 
government's  policy initiative also helped broaden the demand for the goods and 
services of the TLSI cluster's  supplier firms beyond that of a single, albeit significant 
firm. 
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8.5 GOVERNMENT ROLES IN DEVELOPING THE REGIONAL 
ECONOMY'S 'RELATED AND SUPPORTING INDUSTRY'. 
In terms of developing the regional economy's related and supporting industry during 
the maturity stage of the TLSI cluster's life cycle, the focus of the Tasmanian 
governments centred on the enhancement of the synergies available within the TLSI 
cluster. This aim was undertaken by policies that further integrated the operations of 
the individual cluster entities, and in particular, those between the private sector firms 
and the government sponsored training institutions. As part ofthe TMN arrangement, 
the Tasmanian government funded the introduction of a number of reciprocal 
arrangements between the TLSI cluster's  firms and its training infrastructural support, 
utilising the resources of the DSD, AMC, and the TAFE. In terms of improving and 
updating the AMC and TAFE's training courses, the managers of the TLSI cluster's  
private sector firms indicate a significant level of interaction that serves both the 
individual firm, the educational institution, as well as indirectly benefiting competitor 
firms: 
Yes - we have had quite a bit of dealing backwards and forwards with them [the 
AMC). They have actually asked use for advice, and back in the early days we helped 
them set up their hydraulic steering systems (Richard Riley. Personal Interview, 2002). 
They [the AMC] are part of the Tasmanian Maritime Network, so we do have dealings 
with them by way of reciprocal arrangement; from promoting their products and them 
promoting ours at exhibitions. We also use the college to test out new ideas and 
sometimes we even suggest ways that they can help similar businesses to our own 
(Terry Gunton. Personal Interview, 2002). 
I mean the fact that our president [of the TMN] is also the chief instructor at the T AFE 
college here, that is a government body, and there is this influx of government 
ministers, etc., to the TAFE college over time and it has been brought to their notice 
that we are involved in this network aspect. Whether it has a direct bearing in any way, 
I don't know. The fact that we have been involved with the T AFE College there is that 
awareness that we are about (Terry Gunton. Personal Interview, 2002). 
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Interestingly, the concern that other firms should be able to benefit from the TLSI 
cluster's  enhanced interaction also included international competitors, although not 
entirely for benevolent reasons. As the head of the TAFE Aluminium Welding 
School indicates: 
When we started talking about selling some of our training overseas, because we had 
an expertise to off-sell, Clifford was actually for the idea and said, "Go for it, because 
what I don't want to see is the vessel sink anywhere in the world that is made out of 
aluminium because down goes the market as soon as one does it." He had an outlook 
that way and he actually helped anything that we wanted to do, we could utilise any of 
his staff if we wanted to, if we needed expertise he did it. Even in the Canadian deal 
[an export training arrangement] we used one of his staff that had expertise in one of 
the skills analysis areas. So, again we were able to utilise each other (Terry Hall. 
Personal Interview, 2002). 
Similarly, the training institutions themselves sought to improve their training 
competency by involving the TLSI cluster firms in the formulation of courses, and 
utilising the Tasmanian government's  resources, fund the changing curriculum and 
introducing a national accreditation for them. As the director of the T AFE 
Aluminium Welding School notes: 
Naturally we have the expertise in providing the necessary training, but before we set 
up any course, or on any request, we actually go down onto site, talk to those that 
require the training, and form it to suit them. But, then we will have to make sure it 
fitted to the middle stream packages and other things. We can set up personalised 
training programs for individuals but that it not certificated but if we can fit it into a 
training package we can get some outcome that is beneficial to the person that is getting 
the training and not only the company - so, that is the sort of way we look at it. We try 
to benefit the user of it, the one that is physically going to do the work and also keep the 
company happy and he gets what he wants as well so they both get it in the end and the 
man that does it can carry it somewhere else (Terry Hall. Personal Interview, 2002). 
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As such, the Tasmanian government focused its efforts on the maintenance of the 
TLSI cluster's  training regime, ensuring that the innovative nature inherent to the 
success during the growth stage of the industry's  life cycle was likewise maintained 
in an environment of decelerated sales increases. 
One of the most important issues arising from the implementation ofthe IDP was the 
recognition that there was a requirement for the Tasmanian government to undertake 
a number of key roles that would be otherwise provided by private sector firms in a 
major Australian economy. A number of current and ex-state politicians concur that 
the Tasmanian government has a unique role in developing its economy: 
I think the government of a regional economy has got to get in there and help industry. 
Obviously there is more that we can to - but if our economy is to really develop, the 
government must play a central role. I think we still have future problems - we are a 
relatively poor state - we are struggling still, our unemployment levels are much higher 
than elsewhere. We are remote in terms of the world markets, and unless government 
is very pro-active, and unless government is up with the latest and really effective in 
helping industries, then we will stagnate and continue to struggle along on the bottom. 
I don't think any government yet has found all the answers, and we will probably have 
to redefine the wheel or something like that rather than find the answer (Ray Groom. 
Personal Interview, 2002). 
Being responsible for a state makes it different. In Victoria, if you want to influence 
strategic decision-making you could probably pull together a room of 50 people who 
command large resources and if you can sell the taste to them you can perhaps achieve 
an end quickly. In Tasmania that would be very difficult. Doesn't mean it can't be 
done but it does mean that you are negotiating with entities which are often represented 
at fairly low levels without decision making capacity in this state or without profound 
decision making capacity (Duncan Kerr. Personal Interview, 2002). 
I think the government in Tasmania is always going to be more important than in a 
macro-economic setting. You don't have to intervene much in Sydney or Melbourne. 
In Tasmania you do just because within the economy itself government is such a big 
player. (Michael Field. Personal Interview, 2002). 
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I think the government in regional economies, particularly in a small regional economy 
like Tasmania, inevitably has a bigger role than one in a larger economy. The larger 
economies have got critical mass, they pretty much run under their own steam and it is 
really an option of choice for government, how much government gets involved. A 
regional economy is different because of certain things, like population, geography etc, 
and the government has a key role in bringing people together, and providing 
leadership. I think, though that the government does not have a key role in how to run 
enterprises, but rather to provide leadership in terms ofthe direction that we want to go, 
the things we need to concentrate on (Jim Bacon. Personal Interview, 2002). 
As such, the Tasmanian government's  reorganisation ofthe DSD resulted in it playing 
a central role on behalf of the Tasmanian government within the diamond factors 
pertinent to the TLSI cluster's  development. For example, the DSD was charged with 
providing a coordinating role for the TLSI cluster firms (in their efforts to 
communicate with the many faces of government); on numerous occasions it had 
undertaken significant and direct efforts to negotiate with the TLSI cluster's  potential 
customers; and as mentioned in 'demand conditions', it undertook an important 
marketing role for the TLSI cluster (and the TMN's) entry into the 'Pacific 2000' 
trade show. Of the DSD's role in providing a supporting role for the TLSI cluster, the 
head of the department noted that: 
We maintain close co-operation with all government agencies, be they federal or state­
based. We create an awareness of the programs and services and we offer, including 
our access to marketing expertise and research data that we have been able to generate. 
We certainly at all times seek to make our clients aware of programs where they can get 
advice, assistance, funding, particularly in such areas as research and development, 
which is actually a commonwealth function. We have a Tasmanian government office 
in Canberra and the Tasmanian government office in Canberra advices us formally of 
all changes in commonwealth policy, programs that have any impact on this state so 
that we can react to it in a speedy and professional manner (John Keller. Personal 
Interview, 2002). 
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The DSD's coordination and support role was sited as even more important, given the 
nature of the private sector in Tasmania: 
I remember having these arguments with a number of federal ministers who were 
responsible for a number of federal industry assistance programs and saying, "Look it is 
very difficult to put together people who are genuinely able to command resources and 
speak for their communities, in places like Tasmania, because they are often not here 
[in Canberra)". The people that you are bringing together are second string managers 
who just don't have the clout or the resources." So, this is a real problem, this kind of 
level of regional economic development requires us to say, "Well, let's give resources 
to people on the ground, at that level, who know what they want." The one way we can 
find out is through research, and a strong relationship between private sector firms and 
government departments, like the DSD (Duncan Kerr. Personal Interview, 2002). 
8.5.1 Summary of the government roles in developing the regional economy's 
'related and supporting industry' during the maturity stage. 
During the maturity stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle, the Tasmanian 
government's  focus centred on the enhancement of the synergistic capabilities 
inherent to the TLSI cluster. In particular, the Tasmanian government focused on 
ensurmg that the training programs offered by the AMC and TAFE Aluminium 
Welding School utilised state-of-the-art equipment were flexible in that they could 
accommodate the requests and changing needs of the TLSI cluster's  private firms. In 
order to achieve this end, the Tasmanian government, through its involvement in the 
TMN, ensured that the TMN firms were involved in the course design process where 
appropriate, and that public monies were made available for the funding of the course 
changes, and that national accreditation was applied to the training courses. In 
addition, the Tasmanian government, also through the formation of the TMN, 
facilitated the development of a 'community' of Tasmanian shipbuilders and marine 
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manufacturers that could more readily access the infrastructure and government 
support that was formerly available only to the TLSI cluster firms. 
The Tasmanian government also undertook the responsibility to provide a number of 
supportive roles for the TLSI cluster, including marketing support for the 'Pacific 
2000' trade show, the continued representation of the state Premier's  office during the 
sales negotiation process for the TLSI cluster firms, and the role of market and 
industry research analyst for the TMN. The roles undertaken by the government 
(largely through the DSD) were aimed at providing support services that were critical 
to the TLSI cluster's  success, but beyond the scope or competency of any single firm 
within the TLSI cluster. 
8.6 GOVERNMENT ROLES IN DEVELOPING THE REGIONAL 
ECONOMY'S 'FACTOR CONDITIONS'. 
In terms of developing the regional economy' s  factor conditions during the maturity 
stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle, the focus of the Tasmanian government 
surrounded the continued upgrading of the training infrastructure for the TLSI cluster 
firms. In addition, and primarily for Incat, the Tasmanian government also undertook 
measures to support Incat through its cash flow crisis by providing the company with 
a government loan of $30 million, and by reducing its employment costs through a 
reduction in its payroll taxation liability. 
The Tasmanian government's aim of positioning Tasmania as an innovative 'one-
stop-shop' for the international consumer was further supported by the Tasmanian 
government's  lobbying effort with the federal government to purchase a $1  million 
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state-of-the-art Model Test Basin for the AMC. In order to influence the purchase, the 
Tasmanian government pledged $421 000 of the state's  public funds to finalise the 
purchase. The Tasmanian government's  investment in the educational infrastructure 
was justified by Premier Bacon in a government press release, where he indicated 
that: 
The investment has certainly deterred other states from attempting to steal business 
away from the AMC and Tasmania. In fact, since late 1999, the AMC's newly 
established courses in Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering have had significant 
growth in student numbers. The new hydrodynamic research facilities [the Model Test 
Basin] should enable AMC to continue to gain market share in these disciplines . . .  As 
well as its educational function, the AMC has an enviable maritime research reputation, 
which will also be enhanced by the commissioning of the Model Test Basin (Bacon, 
2001b: 2). 
The Tasmanian government's strategy to increase its investments in the educational 
infrastructure for the TLSI and TMN included the funding and accreditation of 
courses that were jointly devised by the AMC and TAFE Aluminium Welding School 
institutions. As a result, the educational institutions were able to maintain its 
relevance to the innovative firms within the TLSI (and the TMN). As a number of 
TLSI cluster manager's stated: 
Naturally we have the expertise in training but before we set up any course, on any 
request, we actually gone down onto site, talk to those that require the training and 
form it to suit them. But, then we will have to make sure it fitted to the middle stream 
packages and other things. We can set up personalised training programs for 
individuals but that it not certificated but if we can fit it into a training package we can 
get some outcome that is beneficial to the person that is getting the training and not 
only the company - so, that is the sort of way we look at it. We try to benefit the user 
of it, the one that is physically going to do the work and also keep the company happy 
and he gets what he wants as well so they both get it in the end and the man that does it 
can carry it somewhere else (Terry Hall. Personal Interview, 2002). 
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We have had talks with the TAFE, and they are responsive to industry needs, and they 
will schedule block release training at times when you are in a manufacturing 
environment like us, when at times it suits you not to have staff here and they will 
schedule block periods around those sort of times, and I have find them to be on the 
ball. Our first intake of apprentices all came through people doing courses out of 
T AFE It helps to identify the kids that have the hands skills and the skill sets that they 
need to be successful in working in this industry. So, we have chosen our apprentices 
out of there and we have had 100% success rate with those guys so far (Nigel Burridge. 
Personal Interview, 2002). 
[The Model Test Basin at the AMC] is an important bit of infrastructure actually. All 
the models that we have developed, the hull forms that we are trying to develop, when 
they come up to 1/35 scale model size we take them to the Maritime College for their 
tank testing and use those facilities extensively. That really is an important facility. 
We have also had guys come through, Naval architects that have been trained up there, 
been working out of there as well (Nigel Burridge. Personal Interview, 2002). 
The Tasmanian government was aware that the educational and infrastructural support 
proffered by the educational institutions was paramount to maintaining, and indeed 
enhancing, the state's reputation as an innovative centre of shipbuilding and marine 
manufacturing excellence. Also, the investment represented an effort by the 
government to protect its shipbuilding and maritime manufacturing market share by 
raising the TMN firms' costs of exiting the state, should they receive financial 
incentives to relocate from a rival interstate government. As noted by TLSI cluster 
firm managers: 
I think it was sort of like a rolling ball, once it got started it just gained momentum. I 
think the guys at the Aluminium School of Training had a bit to do with it because they 
helped promote the place as a cohesive marine area where we can train people to do all 
sorts of things. I think that was the grand plan and I think it has worked pretty well 
(Alan Williams. Personal Interview, 2002). 
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Although the investment in the TLSI cluster's educational infrastructure was intended 
to facilitate the development of the entire TLSI cluster (and the newly integrated 
TMN) the Tasmanian government's  second policy initiative affecting the state's factor 
conditions was aimed at supporting only a few of the TLSI cluster firms, namely the 
major employers Incat, FC Management, and NWBS. Of the payroll tax relief for the 
firms, Premier Bacon and two TLSI cluster firms' managers stated that: 
Tasmania's biggest private sector employer, Incat, is set for a payroll tax deal from the 
Tasmanian government. Premier Jim Bacon confirmed yesterday that he would meet 
Clifford within days to discuss payroll tax cuts. Of the tax relief, Premier Bacon stated 
"Payroll tax and the lack of skilled labour were mentioned in a recent industry audit as 
inhibitors to growth in Tasmania's shipbuilding industry. Already, fifteen existing 
information technology businesses have been earmarked for payroll tax exemption in 
the next financial year." (The Examiner, 1999a). 
We were closed down twelve months ago and now we are back up and operating, and 
without the changes to the payroll tax we would not have opened our doors again, so it 
was a good thing (Bayles, in Stubbs, 2001). 
It was pleasing to see, that was actually in the payroll tax area where we were involved 
with a group of companies and some changes were made where companies were 
grouped. We have got companies operating in different industries and it is illogical to 
be grouping companies that are in totally separate industry sectors. I understand the 
origins of the legislation, where people used to break up the same company into smaller 
groups to pay no payroll tax but when you are operating in totally separate industry 
sectors, the grouping was really illogical and they changed that legislation and now we 
are able to employ more people (Nigel Burridge. Personal Interview, 2002). 
As such, the payroll tax relief applied to Incat, FC Management, and NWB S was a 
strategic response to the needs of the industry that arose from the IDP research, rather 
than merely a subsidy arrangement for important employers within the state. The 
Tasmanian government, therefore, implemented a policy initiative that effectively 
reduced the cost of labour for these three major employers within the TLSI cluster, 
ensuring that the firms remained viable and ongoing concerns during the economic 
221 
downtUTil, and that their workforce and innovative human capital capacity was not 
dissipated or lost to interstate firms. 
In terms of supporting the maJor employers within the TLSI, the Tasmanian 
government was forced to specifically address the manner m which econormc 
downtUTil adversely affected the cluster's  leading employer, Incat. The marked 
downtUTil in the world demand for new ship production resulted in the company 
overestimating its projected sales revenues, leading to the overproduction of six 
vessels valued at approximately $40 million each. The cash flow crisis that ensued 
jeopardised both !neat's ability to operate in solvency, and the reputation of the state 
as an innovative centre of shipbuilding. In response to the company' s  cash flow 
crisis, the Tasmanian government undertook a series of lobbying efforts to secure 
additional federal grants to help Incat fund its daily operations and maintain its 
workforce. The lobbying was unsuccessful, with the Prime Minister stating that the 
federal government could do nothing for the company beyond its current scheme to 
fund the Shipbuilding Bounty. The Tasmanian government's  response to the Prime 
Minister's  refusal was to provide Incat with a secured government loan (through the 
DSD) of $30 million: 
. . .  it was revealed that the Tasmanian government lent $30m to the shipbuilder last 
year. Jim Bacon confirmed that the Tasmanian government made a fully secured $30m 
loan to Incat in July. "It is no secret that recently Incat has endured cash-flow 
problems, alleviated by he sale of a vessel and I congratulate Clifford on his company's 
recent success", Jim Bacon said. The Tasmanian Development and Resources loan will 
be repaid at an undisclosed rate, but the Tasmanian government has the first claim on 
Incat assets in the event that the company failed. "Incat Tasmania is one of the State's 
icon industries, employing more than 800 people onsite and supporting many hundreds 
more in allied industries", :Mr. Bacon said (Paine, 2002). 
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As such, and similar to changes to the payroll tax legislation, the Tasmanian 
government was able to justifY the loan arrangement as a method to protect the 
innovative nature of the state's TLSI cluster by protecting those that were employed 
by it. Of the loan arrangement, the head of the loaning body (the DSD) stated that: 
. . .  we still have a loan program. It hasn't been entirely abandoned but we are less 
active now in the loan area than previous incarnations of this department used to be. 
We used to have a far more active loan policy. Now loans are only given in matters of 
state significance, of which Incat's plight clearly is (John Keller. Personal Interview, 
2002). 
8.6.1 Summary of the government roles in developing the regional economy's 
'factor conditions '  during the maturity stage. 
In terms of facilitating the development of the regional economy's factor conditions 
during the maturity stage of the TLSI cluster's life cycle, the Tasmanian government's  
role focused on two critical issues. The first was the continued upgrading of the TLSI 
cluster's  educational infrastructure; the second was the protection of the innovative 
human capital capacity that had developed, and was inherent to the international 
success of the TLSI cluster. The upgrading of the educational infrastructure served to 
further enhance the state's reputation as an innovative centre of shipbuilding and 
marine manufacturing excellence, as well as increase the exit costs to TMN firms that 
may receive financial incentives to relocate their operations interstate. As such, the 
Tasmanian government's investment in the AMC and the TAFE School of 
Aluminium Welding served to reinforce its strategy of marketing Tasmania a 'one-
stop-shop' for the international consumer of ships and maritime manufacturing. In 
terms of protecting the TLSI cluster's  innovative human resource capacity, the 
Tasmanian government also undertook efforts to reduce the costs of employing skilled 
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labour (through payroll tax relief to specific firms) and providing a non-subsidy, 
government loan to facilitate the ongoing operations of the TLSI cluster's  hub firm, 
and state's  largest employer, Incat. 
8.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY. 
This chapter provided an analytical account of the Tasmanian governments' role in 
developing Tasmania's diamond factors during the maturity stage of the TLSI 
cluster's  life cycle. The maturity stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle was 
highlighted by the Tasmanian government' s  efforts to further enhance the synergistic 
characteristics of the TLSI cluster, and to extend the success enjoyed by the TLSI 
cluster to the wider community of Tasmanian shipbuilders and marine manufacturers. 
Interestingly, the Tasmanian government undertook significant and deliberate 
measures to ensure that the TLSI cluster diversified away from its traditional reliance 
on the demand generated by the TLSI cluster's  hub-firm, Incat. 
The Tasmanian governments' policy initiatives were largely implemented through the 
reorganisation of the TDA into the DSD in 1998. The new government department 
was immediately involved in the TMN as a research and communications facility for 
both the TMN firms, and the Tasmanian government in its many forms. The DSD 
was able to identify the drivers and inhibitors to the TMN and TLSI cluster's  growth 
through its IDP and Industry Audits Programme. It also undertook measures to realise 
growth through its supportive responsibilities in provide marketing, sales negotiation, 
and communications functions for the TMN and TLSI cluster firms. Additional 
efforts included the continued upgrading of the TLSI cluster's  educational 
infrastructure to include Tasmanian government investment in state-of-the-art testing 
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equipment at the AMC, and the funding and accreditation of courses requested and 
partially developed by the TLSI cluster firms. 
In terms of reducing the TLSI cluster's  reliance on Incat, the Tasmanian government 
undertook deliberate measures to dilute the firm's importance as a generator of sales 
and 'internal demand' for the TLSI cluster's  production. For the first time, the 
Tasmanian government undertook an equity arrangement with a similarly innovative 
firm (NWBS) such that the TLSI cluster' s  supplier firms (i.e. not Incat) would have an 
increasingly diverse source of internal demand for their production, and perhaps more 
importantly, their ability to innovative. The Tasmanian government, however, 
continued their support for Incat as a major employer within the state. Given the 
global downturn in demand for its product, the Tasmanian government implemented 
financial and lobbying assistance for the firm in the form of payroll tax relief and a 
government loan of $30 million such that the company could continue to operate (and 
employ) in a time of negative cash flow. 
The maturity stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle represents the third and last of the 
stages to be included in this research project. Chapters Five through Eight introduced 
each of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle stages in turn, and undertook an analysis of the 
regional government roles that facilitated the development of the diamond factors 
pertinent to the international success of the TLSI cluster. The following chapter will 
provide a discussion of the Tasmanian governments' role in developing the regional 
economy's diamond factors over the TLSI cluster's  life cycle, through which it will 
specifically address the research questions posed in Chapter Two. 
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CHAPTER NINE. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION. 
9.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE CHAPTER. 
The objectives of this chapter are threefold. Firstly, it provides a discussion of the 
thesis results by answering the specific research questions posed in Chapter Two. 
Secondly, the implications of the research are noted; these relate to the questions as to 
the beneficial roles that an Australian state government in a regional economy may 
undertake in the development of internationally competitive industrial clusters. 
Finally, the chapter closes with a report of the limitations of the research. 
9.2 DISCUSSION OF THE THESIS RESULTS. 
The broad research opportunity identified in Chapter One of this thesis was: What is 
the state government's role in the facilitation and development of an internationally 
competitive industrial cluster in a regional Australian economy? In order to 
successfully answer the broad research question, two research questions were posed 
as follows: 
Research Question 1: What role did the Tasmanian Government play in the 
development of the TLSI cluster since its inception in 1977? 
Research Question 2: How did the change in the importance of the TLSI cluster to 
the Tasmanian economy over time impact upon the Tasmanian government's policy 
development process? 
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The questions were investigated through an extensive rev1ew of pnmary and 
secondary data pertaining to the TLSI cluster's  development between 1977 and 2002. 
The secondary data research was analysed in order to formulate the set of questions 
used in the semi-structured interview process. The findings relevant to the research 
questions are summarised and discussed below. 
9.2.1 Discussion of the results in relation to Research Question One: 
What role did the Tasmanian government play in the development of the TLSI 
cluster since its inception in 1977? 
As noted in Chapter Two, one of the major reasons cited for the government's  failure 
to effectively implement Porter's  ICT has been the assumption by government that the 
industrial cluster's  stage of development is irrelevant to the policy development 
process (Klepper, 1996; Walcott, 1999). As recommended by Audretsch and 
Feldman (1996), and Van Klink and De Langen (2001), this research undertakes an 
analysis of the Tasmanian government's  policy initiatives during the life cycle stages 
of the TLSI cluster's  development as defined in Chapters Six through Eight. 
9.2.1.1 The role of government during introductory stage of the TLSI cluster's life 
cycle. 
During the introductory stage of its life cycle, three key government roles positively 
influenced the TLSI cluster's  development. The first was the state government's  
initial non-committal stance towards the specific development of the state's  'new' 
shipbuilding industry. The second role surrounded the enhancement of the state's  
reputation within the domestic market as a centre for maritime research. The third 
role was the government's support for the entrepreneurial activities undertaken by 
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Incat, when it became apparent that the company was a potential source of significant 
economic growth for the regional economy. 
The state government's  initial non-committal stance towards the state's  'new' 
industry was not deliberate, as its policy focus at the time was on the macro-economic 
restructuring of the state's  economy away from its dependence on hydro-
industrialisation. Due to this focus on the macro-economic restructuring process, the 
state government did not at any stage pre-empt the growth requirements of the 
potential industry. As such, the Tasmanian government avoided the Issues 
surrounding many of Australia's industrial cluster failures of the 1990s in which 
governments built up the infrastructural support to potential industries in the hope that 
this would attract firms, as for example, the federal and South Australian government 
did with the failed multi-function polis planned for Adelaide. Consequently, the 
development of the innovative technologies (i.e. the development of elements of 
Porter's  'firm strategy, structure and rivalry') remained the sole responsibility of the 
private sector firms that existed during the industrial cluster's  initial formation (i.e. 
Clifford and his maritime friendship network). As stated by Premier Groom: 
. . .  if government takes a too bigger role in [the private sector's activities] that is 
fraught with huge dangers because the record of government running shows is not 
very good. I happen to believe government needs to be there backing up . . .  but the 
innovative process is still fundamentally a private enterprise show (Ray Groom. 
Personal Interview, 2002). 
The second key role was the state government's development of the region's  
reputation within the broader domestic maritime market as a national centre for 
maritime research. The Tasmanian government implemented a series of lobbying 
initiatives that resulted in the federal government providing additional funding to the 
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AMC and relocating its national maritime research institute (the CSIRO) to Hobart. 
These state government efforts were largely aimed at the federal government rather 
than the private sector, but their success had implications for the region's 'factor 
conditions', 'related and supporting industry', and 'demand conditions'. The 
regional economy's factor conditions were advanced by developing the region's 
supply of human capital through both the generation of specialised employment and 
education within the broader industry. The regional economy' s  related and 
supporting industry factor was advanced by the increase in the sophistication of 
supply of inputs to the private sector firms (in terms of products and world standard 
maritime research). The Tasmanian government's  enhancement of the region's 
reputation helped to develop the demand conditions faced by the private sector 
shipbuilding firms, most significantly in the from of customers ready to import their 
products from interstate. It was only after the domestic exporting success of lncat's 
semi-aluminium catamarans in the early 1980s were realised that the Tasmanian 
government undertook its third key role, that of accommodating the growth 
requirements of the innovative hub-firm Incat. 
Although the Tasmanian government did provide its first direct support for Incat in 
the introductory stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle, it did so only after the hub­
firm's success was able to demonstrate its commercial success in the domestic market 
for ferry transportation. The government support for Incat was provided when the 
firm could demonstrate that it did not possess the resources required for its continued 
expansion, and then only after its management was able to demonstrate that 
significant increases in employment were the likely result of the support. This initial 
government support is consistent with the recommendation of Porter' s  ICT, as it 
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allows for the challenges facing the 'new' industry to be overcome whilst avoiding 
the inefficiencies associated with the government's direct involvement in private 
sector enterprise. 
9.2.1.2 The role of government during the growth stage ofthe TLSI cluster's life cycle. 
During the growth stage of its life cycle, three key state government roles positively 
influenced the development of the TLSI cluster. The first was the Tasmanian 
government's  continued effort to enhance the reputation of the regional economy, 
although the focus of these efforts changed from the domestic maritime market to one 
of a marketing effort in the international market for !neat's fast-ferry vessels. The 
second was the Tasmanian government's  direct involvement in !neat's sales 
negotiations processes with its international customers. The third was the Tasmanian 
government's  policy initiatives that served to maximise the synergistic relationship 
that existed between Incat and its supplier firms. 
The first of the state government policies that positively influenced the development 
of the TLSI cluster was the continued enhancement of the region's  reputation as a 
centre for maritime excellence, although the policy's  focus changed markedly to 
encompass the international marketplace. This change in focus was driven by the 
continued success of !neat's innovative product line in the domestic ferry 
transportation market. Through the use of government sponsored trade missions and 
the associated negotiation activities, the Tasmanian government used the success of 
Incat to illustrate the region's maritime competency to international buyers of these 
products, in turn facilitating an increase in the international demand conditions for 
!neat's production. The Tasmanian government also applied pressure on the 
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remainder of the TLSI cluster firms, and indeed the region' s maritime industry as a 
whole, to similarly increase the quality of their production in line with the growing 
international reputation of the region. The Tasmanian government helped the region's  
shipbuilding and maritime manufacturing firms to achieve high quality production by 
maintaining its existing lobbying efforts for additional infrastructural funding for the 
industry. As Premier Rundle stated on the matter of federal government lobbying: 
We certainly put in a lot of effort on that using our Federal members and Federal 
Liberal members as well, there were direct representations made to Canberra by the 
State Government and also by our Federal Senators. But, they were all on the job, 
there was no doubt about that, because obviously it was a very important industry, 
employing probably about 1,000 at that stage (Tony Rundle. Personal Interview, 
2002). 
Specifically, the Tasmanian government undertook political action to secure 
additional funding for the educational and R&D requirements of the industry. As 
with its direct support for !neat's needs, however, the Tasmanian government only 
lobbied for additional federal government funding after its need was recognised by the 
private sector, and where the private sector firms could demonstrate that these needs 
were necessary for their future growth. The Tasmanian government' s  reputation 
enhancement strategy served to increase the demand conditions enjoyed by the state's  
shipbuilding industry, and in particular, for the output of the regional industry's  hub-
firm. It also served to apply a degree of pressure upon the hub-firm's suppliers to 
similarly improve their production output in line with the growing prestige of the 
regiOn. 
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The second role undertaken by the Tasmanian government was that of direct support 
during !neat's sales negotiations with their potential international customers. This 
was directed by the incumbent state Premier at the time, through his department of 
economic development, most notably in the form of funding for international 
customer visits to !neat's factory, but also by having the Premier accompany the 
potential customer during their visit. On the issue of providing this form of support, 
Premier Field commented: 
. . .  when [Clifford] was involved with the U.K. bloke, I went out for a meal with 
him, to give him some comfort, so Clifford could show he had real government 
support and that everything was on the level. These efforts were both moral and 
actual support from us-which is quite important actually, so that other people know 
that the government backs them in their industry. With potential customers that 
happened more than once. I was Premier when we did that but there were other 
levels that it happened too, at bureaucratic and at a political level. So, if there were 
visitors that Bob wanted to show, "Yes, the government is supporting me." We did 
as much as probably any state government could rationally do (Michael Field. 
Personal Interview, 2002). 
As a result of the state government's  policy initiative to become involved in !neat's 
sales negotiation process, it provided a level of prestige, moral support and sales 
expertise that was otherwise beyond the ability of the hub-firm to provide. Indirectly, 
this policy also served to highlight the supplier firms within the TLSI cluster, as their 
inputs into !neat's final product were also supported by the state government's 
involvement in the sale. As Premier Gray stated: 
Well, obviously there were down-stream benefits from the catamaran sale itself­
even to the creation of the lifeboat technology. We always had Incat's ship as the 
main product we wanted to help promote, after all the dollars and employment were 
so important to the state. But we also highlighted the ship's bits and pieces, like the 
lifeboats and the internal finishes, they were all top quality and deserved mentioning 
(Robin Gray. Personal Interview, 2002). 
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In terms of advancing the diamond factors, the Tasmanian government's second 
policy initiative served to develop the regional industry's firm strategy, structure and 
rivalry by state Premier's  personal endorsement of the TLSI cluster's output. It also 
served to align the TLSI cluster firms' goals with that of the state government by 
pressuring all of the individual firms to innovate their products in line with the 
requirements of the hub-firm. In terms of advancing the demand conditions enjoyed 
by the regional industry, the state government's  involvement served to enhance the 
legitimacy of the hub-firm's innovative product to potential international customers. 
The third key role undertaken by the Tasmanian government was to undertake 
measures to deliberately maximise the synergistic relationship that existed between 
Incat and its supplier firms. Inherent in Porter's  ICT is the notion that within a 
clustered network of firms, some forms of scale or scope economies exist through 
which the industrial cluster develops an internationally competitive advantage. 
Through its development of marine parks and industrial councils (in which firms 
complementary to Incat' s operations can more easily interact) the Tasmanian 
government deliberately enabled the realisation of the synergies of both scale and 
scope inherent to the region's  natural industry. The third state government role 
served to advance the diamond factors by developing the 'firm strategy, structure and 
rivalry' and the 'factor conditions' enjoyed by the TLSI cluster firms in residence at 
the Prince of Wales Bay marine park. With the TLSI cluster firms in close 
geographic proximity, the individual firms were better able to communicate and 
coordinate their interrelated production and training activities, as well as allowing 
them to access the advanced and specialised (and expensive) infrastructure developed 
for the marine park. 
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9.2.1.3 The role of government during the maturity stage of the TLSI cluster's life 
cycle. 
During the maturity stage of its life cycle, three key state government roles positively 
influenced the development of the TLSI cluster. The first key role was the continued 
enhancement of the regional economy's reputation as a world centre for maritime 
manufacturing excellence, although the focus of its efforts changed from the singular 
promotion of lncat' s success to incorporate the production of the entire set of industry 
members, be they cluster firms or otherwise. The second role was to formalise the 
relationships that existed within the regional shipbuilding and marine manufacturing 
industries. The third role was the Tasmanian government's  deliberate strategy to 
dilute !neat's importance and impact upon the regional economy. 
The first key state government role was its continued enhancement of the regional 
economy's reputation as a world centre for maritime manufacturing excellence. 
During the maturity stage however, the focus of the Tasmanian government's 
reputation strategy in the world shipping vessel market changed from the singular 
promotion of !neat's success to incorporate the output of the entire industry, be they 
TLSI cluster firms or otherwise. The functional strategies incorporated by the 
Tasmanian government included trade missions, direct involvement in the 
international sales negotiations process, and the provision of marketing assistance to 
the industry. The marketing assistance provided to the industry was specifically 
targeted at generating a consistent message for all of Tasmanian firms in the 
international marketplace. 
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The policy to incorporate the entire set of cluster firms developed the demand 
conditions for the regional industry, with the region now marketed as a 'one-stop-
shop' for a wide variety of innovative and high-quality maritime production, not 
simply fast catamaran production. The state government could afford to undertake 
this marketing strategy given the success that the TLSI cluster firms had enjoyed both 
individually, and as a network, during the growth phase. For example, by the end of 
the growth stage of the TLSI cluster's  development, each of the supplier firms had 
secured their own export sales independent of those associated with their alliance with 
Incat. Further to this, two additional TLSI cluster firms, Liferaft Systems and 
Richardson Devine, emerged within the industry and enjoyed immediate export 
success, largely due to their association with Incat and the innovative and valuable 
nature of their output. Two respondents, one a state Premier, the other a managing 
director of a cluster firm, noted that: 
I think it was partly due to !neat's expertise and international recognition, and partly 
because of the expertise that we had developing in training of skilled people and also 
the growing number of companies who were out there doing internationally 
competitive and technically innovative products and services. Richardson & Devine, 
I've talked about, Muir Engineering, they have been on the international market now 
and being very successfuL So, it was a logical bringing together of all of the 
expertise and skills that had been created over a period of probably 15 years - and 
they had reached a sort of critical mass, at a point where you really did have 
something to offer because they were companies that you could be confident in, had 
the expertise and there was a diverse range of maritime products and expertise that 
gave you a very marketable package (Tony Rundle. Personal Interview, 2002). 
For the first five years we only supplied Incat and Austral ships. We supplied both 
those yards and that was 100% of our work. Then we sold our equipment to a yard 
in Spain five years later that was in 1997 and then it just progressed from there. 
Word of mouth, us being a little bit more vocal and the government supporting our 
attendance at international trade conventions and the product itself created quite a lot 
of excitement in the marine industry, people heard about it very quickly. It was the 
first marine evacuation system that evacuated passengers directly from a ship to a 
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life raft, at the time it was the largest life raft ever built and the design of our slide 
was quite unique. So, that created a lot of excitement. We had customers who 
wanted to buy it, they could see the merits of the system, the weight, the size, the 
performance and word spread very quickly (Michael Granger. Personal Interview, 
2002). 
The second key role was to formalise the relationship between the region's entire set 
of shipbuilders and maritime manufacturers (' TLSI cluster firms or otherwise) and the 
state government. After the Prince of Wales Bay maritime park was established by 
the Tasmanian government, the private sector firms, along with the Aluminium 
Welding School, formed the Tasmanian Maritime Network (TMN) within which the 
TLSI cluster could better develop its communications and lobbying efforts. After the 
Bacon Labor government's industry audit program of 1998 was completed, the TMN 
was restructured to form an Industry Council that represented approximately 85 
percent of the region's shipbuilding and marine manufacturing firms. The industry 
council meetings were attended by the DSD, whose role was to provide a secretariat 
for the council, as well as provide a representative for the state government. The 
industry council meetings sought to provide the region's  shipbuilding industry with a 
direct communications channel between the entire set of firms that accepted the 
invitation to join, and between the state government and the industry as a whole. The 
industry council arrangement also helped to ensure that that the set of firms within the 
industry could better incorporate the success factors of the TLSI cluster into their 
operations, and therefore become involved in the process of further developing the 
regional industry's 'firm strategy structure and rivalry' to comply with world-best 
standards. 
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The third key role was the Tasmanian government's  strategy to dilute !neat's 
importance and impact within the regional economy. The policy was implemented 
through the attraction of additional innovative shipbuilding firms to the region 
(producing vessels unlike those of Incat) in the hope that the TLSI cluster's  supplier 
firms would have alternate sources of sales opportunities incremental to that of Incat. 
Premier Bacon indicated the rationale for this policy direction when he stated that: 
One of the big problems identified with the industry at that stage was that it was too 
reliant on Incat and that having one major company does not a healthy cluster make! 
You've got everybody relying on this one company . . .  we saw that as a weakness of 
the industry, that it was too reliant on one company. So, we assisted . . .  to establish 
North West Bay Ships, we have given them considerable assistance over the four years, 
the winches at Devine Marine, and both of those companies are prospering and 
growing rapidly and winning new orders . . .  (Jim Bacon. Personal Interview, 2002). 
The Tasmanian government was able to attract additional innovative hub-firms 
through marketing the region's  advanced infrastructure, support that was initially 
provided solely for the benefit of Incat. Where needed, the Tasmanian government 
also provided the option to undertake an equity arrangement with the new hub-firms, 
an arrangement that involved funding of the new firms' relocation and start-up costs, 
but did not involve the state government intervening in the innovative process of the 
firm. This policy initiative had a direct impact on the diamond factors enjoyed by the 
TLSI cluster (and indeed the entire industry) by effectively driving incremental 
demand from the international marketplace for region's maritime production. In 
addition, it allowed the TLSI cluster's  supplier firms to develop exponentially greater 
linkages within the industry, and more importantly, with firms of similar importance 
as the original hub-firm in terms of their innovative ability and supply requirements. 
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In order to fully address the first research question, a discussion of the antecedent 
factors leading to the inception and development if the TLSI cluster is required, given 
that these factors set the context within which the government was to base its policy 
initiatives during the introductory stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle. As noted in 
Chapter Two, Porter's  ICT provides the concept of historical dependence to explain 
why many observed industrial clusters exist in their particular locations. With regards 
to the TLSI cluster, its formation and dominance of the international marketplace for 
fast ferries may be somewhat attributed to the associated human capital that has 
developed in the island' s population. 
As noted in Chapter Four, the travel and trading needs of the isolated Tasmanian 
community necessitated the development of an advanced and innovative shipbuilding 
industry evidently capable of dominating the domestic market. This historical 
dependence resulted in the growth of the island population's human capital in terms 
of a competency in innovative shipbuilding and design. More specifically, the interest 
in shipbuilding and design within the state was shared amongst a rather close network 
of individuals that enjoyed a long association with the industry. As such, the 
development of the island population's innovative shipbuilding competencies (i.e. 
human capital) aligns closely with Coleman's ( 1988) concept of social capital, 
whereby a population invest in a closed social network through which they gain 
access to embedded resources and knowledge that serve to enhance the returns of 
their common activities. This is demonstrated by the latent shipbuilding 
competencies that remained within Tasmania's shipbuilding industry despite its 
decline to virtually nil export production during the 1970s. 
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As noted in Chapter Four, despite the observed failure of Australia's protectionist 
policies in the globalising environment of the 1970s and 1980s, after the 
consequences of the Tasman Bridge tragedy became apparent, Tasmania's 
shipbuilding industry managed to grow its exports sales from virtually nil in the 
1970s, to 40 percent of the global market for fast ferry transport. The implication of 
this contextual analysis suggests that chance events (here represented by the Tasman 
Bridge tragedy) may be viewed as 'economically relevant' given that the implications 
of its occurrence align closely with the human (and in this instance, social) capital that 
had developed within the region. 
9.2.2 Discussion of the results in relation to Research Question Two: 
How did the change in the importance of the TLSI cluster to the Tasmanian 
economy over time impact upon the Tasmanian government's policy development 
process? 
The second research question dealt with the manner in which the changing importance 
of the TLSI cluster affected its relationship with the state government, and 
importantly, the way it affected the state government's  policy development 
framework. As with the first research question, Research Question Two is best 
discussed in terms of the TLSI cluster's  industry life cycle. 
9.2.2.1 The introductory stage. 
During the introductory stage ofthe TLSI cluster's  life cycle, the private sector firms 
involved in the development of the world's  aluminium-hull design were operating in a 
highly protected and internationally uncompetitive industry. As such, the existing 
firms that were to eventually comprise the TLSI cluster possessed little lobbying 
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power with the state government in terms of demanding additional expensive 
infrastructure. Instead, Clifford's family business, and the friendship network within 
which it existed, remained solely responsible for the development of products 
commensurate with the prevailing domestic demand. Similarly, the Tasmanian 
government's  economic restructuring strategy (away from a reliance on 
industrialisation) meant that its policy focus and major resource allocations were 
focused on economic development issues, and not for the specific needs of particular 
industries. As such, during the majority of the TLSI cluster's  introductory stage, 
neither the private sector firms, nor the Tasmanian government, had a specific 
dependency on the other that necessitated the existence, or development, of a unique 
relationship. 
Towards the end of the TLSI cluster's  introductory stage, the success of !neat's 
innovative aluminium-based vessels on the domestic market resulted in the 
Tasmanian government providing incremental support to the hub-finn. The support 
was in the form of a loan guarantee for Incat, and was justified as an affordable 'risk' 
for the state government given that the support was consistent with !neat's 
employment potentiaL It was emphasised by the Tasmanian government at the time 
that the support given to Incat was focused on the issue of employment, and not due 
to the benefits now associated with industrial cluster development: 
I certainly didn't have any great vision as I have explained about the shipbuilding 
industry. It was, here is an opportunity, let's support it . . . .  I guess every time you 
supported a new industry you did think about, to be presented with claims about how 
much employment it was going to create, over which period it was going to create, 
and that obviously is a factor (Robin Gray. Personal Interview, 2002). 
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9.2.2.2 The growth stage. 
During the growth stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle, Incat was able to demonstrate 
that its aluminum-hull technology was relevant to the commercial needs of the 
national and international markets for fast ferries. Incat used this success, and the 
associated employment potential, to aggressively lobby the state government for the 
provision of its specialised and advanced infrastructure requirements. Using their 
employment and manufacturing potential as a lever in its negotiations with the state 
government, !neat's  management threatened to relocate its operations on six separate 
occasions during the TLSI cluster's  growth stage. In 1986, the company used the 
threat to relocate in order to lobby the state government to partially fund its upgrading 
of its Sullivan's Cove shipyard. In 1988, Incat used the threat once again to hasten 
their relocation to new and improved premises at the Prince of Wales bay marine 
park. In 1990, Incat publicly announced offers from interstate councils to relocate its 
manufacturing operations for additional state government funded training 
concessiOns. Again, in 1995, !neat's management used the press to lobby the state 
government for funding for further expansion of its manufacturing operations. In 
1996 and 1997, Incat threatened to move its operations overseas else the state 
government undertake steps to retain the shipbuilding bounty, a grant scheme worth 
approximately $35 million to the firm. Given the importance of the employment 
issue to the regional economy, !neat's management undertook a bargaining strategy to 
create a unique relationship with the state government that served to advance its 
infrastructure needs. 
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Interestingly, the state government also used !neat's relocation as a lever in the 
negotiation process, this time however, to justify to the state opposition and the public 
at large the expenditure of public funds on the expensive infrastructure requirements 
of the hub-firm. Even though the threat by Incat to relocate its operations away from 
the regional economy characterised their exchanges with the state government, the 
company maintained a close relationship with the local community and invested 
heavily in the regional economy throughout. Indeed, commenting on the repeated 
threats to relocate its manufacturing and employment, a number of Premiers noted 
that: 
I didn't ever see !neat's relocation as a serious threat. There was talk about it in the 
press, but certainly in private discussions I was satisfied that they would be 
remaining here for the long term (Ray Groom. Personal Interview, 2002). 
I always doubted strongly that he [Clifford] could have walked away from this 
facility, but he could have probably halved it and gone to another state to set up a 
facility because he was constantly being pursued by other state governments. But 
realistically, the infrastructure here was world-class and I doubt he would have had it 
better elsewhere (Tony Rundle. Personal Interview, 2002). 
During the growth stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle, therefore, the demonstrable 
success of the hub-firm in the international market enabled it to use the threat of 
relocation (communicated through the popular press) as a bargaining 'weapon' with 
the state government. Similarly, the state government was also able to use the same 
weapon as a 'double-edged' political lobbying tool to justify its expenditure on the 
expensive infrastructure to the state opposition, the federal government, and the 
Tasmanian tax-paying public. Interestingly, it appears that neither the hub-firm, nor 
the state government, realistically contemplated the firms' threat to relocate, but 
rather used the exchange as a somewhat rhetorical lobbying exercise. Indeed, during 
the period when Incat was to be placed into temporary receivership, its management 
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stated that one of the main reasons it was in financial difficulty was its continued 
employment of, and loyalty towards, its 'family of Tasmanian workers' during the 
world economic recession (The Mercury, 2002: 1). 
9. 2. 2. 3 The maturity stage. 
During the maturity stage of the TLSI cluster's  life cycle, the state government's 
policy priority remained that of employment within the industry, but shifted away 
from its singular focus on the growth requirements of lncat (as the industry cluster's  
hub-firm) to include the broader growth needs of the entire industry. The state 
government's  rationale for this shift centred on its strategy to protect the industry 
cluster from the perils associated with its growth being driven by the success of a 
single firm, especially given the volatility of the world economic environment at the 
time. In order to safeguard the employment generated in the industry's supplier firms, 
the state government undertook policy initiatives that aided the establishment of a 
number of additional hub-firms into the regional economy. 
As such, during the maturity stage of the industrial cluster's  life cycle, the state 
government's  responsibility to provide employment within the industry as a whole 
was asserted as its priority. Although !neat's  needs were not ignored by the state 
government, it undertook policies that secured the employment generated by its 
supplier firms, mainly by diversifying their customer base within the industry. The 
state government's  responsibility within the industry also necessitated its 
implementation of policies that enabled the industry to form an officially recognised 
coalition, whereby all of the private sector firms in the industry could benefit from the 
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synergistic relationship forged between the state government and the internationally 
competitive industrial cluster. 
9.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS OF THE THESIS. 
The implications for the role of state government in the development of a regional 
economy's industrial clusters are five-fold. The first implication surrounds the state 
government's  initial response to the potential formation of an industrial cluster. In the 
TLSI cluster case study, the research indicates that the state government's  initial 
support for any emergent entrepreneurial activity must be commensurate with its 
relevance to the region's natural advantages (and/or historical dependence) and the 
likelihood of their commercial success in export markets. The reverse holds that state 
government need to be aware that supporting entrepreneurial activity that does not 
closely align with the region' s natural advantages and store of social capital may be 
likely to relocate their activity as more cost effective opportunities arise. This 
conclusion is echoed by Premier Bacon: 
We have had some examples, back in the ' 80s, . . .  they called it "strategy" for God 
sake, it attracted a number of growth businesses for a while, . . .  and now most of 
them have moved to Fiji and elsewhere. It was totally unsustainable because the 
minute another government grants a greater subsidy, they packed up and left because 
there was no reason for them to be here other than the fact that the government had 
offered them so much money they would have been mad not to. It was totally 
unsustainable. So, we are very careful not to financially support activities which 
haven't got reasons, independent of the government's financial support, to profit in 
business here (Jim Bacon. Personal Interview, 2002). 
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The second implication surrounds the importance of the state government's  role 
within Porter's Diamond Factor Model. The research indicates that the government 
of a regional Australian economy needs to position itself as an endogenous variable 
within Porter's  ( 1990) Diamond Factor Model. That is, the government of a regional 
Australian economy cannot positively and effectively influence economic growth as 
an exogenous variable as assumed in the Porter's  original theory. Instead, the 
government of a regional Australian economy has a significant role to play in its 
development (given its relative size to the region's gross domestic product), and the 
Diamond Factor model requires some alteration to reflect this central role (see Figure 
9.2). As a number of Premiers noted of the government's role in a regional economy: 
A government in a state like Tasmania just must be pro-active in this area of helping 
companies. I think the government has got to get in there and help it. Obviously 
there is more that we can do about that - but if our economy is to really develop, the 
state government must play a central role. I don't think any government yet has 
found all the answers and we will probably have to redefine the wheel or something 
like that rather than find the answer. That might make a difference but government 
can't afford to step back, got to step forward, be more involved, more aggressive in 
the area of industrial development (Ray Groom. Personal Interview, 2002). 
I think the government in regional economies, particularly in a small regional 
economy like Tasmania, inevitably has a bigger role to play than one in larger 
economy. The larger economies have just gone critical mass, pretty much under 
their own steam and it is really an option of choice for government, how much 
government gets involved. A regional economy is different because of things, the 
government has a key role in bringing people together, providing leadership, not in 
how to run enterprises but to provide leadership in terms of the direction that we go, 
the things we concentrate on (Jim Bacon. Personal Interview, 2002). 
Despite the intrusive role required by the government in the regional economy, it is 
important to note that at no stage did the state government seek to influence the 
innovative nature of the industry, which was always left in the hands of the private 
sector and its entrepreneurs. 
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Similarly, the incorporation of chance events into a government's  industrial cluster 
policy framework is also reasonable. In Porter's  original ICT, chance events, 
alongside the role of government, are viewed as exogenous variables that may impact 
on an economy's diamond factors from time to time. Given the findings of this 
research, chance events that align closely with the human and social capital generated 
within an economy may be viewed as 'economically relevant', and therefore, play a 
boundary setting role within which internationally competitive industrial clusters may 
be effectively developed by the government's  interaction with the diamond factors. 
This notion will be further discussed in section 9.4 with the introduction of a 
plausible Diamond Factor Model for a regional Australian economy. 
The third implication is that the role of the government in a regional Australian 
economy is necessarily variable over the life cycle of the industry cluster, and as a 
result it needs to have the capability to identifY and monitor the set of natural 
industries that exist within the region, and their stage of development. It is also 
important for the government to avoid the adoption of a 'one size fits all' policy 
regime for its set of industrial clusters, as each will have its own requirements given 
their own particular stage of development. Central to this point is the need for 
government to be able to recognise the existing and potential synergies that exist 
within the industry cluster, and therefore be better able to aid the optimisation of this 
idiosyncratic relationship, however at all times aware not to artificially create the 
synergy within the industry cluster. 
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The fourth implication of this research is that government must provide the required 
infrastructural needs of the developing industrial cluster, however, the manner of its 
provision is clearly demonstrated by the Tasmanian government in this case. Firstly, 
the needs of the industrial cluster were never pre-empted by the government. Instead, 
the government awaited a claim from the private sector firms, with demonstrable 
evidence that without its provision, growth and employment within the industry 
cluster would decline. 
The fifth implication is the need for the government to actively dilute the importance 
of the original hub-firm to the regional economy as the sophistication of its supplier 
firms similarly advances. It is necessary to safeguard the hub-firm's suppliers (and 
indeed the region's entire set of industry members) against reliance upon one major 
entity for their sales growth. Possible methods to achieve this end include the 
introduction of new hub-firms to the region such that they can benefit from the 
advanced diamond factors that exist there (creating a set of hub-firms for the supplier 
firms to interact with), and to apply a positive influence upon these firms to take steps 
in securing their own discrete export sales. 
9.4 A PROPOSED MODEL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIAL 
CLUSTERS IN REGIONAL AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIES. 
This section provides a concluding discussion of the thesis results, and introduces an 
alternative Diamond Factor Model for the Australian context. As noted in Chapter 
Two, Porter's ICT is based upon the observed interaction between four key diamond 
factors, and the exogenous variables of chance events and the role of government. In 
order to explain the types of industry clusters that were found to dominate particular 
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regions were the additional influences of historical dependence (forming part of the 
demand factors within the Diamond) and the stage of economic development enjoyed 
by the nation. Figure 9 .1  depicts the original model proposed by Porter (1990) in his 
book The Competitive Advantage of Nations. 
Figure 9.1: Porter's (1990) original Diamond Factor Model. 
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Adapted from Porter's (1990) The Competitive Advantage of Nations. 
Also noted in Chapter Two, however, was the observed inadequacy of Porter' s  ICT to 
provide a framework for the development of industrial clusters for the purpose of 
economic development. Of greatest concern in the literature was the propensity for 
western governments to incorporate Porter's  ICT in their economic policy 
development despite this apparent weakness. The observed policy failure in 
Australian efforts to develop industrial clusters indicated that a descriptive role for the 
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government in Porter's  ICT remained largely undefined, and provided the rational for 
this thesis. 
The findings of this thesis indicate that the role of government in a regional Australian 
economy is far more significant than the exogenous one theorised by Porter (1990). 
Indeed, an analysis of the TLSI cluster's  development indicates that the role of an 
Australian government is endogenous, and arguably central, to the machinations of a 
Diamond Factor Model for a regional Australian economy. As such, for the purposes 
of providing a role for an Australian government in a regional economy, the variable 
cannot be considered exogenous to the diamond factors associated with Porter's  ICT. 
Rather, the role of government must be considered fully integrated within the original 
diamond factors, indicating that it is directly involved in their development, and 
indeed very generation over time. 
The findings of this research also indicate that theorising the role of chance events 
within a regional economic model also requires some attention. Under Porter's  
original Diamond Factor Model, chance events are similarly considered exogenous to 
the diamond factor's interaction, and the role that the government has to play in the 
development of industrial clusters. This thesis indicates that the role of the 
government may be directly influenced by those chance events that serve to amplifY 
the commercial importance of regional economy's diamond factors. As such, the 
adapted model for a regional Australian economy includes an integrative link between 
the original diamond factors, and the occurrence of chance events that serve to 
amplifY their commercial value in the international market. It similarly indicates that 
chance events that do not coincide with the 'natural advantages' or the advanced 
249 
social capital developed within the region should be viewed with some caution by the 
region' s policy makers. The research also indicates that the adapted model must 
consider the region's  store of social capital as an important variable in the 
development of internationally competitive industrial clusters. Unlike the economy's 
factor conditions, which refer largely to physical assets, the region's store of social 
capital refers to the latent or tacit knowledge possessed by an economy's labour 
market, their cultural understanding (based upon the region's  historical dependencies) 
and their belief that efforts to leverage this knowledge and understanding in the 
marketplace will lead to commercial success. 
Figure 9.2 (over page) illustrates a plausible model for industrial cluster development 
in a regional Australian economy. In line with the research findings, the role of 
government is altered from an exogenous variable to one that is central, and 
necessarily intrusive in the regional economic development process. As demonstrated 
in the analysis chapters, the key to an effective government role centres on the timing 
of its policy initiatives and the changing life cycle needs of the industry cluster. 
Similarly, 'chance events' are incorporated into the adapted model, and although they 
are represented here as an important variable, their occurrence is not considered 
essential to the development of internationally competitive industrial clusters. 
Instead, chance events are characterised as occurrences that serve to initiate industrial 
clustering activities. The region' s store of social capital is also incorporated into the 
adapted model. Although it may lie dormant for some considerable length of time, 
the variable represents the set of intangible economic assets possessed by a region's  
labour market, which may also serve as a basis for the formation of the regional 
economy's internationally competitive industrial clusters. 
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Figure 9.2: Porter's Diamond Factor Model adapted for a regional Australian 
economy. 
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9.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH. 
The findings of this inquiry need to be assessed in relation to the limitations of the 
chosen methodology. This research was conducted as an embedded single case study, 
utilising historical secondary data to construct the development of the TLSI cluster, 
and primary interview data to analyse the role of the Tasmanian state government 
therein. There are problems and limitations with both of these approaches that require 
some discussion. The historical data gathering process, for example, may be 
characterised by contextual misinterpretation of the critical events of the period, 
especially where the researcher is unable to directly ascertain the motivations of the 
actors involved (Andrew, 1985; Breisach, 1994; King, 1983). The use of semi-
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structured interviews also posed methodological difficulties, as they may be time 
consuming, and therefore, reduces the respondent's  willingness to participate (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 1994). In addition, the validity of the interview process may be affected 
by poor interviewer recall and interviewer bias. 
These methodological limitations were dealt with in this research as follows. The 
historical data gathering process was employed solely to create a time line of events 
upon which the semi-structured interview questions were framed. As such, the 
historical data gathering process sought to provide an accurate reflection of the critical 
incidents that occurred throughout the TLSI cluster's  developmental history. The 
motivations of the actors involved in the critical incidents surrounding the TLSI 
cluster's  development were then sought through the semi-structured interview 
technique described in Chapter Three. Consistent with the recommendations of 
Andrew (1985) and Breisach (1994), this research method provided each participant 
the opportunity to comment upon the specific incidents relevant to their involvement, 
to discuss the motivational forces that culminated in their actions, and to provide 
additional contextual information pertaining to the incident otherwise unavailable to 
the researcher. 
With respect to the limitations inherent in the use of semi-structured interviews, the 
following steps were taken. Access to the participants was organised some two 
months in advance of the interview process. Each participant was sent a copy of the 
interview questionnaire in advance of the meeting, allowing the participant to review 
his or her documentation of the events and therefore better inform their response. 
The response to this method of recruitment was the granting of access to 23 key 
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individuals involved in the formation and development of the TLSI cluster. As noted 
in Chapter Three, four of these were current heads of Tasmanian government 
departments (including the TLSI cluster's  training entity); five were ex-state premiers 
spanning the TLSI cluster's  history (1977-1998); one was the current state premier 
(1998 - present); three were senior bureaucrats that had served the state parliament 
from 1977-1998; one was an incumbent federal Member of Parliament for Tasmania 
that has served since 1977; and finally, the nine founding managers of the TLSI 
cluster firms (all of whom were managing their organisation in 2002). With regard 
to the problem of poor interview recall, the use of a tape recorder and subsequent 
transcriptions provided an accurate record for later analysis. The issues surrounding 
the problem of interviewer bias were also reduced with the use of a semi-structured 
inteview schedule. 
With regard to the generalisability of the research, the use of an embedded single case 
study method suggests that the implications of the research must be considered 
somewhat specific to the role of government in the development of a 'hub and spoke' 
industrial cluster in a regional Australian economy. As noted in Chapter Two, a 
number of different industrial cluster typologies have been found to exist, each with 
their own particular nuances and developmental requirements; generalising the 
findings of this thesis onto differing industrial cluster typologies, therefore, may be 
problematic. It is a recommendation of this thesis that additional research be 
undertaken into the developmental requirements of different industrial cluster 
typologies within Australia, and the government's  role therein. 
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9.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. 
The broad aim of this thesis was to analyse the development of the TLSI cluster since 
its inception in 1977, and distil the positive roles that an Australian state government 
had therein. The results and insights provided by this research are of value for three 
main reasons. Firstly, the results of this research have gone some way in developing 
the role that government has to play in its implementation of Porter's  ICT notion of 
economic development. Ellis & Pecotich (2002), Rajneesh ( 1993), and Yetton et al, 
(2002) have argued that the theory' s  major weakness is its backward looking focus, 
and its resultant inability to provide a framework upon which government can 
develop its future-oriented industrial cluster policy platform. 
Secondly, this research has provided a reworking of Porter's  (1990) Diamond Factor 
Model of national competitive advantage such that it better reflects the realities of the 
government role in developing ICs in a regional Australian economy. Yettin, Craig, 
Davis & Hilmer (1992) and Yla-Anttila (1994) have commented that another of the 
original theory's  weaknesses has been its assumption that all developed economies 
around the globe mirror the conditions and government involvement experienced in 
the home country of its author, the United States of America. As noted however, this 
condition is rarely met, and as a result the assumptions of Porter's  ICT rarely reflects 
the reality of regional economies. The reworking of the model also includes the 
repositioning of the role of chance events, such that it no longer remains an 
exogenous factor to the development of a location's competitive advantage. This 
research has, to some extent, indicated that chance events, and their relationship to the 
regional economy's store of social capital, forms the boundary within which the 
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government can interact with the diamond factors to facilitate the development of 
internationally competitive ICs. 
Thirdly, this research has undertaken an analysis of the manner in which the industrial 
cluster's  importance to the regional economy effects the manner in which the 
government develops its policy responses over time, and the manner in which the IC 
firms (and particularly Incat) simultaneously conducts its lobbying efforts towards 
government. Until recently, the role of the clustered entities and the government have 
been assumed to be separate functions within Porter's  ICT. This research indicates 
that the role of the government, and the manner in which the clustered firms interact 
with the government are not mutually exclusive, but rather a complex 
interrelationship that serves to benefit both parties, and indirectly, the regional 
economy as a whole. 
Overall, this research has shown that governments in regional economies are able to 
use the tenets of Porter's  ICT as a framework for developing internationally 
competitive industrial clusters, albeit in a modified form. The challenge from this 
point onwards, is the continued modification ofthe government's role in Porter's  ICT 
for the number of different industrial cluster typologies that exist, and the manner in 
which both the industrial cluster entities, and regional government, can best integrate 
their particular operations in the continued development of the region's  competitive 
advantage. 
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APPENDIX A: CASE STUDY PROTOCOL. 
1. PROPOSED TITLE OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT. 
Industrial Cluster Development: The Role of Government in a Regional Australian 
Economy. 
2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES. 
1) To generate an historical time line of events and critical incidents relating to the 
formation and development of the Tasmanian Light Shipbuilding Industry cluster (the 
TLSI cluster) . 
2) To detennine the key government officials (both elected and bureaucratic) that 
undertook activities critical to the development of the TLSI cluster in the regional 
Tasmanian economy. 
3 )  To determine the role that regional governments can play in the development of 
internationally competitive industrial clusters over the stages of its life cycle. 
3. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PHENOMENA OF INTEREST. 
The current theory concerning industrial cluster development does not prescribe the 
role that Australian government needs to play in their formation. This is especially 
interesting given the prominent role that the government is given in the current 
industrial clustering theory (i.e. Porter's 1 990 ICT). An opportunity exists to better 
define the government' s  role in developing internationally competitive industrial 
clusters (whilst concurrently avoiding the implementation of protectionist policies). 
The research is perhaps even more significant given Australia's poor experience at 
developing internationally competitive industrial clusters over the past decade. 
4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS. 
In order to achieve the research objectives set in this thesis, the following research 
questions will be posed by the researcher. 
Research Q uestion 1 :  What role did the Tasmanian Government play in the 
development of the TLSI cluster since its inceptio11 in 1977? 
Research Question 2: How did the change in the importance of the TLSI cluster to 
the Tasmania11 economy over time impact upon the Tasmanian government 's policy 
development process ? 
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In order to allow the researcher to answer these research questions, a series of ' semi 
structmed' interview questiOnnaires will be devised for the participants. The series of 
interview questionnarres will be similar in that they will ask the same generic sets of 
questions dealing with the nature of the participant's involvement with the TLSI 
cluster' s development over time. However, the interview questionnaires will be 
specific in that there will be an emphasis on the critical incidents particular to their 
involvement. Broadly, there are two main areas of inquiry: 
1 .  General information concerning the key government officials that have 
interacted with the TLSI cluster in terms of facilitating its development; and, 
2. Spec1fic questions related to the rationale of the policy choices (or other 
activities) undertaken by the key government officials in terms of facilitating 
the development of the TLSI duster. 
Copies of the interview questimmaires are attached. 
5. SELECTION OF THE RESEARCH RESPONDENTS. 
The identification of the government heads to approach will be ascertained through 
secondary data analysis of newspaper, television, and government reports of the 
critical historical incidents surrounding the firms currently forming the Tasmanian 
Light Ship Cluster. In addition, exploratory research will be undertaken in the form 
of interviews with tlle TLSI cluster entities in order to confirm the importance of the 
list generated from the secondary data analysis, and to identify other government 
officials with whom they have had significant dealings. 
6. RECRUITMENT OF THE RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS. 
Each of the interviewees (including the TLSI cluster entities) will be initially 
approached by telephone, where the purpose of the research was made clear to them 
(i.e. the government's role in developing the TLSI duster). At the end of the 
telephone conversation (a preamble is attached), the participant will be asked whether 
they would agree to take part in the research project. Upon their agreement, the 
participant will be informed that the telephone conversation would be confinned by 
mail, and that a 'consent' and ' information' form would be sent to them detailing the 
project and the nature of their direct involvement. The 'consent' form will clearly 
state the time and location of the interview (as would have been dete1mined as part of 
the initial phone call); the ' information' sheet will provide the participant with the 
specific questions to be asked of them, as well as the specific ' critical incidents' to be 
commented upon. The participants will be infonned that the interview is  to be 
recorded onto audiotape, and that these tapes are to be held in secure storage for a 
period of five years. 
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7. DATA COLLECTION AND MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES. 
Both past and present heads of federal government departments and agencies are to be 
approached to ascertain their [department's ]  role in developing the TLSI Cluster 
between 1 977-2002. The respondents will be asked to comment, where possible, on 
their involvement in developing and facilitating the TLSI cluster, as well as provide a 
rationale for their department's  actions at critical junctures in time (i .e. historical 
incidents as identified by secondary data analysis). The informants will not be asked 
to comment on the actions of others during the interview process, only their own 
particular involvement and perspective. This infonnation will be gathered through the 
use of semi-structured face-to-face interviews, recorded onto audiotape. An example 
of such an interview questionnaire is attached. 
Upon meeting the respondent, the investigator will request the consent form prior to 
the commencement of the interview process, and ask whether the respondent is happy 
to answer the research questions posed. Where possible, the interviews will be 
conducted at the participants' workplaces. Where this is not possible, arrangements 
will be made to locate the interview in a time and place convenient to the respondent. 
Further permission will be requested to audiotape the interview to ensure that the 
respondent is at ease with the recording process. It will also be made clear how the 
information they provide will be stored, and that any papers generated from the 
research would be sent to them for prior approval before publication. 
8. DATA ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE. 
The data gathered during the interview process will be imported into the NUD*IST 
(version six) software program, where concepts pertinent to the research questions 
(and their interrelationships) will be coded for further analysis. The coding of the 
interview data will facilitate the researcher in distilling the important actions and 
policy rationales were undertaken by the key actors, and assist in the integration of 
said actions and policy rationales into the historical context within which they were 
made. 
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APPENDIX B :  Interview Questionnaire Sheet for managers of the TLSI Cluster 
Firms. 
1 .  Can you tell me a little about the history of your company? When was it 
established? What were its origins? What does it attempt to achieve? 
2. What were the main reasons for choosing Tasmania as a location for your 
business? 
3 .  D o  you believe that the state govemment has had much influence conceming the 
expansion and intemational success of the Tasmanian Shipbuilding Industry? 
4.  Which state govemment representatives have you had significant dealings with 
over the history of your company? How? 
5 .  Which Federal govemment representatives have you had significant dealings with 
over the history of your company? How? 
6. Which local govenunent representatives have you had significant dealings with 
over the history of your company? How? 
7. Have you experienced any govenunent action that has greatly b enefited your 
company? 
8 .  Have you experienced issues that have been detrimental to your business 
operations? 
9. Are you a member of a peak body organisation? Which one? Are they effective at 
negotiating with the govemment? 
1 0 .  Do you tend to deal with govenunent on a regular consultative basis? 
1 1 .  Does the govenunent tend to approach your company on a consultative basis? 
1 2 .  What in your opinion is the role of the state govemment have in facilitating 
business growth in Tasmania? 
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APPENDIX B: I n terview Questionnaire Sheet for State Premiers 
l .  How did your government perceive Tasmania's shipbuilding industry when you 
came to power in rNSERT YEAR HERE? Did you consider it a single business 
industry? Did you consider it a network of fi1ms? 
2 .  In what ways did your government directly assist the development and growth of 
the Tasmanian Shipbuilding Industry (policy initiatives/agencies)? What 
influenced this choice (i.e. Federal policy, politics)? 
3 .  I n  what ways did your government indirectly assist the development and growth 
of the Tasmanian Shipbuilding Industry (policy initiatives/agencies)? What 
influenced this choice (i.e. Federal policy, politics)? 
4. When implementing your govemment' s  policies, were you thinking 
' cluster/network development' or 'finn development'? 
5. On what basis did your govemment form its policy base for cluster/network 
development (Literature, consultants, case study, world best practices)? 
6. Did your goverrunent consider other Tasmanian industries or sectors when 
developing your Shipbuilding Industry policies (education implications etc)? 
7.  What was your government's role in terms of lobbying the Federal Government 
on the Tasmanian industry' s  behalf? 
8. What time frame did you have in mind when developing your government' s 
policies regarding the Tasmanian Shipbuilding industry? 
Specific Circumstances FOR THIS PREMIER 
LIST HERE THE MAJOR POLICY INITIATIVES OF THIS PREMIER'S 
GOVERNMENT. WHAT WAS THE DEVELOPMENTAL STRATEGY O F  
THESE POLICIES FOR THE TASMANIAN SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY? 
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APPENDIX B: Interview Questionnaire Sheet for Heads o f  Government 
Departments. 
Please find below the list of questions to be asked during our interview session on 
INSERT DATE AND TIME AND LOCATION HERE. 
1 .  Can you tell me about the role and function o f  the GOVERNMENT AGENCY 
OR DEPARTMENT NAME HERE? 
2.  Does the GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT NAME HERE have 
linkages with other govenm1ent departments? Why? 
3.  Does the GOVERNMENT AGENCY O R  DEPARTMENT NAME HERE have 
linkages with the federal government? Why? 
4. Does the GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT NAME HERE have 
linkages with the private-sector shipbuilding industry network? Why? 
5 .  Does the GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT NAME HERE have 
linkages with a peak marine body in Tasmania? Why? 
6.  Did your department have any input into the state govemment's Industry Audits in 
1 998? Or the Industry Development Plans of the 1990s? 
7. How has the GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT NAME HERE 
helped the relationship between the government and the private sector 
shipbuilding industry? 
8. Could you p lease comment on the following characteristics of your department? 
LIST HERE THE SUB-DEPARTMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OR 
AGENCY - ASK WHETHER THESE HAVE HAD INPUT INTO THE 
TASMAN IAN SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY. 
1 0. Could you please comment on the following GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR 
DEPARTMENT NAME HERE initiative? 
LIST HERE THE INITIATIVES SPECIFIC TO THE TASMANIAN 
SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY UNDERTAKEN BY THE GOVER NMENT 
DEPARTMENT 
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The QSR Nun�� 1ST Coding Index Tree. 
I UTAS 
279 
APPENDIX C: The QSR NUD*IST Coding Index> Tree 
(1) What is Government? 
(1 1) Government Agencies 
(1 1 1 ) D.S.D 
(1 1 2)  Workplace Standards 
(1 2) Parliamentarians 
(1 3) Federal Government 
(1 3 1 )  ABS 
(1 3 2) CSIRO 
(1 3 3) Maritime Safety Authority 
(1 3 4) Australian Defence Force 
(1 3 5) National Training Authority 
( 1 3 6) Oz Industry 
(1 3 7) DFAT 
(1 3 8) National Industry Extension Service 
(1 3 9) Austrade 
(2) Role of Government 
(2 1 )  Job Creation 
(2 2) Economic Refonn 
(2 2 1)  Consultants 
(2 2 1 1 )  Inside System 
(2 2 1 2) Outside System 
(2 3) Industry Facilitation 
(2 3 1) Promote Industry/Intra-govt Links 
(2 3 2) State Reputation 
(2 3 3) Providing Infrastructure 
(2 3 4) Industrial Equity 
(2 3 5) Natural Industry Development 
(2 4) Bankroll Projects 
(2 5) Cluster Policies? 
(2 5 1) Opportw1ism 
(2 5 2) Inadvertent Policy Direction 
(2 5 3) Industry Support and Facilitation 
(2 6) Lobbying Canberra 
(3) The Role of Chance 
(3 1) Tasman Bridge Disaster 
( 4) Clustering in a Regional Economy 
( 4 1)  Tasmanian Maritime College 
(4 2) Peak Bodies 
(4 3)  TAFE 
(4 4) Tasmanian Maritime Network 
(4 5) Entrepreneurial Ability 
( 4 6) Support for In cat 
( 4 7) Social Ties 
(5) Facts and Figures 
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(6) Policy Implications 
( 6 1 )  Industry .Audits 
(6 2) Federal Economic Management 
(� 3) Overcome Fear of Failure 
(6 4) Industty Life Cycle Analysis 
(6 5) Arm's Length Policy Development 
( 6 6) Suppo1i Entrepreneurs 
( 6 7) Reputation Management 
(6 8) Peak Body Establishment 
( 6 9) Flexible policy creation 
(6 10) Getting Tas closer to M<u=J.�t!! 
(7) Industry Demise? 
(7 1 )  Lack ofTrust 
(7 2) Collapse of World Market for I!lGat 
(7 3) Lack of Diversification by Incat 
(8) Porter's Diamond Factors 
(8 1 )  Demand Conditions 
(8 2) Factor Conditions 
(8 3) Related and Supporting Industrv 
(8 4) Firm Strategy/Structure 
(9) Regional Economic Issues 
( 9  1) DeC€Ilttalised Population 
(9 2) Low Tax B ased Revenues 
(9 3) Far from World Markets 
(9 4) Federally Dependent for Gr:au.ts 
(9 5) Lack ofExpe1iise 
(9 6) Intrusive Govt Role Required 
(9 7) Federal Policies for Regions 
(9 8) Branch Office Businesses 
(9 9) Lack afFirm Numbers 
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Pages 282- 290 of thesis are published as: 
Wickham, MD and Hanson, DJ, Industrial clustering in regional Australia: The role of chance, 
entrepreneurs and government in the Tasmanian Light Ships Industry, Proceedings of 16th 
ANZAM Australian and New Zealand Academy of Management Conference, 4-7 December 
2002, Beechworth, Victoria, pp. online. ISBN 0-9750166-0-1 (2002)  
 
Pages 291-306 of thesis are published as the following chapter: 
Wickham, MD and Hanson, DJ, Incat Tasmania's race for international success: Blue-riband 
strategies, Strategic Management Competitiveness and Globalisation [2nd Edition], Nelson 
Australia Pty Limited, Robyn Flemming (ed), South Bank, Victoria, pp. 89-94. ISBN 0 17 
011908 4 (2005)  
 
